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As a science and practice dedicated to preventing, stopping, and 
reversing negative effects on nature, conservation is constantly faced 
with new challenges. Combine this fact with the rise of large, freely 
available datasets and computational power, and the result is a need to 
advance the methods and conceptual approach to conservation planning. 
In my dissertation I present novel methods and address research 
questions that aim to keep conservation science and practice relevant 
and effective in a changing world. This picture of continual change is 
illustrated in Chapter 1, in which I explore how the ongoing collection of 
observations of rare species changes spatial conservation priorities. I find 
that even after a century of data collection, new records do and will 
continue to significantly affect spatial priorities. I then moved to consider 
a new threat: the environmental impacts from shale gas surface 
infrastructure. I focus on how those environmental impacts may be 
partially abated by changing the locations of infrastructure. In Chapter 2 
I assess the relative performance of simple guidelines for placing well 
pads, access roads, and gathering pipelines for shale gas development. I 
find that while targeted guidelines can be effective, none are universally 
so. In Chapter 3, I examine the site-level tradeoffs between reducing 
environmental impacts and increased construction costs for shale gas 
surface infrastructure. I find notable heterogeneity among sites in both 
the degree to which impacts can be reduced and the relative cost of doing 
so. Finally in Chapter 4, I evaluate the cost effectiveness of different 
regulations for reducing aggregate impacts from surface infrastructure 
across sites and find large gains from trade when implementing a cap 
and trade system. Overall, my dissertation facilitates a transition of 
knowledge for conservation planning to be able to better adapt to and 
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Background and Motivation 
The world is changing. Change is not new, but the nature of this change 
is. Some aspects of this change include new threats to conservation 
priorities, an increasingly global scope for problems and decisions, the 
integration of conservation practice and human development (Sutherland 
et al. 2009; Rands et al. 2010), the increasing availability of large 
datasets (Hampton et al. 2013), and increasing computational power. 
These changes point to a need for conservation planning as a science and 
practice to keep pace by updating.  
 Conservation resources are limited relative to biodiversity needs 
(Waldron et al. 2013), which increases the need for new science to inform 
conservation practice now, not in decades when it may be too late. 
Sunderland et al. (2009) argue that the well-accepted gap between 
conservation science and practice can be partially ameliorated by 
increasing the accessibility and relevance of science to practitioners. One 
way this has been done in the past decades has been to incorporate 
limited budgets into conservation planning (e.g a few from the past year: 
Bode et al. 2015; Lentini & Wintle 2015; Boyd, Epanchin-Niell & 
Siikamäki 2015). However, conservation can only benefit by further 
increasing our commitment to immediately applicable science. Further, it 
is increasingly recognized that in order to be relevant, science needs to 
reflect the realities of conservation practice (Salafsky et al. 2002). This 
means designing science that matches the scales, process, data, and 
assumptions of conservation practitioners, sometimes at a cost of 
theoretically optimal outcomes. 
 Increasingly common are the availability and use of large datasets 
for science and practice (Hampton et al. 2013), the format and methods 
of use of which are important. For instance, the use of range maps or 
species distribution models may lead to different planning decisions from 
the direct use of presence only point occurrence data (Wilson et al. 2005; 
Rondinini et al. 2006). In conservation practice it is common to use point 
occurrences in isolation or with modeled distributions. Similarly, the 
choice of planning method may significantly affect decisions (Rondinini et 
al. 2006; Lentini & Wintle 2015). 
 We have an increasing need and ability to make decisions at larger 
spatial and temporal scales. However, larger scale conservation planning 
does not obviate the need to think about smaller scales at high 
resolutions. The focus of studies at different scales should be 
proportional to the needs of decision makers operating at those scales. 
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 One aspect of the changing world to be addressed is how the 
ongoing collection of biodiversity data is influencing spatial conservation 
priorities.  Spatial prioritization is prominent in the science (Brooks et al. 
2006; Pressey et al. 2007; Watson et al. 2011; Coll et al. 2012; Rainho & 
Palmeirim 2013) and practice (Redford et al. 2003; Didier et al. 2009; 
Henson et al. 2009; Groves et al. 2012) of conservation. This is due to the 
long history of spatial conservation planning methods (Diamond 1975; 
Margules & Pressey 2000; Watson et al. 2011), to the recognition that 
conservation funding is limited (Ando 1998; Myers et al. 2000; Bottrill et 
al. 2008) and to the spatial nature of many conservation decisions 
(Pressey et al. 2007). Although several studies exist that look at the 
influence of data characteristics on spatial conservation priorities 
(Freitag & van Jaarsveld 1998; Polasky & Solow 2001; Gladstone & Davis 
2003; Gaston & Rodrigues 2003; Grantham et al. 2008; De Ornellas, 
Milner-Gulland & Nicholson 2011), they tend to use snapshots in time or 
focus on data weaknesses rather than on the actual use of those 
datasets over long time periods. Doing this allows authors to cover a 
range of data collection scenarios in order to generalize across many 
situations that might be encountered. Equally, however, an argument 
can be made for the analysis of longer-term datasets that maintain the 
autocorrelated structure of the data over time and reflect how datasets 
would be used in practice. 
 Another aspect of the changing world is the integration of 
conservation and development. This change to both activities has some 
advantages. Development will continue in places of high conservation 
value, so it is in the interest of conservation stakeholders to work with 
developers. Also, since conservation is partially anthropocentric, it makes 
sense to integrate land use decisions to incorporate multiple competing 
objectives, since only by simultaneous planning can tradeoffs be 
minimized (Naidoo et al. 2008). 
 One especially noteworthy example of a context that can benefit 
from the integration of conservation and development is shale gas in 
Appalachia. Shale gas development has been an increasing source of 
environmental and human health concerns in recent years. In the United 
States, shale gas production has increased steadily over the past decades 
and now makes up ~40% of gas production (Annual Energy Outlook 2014 
2014). Concerns have been raised about the environmental (Gillen & 
Kiviat 2012; Kiviat 2013; Olmstead et al. 2013; Jones et al. 2014) and 
human health (Perry 2012) effects of shale energy production, leading to 
careful consideration of how to protect society and nature from those 
effects (Howarth, Ingraffea & Engelder 2011; Hays et al. 2015) and at 
times outright bans on development. 
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 Terrestrial impacts resulting from the spatial locations of gas 
surface infrastructure are an understudied and important issue. Impacts 
occur at all stages of the development process, from pre-production 
through post-production (Burton et al. 2014). Here I focus exclusively on 
pre-production activities and specifically the construction of well pads, 
access roads, and gathering pipelines, the impacts of which may play out 
at different rates and spatial extents. The magnitudes and types of 
impacts change from stage to stage, but it is clear that site construction 
incurs the most direct and thus quantifiable land use changes. Below, I 
describe some of the impacts resulting from shale gas surface 
infrastructure. 
 In much of the dissertation, I examine how development for shale 
gas, a new kind of threat to species and habitats, can be reconfigured to 
reduce its potential environmental impacts while still allowing 
development to proceed. In doing so, my research builds on a rich history 
of conservation biology that focuses on mitigating and moderating 
threats from particular industries. For example, my research is 
thematically similar to past work on bycatch reduction measures in 
fisheries (Crowder & Murawski 1998), especially with regards to the 
protection of loggerhead sea turtle populations (Crouse, Crowder & 
Caswell 1987; Crowder et al. 1994; Lewison, Freeman & Crowder 2004), 
sea birds, and marine mammals (Cox et al. 2007). Another prominent 
theme in the fisheries literature comes from observations of the 
destruction of seafloors by trawling gear spurred further studies (Graham 
1955; Caddy 1973; Wenner 1983; Jones 1992). Examples exist from 
other sectors as well. In agriculture, for instance, past studies have 
focused on understanding the effects of different practices on bird 
diversity with an eye on how to improve diversity around cropland 
(Owens & Myres 1973; Best 1983). In forestry, some research has been 
concerned with how to best measure the biodiversity outcomes of 
different forest management practices (Lindenmayer, Margules & Botkin 
2000; Lindenmayer, Franklin & Fischer 2006), whether altered or 
managed forests can provide sufficient biodiversity benefits (Hansen et al. 
1991), and the ecological effects of different harvesting patterns (Franklin 
& Forman 1987). 
The Appalachian mountains are highly diverse in species (Stein, 
Kutner & Adams 2000), many of which are endemic to the region and/or 
sensitive to changes in the environment. As such, the negative 
environmental effects of gas infrastructure development are likely to 
impact many species and their habitats. Perhaps the most immediate 
and clear expected impact from gas development is the displacement of 
rare and vulnerable species. Gas development is occurring in fairly 
pristine forests (Drohan et al. 2012) and other important habitats, 
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meaning that there is a high chance that infrastructure will destroy the 
sensitive habitats or individuals directly in its path. 
At the landscape scale, gas infrastructure disrupts forests, 
wetlands, and other habitats. Habitat fragmentation is well studied in 
ecology and conservation (Margules, Milkovits & Smith 1994; Ranta et al. 
1998; Didham et al. 1998; Davies, Margules & Lawrence 2000; Jaeger 
2000; Fahrig 2003). The major fragmenting effects of gas infrastructure 
act through reduction of core habitat, creation of edges, and reduction of 
connectivity. Well pads and their associated infrastructure are regularly 
spaced on the landscape, but with little distance between them. This 
spatial pattern maximally fragments the landscape by creating many 
long edges in core forests and other core habitats (Drohan et al. 2012).  
Edges change the light, humidity, wind, sound, temperature, and 
other factors at the edge of forests and into their interiors (Saunders, 
Hobbs & Margules 1991; Matlack 1993; Forman & Alexander 1998; 
Haskell 2000). These edge effects may increase stress on organisms at 
the habitat edge (Burke & Nol 1998; Gibbs 1998; Lehtinen, Galatowitsch 
& Tester 1999), may facilitate invaders (Cadenasso & Pickett 2001; 
Watkins et al. 2003; Pauchard & Alaback 2006), and will alter the future 
species composition of communities at the edge and in the interior 
(García-Tejero et al. 2013).  
In addition to creating edges, gas infrastructure disturbances 
reduce habitat connectivity by creating barriers to dispersal and 
movement. Some species avoid crossing roads (Rico, Kindlmann & 
Sedláček 2007; Shepard et al. 2008), and we might expect similar 
responses for well pads and gathering pipelines. When roads or pipelines 
cross streams, they change stream flows and may prevent movement up- 
or down-stream (Pépino, Rodríguez & Magnan 2012). These connectivity 
issues are especially important for Appalachian species when considered 
in the context of climate change, since this region is projected to be very 
important for species migrating to track changing conditions (Lawler et 
al. 2013). 
Infrastructure construction increases soil erosion, which has 
negative ecological consequences. Erosion may increase sediment loads 
in streams and consequently affect the turbidity, light absorption, 
chemistry and temperature of the water column (Reid & Dunne 1984; 
Lane & Sheridan 2002). When sediment settles, it can alter the stream 
substrate (Boxall & Maltby 1995). Many species are sensitive to small 
changes in water and substrate quality (Curry & MacNeill 2004; Cover et 
al. 2008). Gas development tends to be concentrated in time and space, 
e.g. many well pads, roads, and pipelines are constructed simultaneously 
(pers. observation), which will enhance short-term erosion impacts and 
could lead to long-term changes in stream biodiversity. Nearer to 
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infrastructure, erosion changes soil qualities (Verity & Anderson 1990; Ni 
& Zhang 2007) and may affect which species move in to the disturbed 
area after construction is complete.  
The combination of drilling technology, energy demand, and desire 
for energy independence means that domestic gas development will 
continue in the Appalachian region and more broadly for some time. 
Since we cannot prevent all gas development, our best chance to avoid 
some of the discussed ecological impacts is to alter future development 
through improved siting practices.  
Chapter Summary 
My dissertation is composed of four chapters which aim to advance the 
science and practice of conservation planning by providing new solutions 
to real world conservation problems as well as concrete 
recommendations for how to use my results. The chapters of my 
dissertation are motivated by four questions: 
Chapter 1: How do new surveys of rare species change our 
conservation priorities? 
In Chapter 1, I use a long-duration time series of rare-species surveys to 
see how a growing dataset changes rankings of watersheds in Tennessee. 
The chapter provides some insight into how data used by conservation 
practitioners may affect their decisions in data poor, data rich, and near-
future contexts.  
Chapter 2: What are the environmental impact tradeoffs 
between four easy-to-implement natural gas surface 
infrastructure siting guidelines? 
In Chapter 2, I compare negative effects of realistic gas infrastructure 
layouts that I create using four siting practices and examine tradeoffs 
between impacts within and across siting practices. The results inform 
how one strategy used by conservation practitioners – rules of thumb – to 
affect gas developer behavior may introduce tradeoffs in future negative 
impacts. The results also point to a need to explore how more advanced 
conservation planning tools may improve the performance of surface 
infrastructure by simultaneously optimizing infrastructure locations to 
reduce potential impacts. 
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Chapter 3: What is the cost of reducing environmental impacts 
from surface infrastructure at the lease-hold scale? 
In Chapter 3, I assess the magnitudes of avoidable impacts from surface 
infrastructure in Pennsylvania by using advanced spatial planning 
software I created for this task to plan well pad, access road, and 
gathering pipeline locations with environmental objectives and monetary 
constraints. I find that the cost of reducing impacts varies considerably 
across sites, and while impacts at a median site can be reduced upwards 
of 40% before costs become prohibitive, a uniform policy applied to this 
context may not produce desirable outcomes. The results of this chapter 
indicate that larger scale actions to reduce environmental impacts from 
shale gas surface infrastructure will perform best when accounting for 
heterogeneity across sites.  
Chapter 4: How cost-effective are different regulations for 
reducing environmental impacts from surface infrastructure? 
In my final chapter, I assess the cost effectiveness of multiple policy 
options for reducing aggregate impacts across the same set of sites 
explored in Chapter 3. I find that a typical uniform, inflexible approach 
similar to the median site approach mentioned above would lead to much 
higher system-wide costs for a given level of impact avoidance as 
compared to a market based, tradable permits approach. These results 
provide inside for several decision makers, but especially policy makers 
who are tasked with formulating and implementing conservation-oriented 




Chapter 1: Updating conservation priorities 





A version of this chapter was originally published by Austin W. Milt, Sally 
R. Palmer, and Paul R. Armsworth: 
 Austin W. Milt, Sally R. Palmer, and Paul R. Armsworth. “Updating 
conservation priorities over 111 years of species observations.” Journal of 
Applied Ecology 51 (2014): 1515-1524. 
 
Austin Milt performed the secondary data collection, data processing, 
analysis, interpretation, and writing for this article. Sally Palmer and 
Paul Armsworth contributed intellectually to the design, interpretation, 
and revision of the article.  
1.1 Abstract  
Observations of species occurrences are often used to inform spatial 
prioritizations for the effective use of limited conservation resources. 
Additional species observations have the potential to change where a 
conservation group plans to invest. But by how much? How different 
would conservation priorities be if planners updated current observations 
with the information they will have next year? We sought to address 
these questions using a 111 year dataset that reflects commonly used 
collection and prioritization practices. We quantify changes in the 
ranking of Tennessee watersheds brought on by annual additions of 
species observations made between 1900 and 2010. We ranked 
watersheds by their complementary contribution to overall species 
richness. We examine the sensitivity of our results to the number of 
watersheds prioritized. We expected the effect of new observations to 
diminish as the dataset grew, and we found this to be the case. 
Importantly, however, additional observations may continue to 
significantly change conservation priorities in the future if current data 
collection trends continue. We found that, overall, additional 
observations can greatly affect priorities and that this result is sensitive 
to the number of watersheds ranked. Thus the extent of planning 
activities moderates the effect of including additional data. Synthesis and 
applications: Long-term, opportunistically collected data of species 
locations are commonly used in conservation planning. We find that 
when using such data additional species observations significantly affect 
subsequent priorities. This effect is most pronounced when data are 
sparse. As such, data collection should be a focus of very early 
conservation actions in new areas. Even in well-studied areas, however, 
additional observations may continue to change spatial priorities into the 
future, and so while data collection can decrease in well studied areas, it 
should continue at a lower intensity. Our methods could also be used to 
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determine the balance of data collection and conservation action in a new 
location. 
1.2 Introduction 
Spatial prioritization is prominent in the science (Brooks et al. 2006; 
Pressey et al. 2007; Watson et al. 2011; Coll et al. 2012; Rainho & 
Palmeirim 2013) and practice (Redford et al. 2003; Didier et al. 2009; 
Henson et al. 2009; Groves et al. 2012) of conservation. This is due to the 
long history of spatial conservation planning methods (Diamond 1975; 
Margules & Pressey 2000; Watson et al. 2011), to the recognition that 
conservation funding is limited (Ando 1998; Myers et al. 2000; Bottrill et 
al. 2008) and to the spatial nature of many conservation decisions 
(Pressey et al. 2007). Prioritization methods vary depending on the 
conservation goals, expertise and data available to planners. Priorities 
may be determined by local species richness or biodiversity uniqueness 
(Csuti et al. 1997; Myers et al. 2000), by metrics of threat (Pressey et al. 
2007; Joseph, Maloney & Possingham 2009; Carwardine et al. 2012) or 
many other factors. This variation in method, along with variation in the 
data used in a particular evaluation, can lead to very different decisions 
about where, when and how to take action (Wilson et al. 2005; Rondinini 
et al. 2006). 
Data on species occurrences are commonly used in conservation 
prioritization (e.g. Zafra-Calvo et al. 2010; Simaika et al. 2013; Mateo et 
al. 2013). Often, such datasets change in extent, resolution, accuracy, 
and coverage as more observations are added (e.g. Magurran et al. 2010; 
Ahrends et al. 2011; Felinks et al. 2011; Martin, Blossey & Ellis 2012). 
Spatial priorities will be affected by data characteristics, such as spatial 
resolution (Araujo et al. 2005; Arponen et al. 2012), type (e.g. 
presence/absence data vs. abundance data; Gaston & Rodrigues 2003) 
and bias (De Ornellas, Milner-Gulland & Nicholson 2011; Metcalfe et al. 
2013). Past studies looking at the effect of changing data on the outcome 
of conservation planning have tended to stylize the spatio-temporal 
extent and resolution of data used in conservation (Freitag & van 
Jaarsveld 1998; Polasky & Solow 2001; Felinks et al. 2011) and ignore 
the somewhat opportunistic nature of data being used by many 
conservation practitioners. 
In this paper, we examine how additional species occurrence 
records affect spatial conservation priorities. In so doing, we focus on 
species-centric conservation approaches, as opposed to focusing on 
conservation goals targeting priority habitats or whole ecoregions 
(Watson et al. 2011). Tennessee, which we use as a case study, is a 
centre of richness for freshwater fish species and molluscs and a region 
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within the coterminous United States of particularly high species 
imperilment (Dobson et al. 1997; Stein, Kutner & Adams 2000). We 
examine how annual additions of species observations made from 1900 
to 2010 would change the ranking of watersheds being prioritized for 
conservation action. Specifically, we rank watersheds by complementary 
richness. As a conservation objective, complementary richness rewards 
watersheds for covering species not found in other protected watersheds 
(Vane-Wright, Humphries & Williams 1991). We use a rank correlation 
statistic to quantify the change in priorities brought on by an additional 
year’s observations. Further, we assess the magnitude, trend, and 
consistency of priority changes over time. We examine the sensitivity of 
our results to the number of watersheds prioritized. In the Appendix, we 
also explore the sensitivity of our results to ranking method, spatial or 
taxonomic sampling bias, and changes in data reliability due to changing 
technology and organism or population persistence.  
The dataset we use is one currently used by conservation planners 
in Tennessee. As is often the case with datasets built from historical 
occurrence records, this one has been collated in a piecemeal and 
somewhat opportunistic fashion. As a result, the dataset suffers from 
more spatial, temporal, and taxonomic sampling bias than in systematic 
surveys. Arguably, it still represents the best information available to 
conservation planners regarding the distribution of priority species in 
Tennessee today. 
Previous studies with similar methodologies to ours focus on the 
effectiveness of conservation outcomes under different data quality and 
quantity scenarios (Freitag & van Jaarsveld 1998; Polasky & Solow 2001; 
Gladstone & Davis 2003; Gaston & Rodrigues 2003; Grantham et al. 
2008; De Ornellas, Milner-Gulland & Nicholson 2011). The general 
approach in empirical studies has been to aggregate data over time, 
simulate changes to the data (e.g. by subsampling to represent reduced 
sampling effort), and to evaluate conservation plans on the altered 
dataset (but see Felinks et al. 2011). Doing this allows authors to cover a 
range of data collection scenarios in order to generalize across many 
situations that might be encountered. These studies conclude that data 
quality and quantity are important factors in taking effective 
conservation actions, but the details are dataset specific. For example, 
Grantham et al. (2009) assess how switching from initial species surveys 
to habitat protection affects the long-term coverage and retention of 
proteas. They find that for their case study area, a shorter duration of 
surveying (~2 years) followed by longer protection is optimal. Their study 
has important implications for conservation planning since it indicates 
that long-term data collection need not preclude conservation actions. 
We complement previous work in many ways. First, we use a much 
longer-term dataset spanning 111 years. Second, we build the dataset 
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sequentially over the time period rather than subsampling without 
regard to time and thus we follow the actual collection of species 
observations. As such, our analysis includes the co-variation of data 
characteristics over time. Third, our analyses do not rely on the 
aggregate dataset as the most accurate knowledge of species 
distributions over time. Rather, we focus on describing how changing 
knowledge over time affects conservation priorities. Finally, we use raw 
species observations as they were recorded rather than modelled data or 
controls for data biases. We briefly explore how reducing among-
watershed sampling bias affects our results (see Appendix S1). 
1.3 Materials and Methods 
1.3.1 Case Study Area 
Tennessee is one of the most biodiverse inland states in the U.S., second 
only to Alabama in the diversity of freshwater fishes and possessing a 
comparatively high degree of species endemism (Stein 2002).  Over 10% 
of the state’s plant and animal species are considered at-risk, and 
Tennessee ranks seventh among all states in the number of documented 
extinctions, a fact largely attributed to the major modification of streams 
and river systems in the early to mid-20th century (Stein, Kutner & 
Adams 2000; Stein 2002).  Widespread conversion of lands for 
agricultural purposes has also contributed to fundamental changes in 
hydrologic regimes in many sub-regions of the state, and excess 
nutrients and sedimentation from agricultural production contribute to 
degraded water and habitat quality (Tennessee Department of 
Environment and Conservation 2014). Increased urbanization within the 
state’s Metropolitan Statistical Areas has resulted in destruction and 
fragmentation of terrestrial habitats and degradation of streams and 
wetlands.   
Local, national and international conservation organizations such 
as The Nature Conservancy and the World Wildlife Fund have invested in 
Tennessee for over 35 years in collaboration with many partners, 
including federal agencies such as the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and 
state agencies such as the Tennessee Natural Heritage Program and the 
Tennessee Wildlife Resources Agency.  Foundational to this work have 
been a series of conservation plans designed at ecoregional scales and 
using species occurrence data to set biodiversity conservation goals 
(Smith et al. 2002; The Nature Conservancy 2006).   Beginning in 2005, 
all state wildlife agencies receiving federal State Wildlife Grant funding 
were required to submit a Comprehensive Wildlife Conservation Strategy, 
more commonly known as a State Wildlife Action Plan.  The primary 
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emphasis of State Wildlife Action Plans is to improve the habitat and 
population conditions of “species of greatest conservation need” as 
defined by the state (Tennessee Wildlife Resources Agency 2005).  
Designing and executing these plans has resulted in an increased 
emphasis on the use of field-collected species occurrence and habitat 
data to identify priority conservation geographies and assess threats to 
these areas.   
1.3.2 Prioritization Data 
We used species observation data collected between 1900 and 2010 by 
Tennessee Natural Heritage Program to test how species observations 
affect conservation priorities.  The Natural Heritage dataset is used in 
multiple forms of conservation planning in Tennessee, and the State 
Wildlife Action Plan in particular (Tennessee Wildlife Resources Agency 
2005).  The 2005 Tennessee State Wildlife Action Plan used these species 
occurrence data in combination with NatureServe global and state rarity 
rankings, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service federal status listings, and other 
available population status data to assign “species of greatest 
conservation need” status (SGCN).  The species occurrence data have 
been used as a key component in mapping local richness to understand 
where high SGCN concentrations occur across the state. These same 
data have been used to assess the complementarity of larger ecological 
units for terrestrial and freshwater species.  
The Natural Heritage data are opportunistically recorded point 
observations (EOs) of individual species, most of which have a 
NatureServe Conservation Status rank higher than S3, and some of 
which are regularly monitored (TN Natural Heritage Program, pers. 
comm.). Rarely, observations are made as a result of premeditated 
prediction and collection efforts (TN Natural Heritage Program, pers. 
comm.). Because of the nature of how these data have been collected, 
there is no measure of sampling effort embedded in the dataset. The 
dataset contains both unique and repeat observations. A unique EO 
represents the spatial location, species identity, and date of an 
observation of an individual or group. Subsequent observations of the 
same individual or group are here called repeat EOs. The dataset 
contains 17 586 unique EOs or 25 838 EOs including repeats. Fig. 1.1 
shows the number of EOs recorded in each year including repeats. The 
dataset contains both terrestrial and aquatic species. The majority of 
EOs recorded in the dataset are of plants (15 001 records or 58%), 
although the dataset also represents species from 14 other taxonomic 
groups recognized under the State Wildlife Action Plan. Approximately 
51% of EOs were recorded after 1995.  





Fig. 1.1. Distribution of element occurrences (EOs) across watersheds and species 
over the 111 year period; x-axis is year.(a) Number of new EOs recorded throughout 
Tennessee each year broken down by taxonomic groups. An EO is an observed point 
location of an individual or population. There are 25,838 EOs in total, with the 
majority represented by Plant (15,001 or 58%). (b) and (c) show distributions as 
histograms of (b) species occupancies in Tennessee watersheds and (c) watershed 
richnesses at 11 time periods. 
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observations and interpolated layers or modelled distributions 
(NatureServe, pers. comm.; The Nature Conservancy 2006; Schloss et al. 
2011; Wilson 2011; Yorkshire Wildlife Trust, pers. comm.).  Modelled 
data, such as those produced by species distribution models, are 
valuable because they estimate the unobserved range of a species and 
thus point out potential high-value areas not revealed by raw point 
occurrences. Also, species distribution models incur fewer omission 
errors and may reduce the effects of spatial sampling bias on 
conservation plans (Rondinini et al. 2006). On the other hand, raw point 
observations are simple to use and do not suffer as much from 
commission errors as species distribution models.  Moreover, species 
distribution models cannot accurately estimate the ranges of very rare or 
under-sampled species (Olden, Jackson & Peres-Neto 2002; Wisz et al. 
2008), a particular problem for our dataset and similar contexts, because 
most species occur fewer than five times in the data (Fig. 1.1b, year 
2010). 
We used watersheds from the US Geological Survey HUC-12 
Watershed Boundary Dataset (http://datagateway.nrcs.usda.gov, 
accessed 09 May 2013) as our spatial unit of analysis. Watersheds are an 
appropriate unit for spatial prioritization in conservation at the state 
level when focusing on terrestrial and aquatic species. At this scale, 
planners can target particular watersheds for further action. This action 
may come in the form of whole-watershed management (e.g. best 
practices by all farmers in the watershed), or it may call for more refined 
analysis to target protection within the watershed (e.g. protecting stream 
headwaters through forested-land conservation). For instance, 
watersheds have been used to delineate conservation priorities for known 
occurrences of freshwater species in the south-eastern United States 
(Smith et al. 2002) and elsewhere (Pryce et al. 2006). Watershed 
boundaries are also less changeable than other spatial units like land 
parcel boundaries and are therefore fitting for our century-spanning 
analysis. Of the 1152 watersheds in Tennessee, 925 have at least one 
observation by the Natural Heritage Program by 2010. These 925 
watersheds (Fig. 1.2) acted as our candidate sites for selection and have 
a median area of 101 km2 (1st quartile = 77 km2, 3rd quartile = 142 
km2). 
1.3.3 Ranking Watersheds 
We explored the situation in which a conservation group aims to 
cover as many species across the combined set of priority watersheds, 
rather than only the most species rich watersheds. This requires 
consideration of how the species assemblages of watersheds complement 




Fig. 1.2. Number of EOs, including repeats, accumulated in each watershed since 
1900 at six snapshots in time. Darker colors have a higher density of EOs. For 
example, the darkest watershed in 1970 has 155 EOs which it accumulated between 
1900 and 1970. Of the 1152 watersheds, 925 have at least one EO by 2010, 695 




frequency in near-optimal solutions to the maximal coverage problem 
(MCP; Cabeza & Moilanen 2001). Given a watershed budget (b), the 
globally optimum solution to the MCP is the set of b watersheds that 
together cover more species than any other set of b watersheds. Solving 
the MCP gives a set of watersheds that together perform well as a 
conservation strategy. It does not automatically give a means to rank 
individual watersheds. However, Pressey, Johnson & Wilson (1994) 
introduced the idea of irreplaceability, defined as “the frequency of 
occurrence of individual [watersheds] in the range of possible 
representative systems.” Irreplaceable watersheds are those that have a 
high potential to contribute to the conservation goal under many realized 
priority sets. We drew on this concept when deciding how to rank 
complementary watersheds. 
The algorithm we used to rank watersheds has two parts. In the 
first part, we used a genetic algorithm optimizer to choose one set of b 
watersheds that maximizes the number of species covered. The difficulty 
of the MCP means that the genetic algorithm optimizer guarantees, at 
worst, locally optimum solutions. In conservation the local optimality of 
solutions can be a strength, because finding many near-optimal 
solutions rather than the one best solution lends flexibility to the 
decision making process. For a given budget, we ran the genetic 
algorithm optimizer 500 times and kept those solutions that achieved ≥ 
95% of the richness of the best solution. In the second part, we ranked 
watersheds by the number of times they appeared across those top-
scoring solutions (irreplaceability). In total, we examined 11 sensitivity 
tests corresponding to 11 watershed budgets (b): 1, 5, 10, 20, …, and 90 
watersheds.  
In Appendix S1 we also explore the sensitivity of our results to 
other ranking methods. Namely, we assess prioritization based on the 
local richness of watersheds when ignoring complementarity in order to 
explore how sensitive our results are to the particular choice of 
conservation objective that we examine. We also assess variations on this 
local richness case to the number of watersheds prioritized, controls for 
data reliability and a control for sampling bias. All ranking was carried 
out in Python v2.5.4. 
1.3.4 Measuring Changes in Priorities 
We measured by how much additional species observations cause 
watershed rankings to change. We used Spearman’s rank correlation 
statistic, ρ, to measure the similarity of two different rankings of 
candidate watersheds for conservation, where the ranking of watersheds 
in a year is based on the observed assemblages of species in those 
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watersheds. Our measure of priority change (V) is the difference between 
rankings, or 
      (                                      ) 
We subtract the rank correlation from 1 to ease explanation such that 
larger values of V correspond to larger changes in priorities. Because ρ 
can take values between -1 and 1, V can vary between 0 and 2. We would 
typically expect V to take values between zero – where the rankings are 
identical – and one – where the two rankings have no relation to one 
another.  
Below, we describe the entire process of ranking watersheds and 
calculating V with a budget of 10 watersheds: 
 
1. Initialize: Using data from 1900–1909, the genetic algorithm 
optimizer chooses 10 watersheds that maximally cover present 
species. This is repeated 500 times. Watersheds are ranked by 
their frequency in the top 95% of the 500 solutions. 
 
2. Update Records: Add records from the next year. In the first 
iteration, we added records from 1910 so that the irreplaceability 
and ranking of watersheds in 1910 was based on EOs from 1900-
1910. The ranking in the second iteration (1911) was based on 
EOs from 1900-1911, and so on. 
 
3. Rank Watersheds: Repeat Step 1 with the updated dataset from 
Step 2.  
 
4. Calculate Vt: Calculate the difference between the rankings 
between the current year and previous year as defined above (1 - 
Spearman’s ρ). This gives the magnitude of change in priorities for 
the current year. In the first iteration, we get V1910 by comparing 
the rankings from 1910 and 1909. In Fig. S 1.2, we summarize the 
result of delaying updates of records and priorities. 
 
5. Repeat: Repeat Steps 2–4 through the year 2010, adding the most 
recent records for each iteration such that 
 
V1910 = 1-ρ(ranking in 1910, ranking in 1909) 
V1911 = 1-ρ(ranking in 1911, ranking in 1910) 
⋮ 
V2010 = 1-ρ(ranking in 2010, ranking in 2009) 
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1.3.5 Statistical Analyses 
To test if additional data have a significant effect on priorities, we tested 
whether the 5% confidence limit (5% CL) about the median of V 
contained zero. To calculate the 5% CL, we used bias-corrected 
accelerated bootstrapping from 10 000 samples of the same size as the 
original sample (usually 101 data points, one from each year within 
1910–2010). Bootstrapping was performed in MATLAB r2012b. 
We examined trends in priority changes over time or dataset size 
using ordinary least squares regression. In this dataset, time and 
log10(dataset size) are highly collinear (R2 = 0.99), indicating they cannot 
be included in the same regression (Quinn & Keough 2002). Therefore, 
we regressed priority changes against time and dataset size separately. 
Due to the similarity of results when regressing against time or dataset 
size, we focus on regressions in time in the main text (but see Table S 1.3 
for dataset size results). We expected changes in priorities to decrease as 
we accumulated data. To confirm this, we tested that the 95% confidence 
intervals of the slopes of the above regressions are negative. 
For some of the watershed budgets, we observed that the data could be 
clearly separated into two distinct segments (e.g. Fig. 1.3a,b). Thus, we 
created piecewise regressions using the segmented package in R v2.12.1 
to further examine the results (Muggeo 2008). The piecewise regression 
optimization is sensitive to initial guesses of breakpoints, so we visually 
estimated the breakpoints and then used the piecewise model with the 
convergence closest to our estimations (Muggeo 2008). For each 
sensitivity test, we tested piecewise models with one or two segments and 
compared AICc scores to determine which offered the more parsimonious 
fit to the data. AICc model comparison explicitly considers the trade-off 
between model fit using maximum likelihood and parsimony through the 
number of parameters (Crawley 2007). 
We also wanted to know if changes in priorities might be sustained 
over the near future. This was primarily determined by interpolating the 
predicted value of V and its 5% significance in 2010 using the one or 
two-segment model chosen by AICc competition. We also extrapolated to 
2030 to assess a more distant level of change if current conditions hold.  
1.4 Results 
We found that spatial conservation priorities are generally sensitive to 
additional data and the number of watersheds in which conservation can 
take place (Table 1.1: column 2). We also found that the sensitivity of 
priorities decreased over time (Table 1.1: columns 4,5; Fig. 1.3a,b), but 
that the trend levelled out after some time and the point at which this 




Fig. 1.3. Representative results of ranking watersheds by their frequency in near-
optimal solutions to the Maximal Coverage Problem (MCP; Cabeza & Moilanen 2001). 
Solutions to the MCP choose a fixed subset of all watersheds that maximally cover 
known species. Conservation priorities are sensitive to additional data, but that 
sensitivity declines with a smaller watershed budget and over time and eventually 
levels out. Panels (a) and (c) correspond to rankings created by choosing 20 
watersheds to solve the MCP; panels (b) and (d) correspond to a 70-watershed 
solution. (a), (b) effect of one year of additional element occurrences, from 1910 to 
2010. (c), (d) range of species covered by solutions to the MCP. Bottoms and tops of 
vertical, lower, black bars are minimum and maximum number of species covered by 
solutions to the MCP. Horizontal, higher grey bars are the number of species with at 
least one occurrence by that year. 
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Fig. 1.3a,b). Finally, we found that additional data may continue to affect 
priorities in the future if current collection conditions hold (Table 1.1: 
columns 9,10).  
Taking two exemplar budgets from those shown in Table 1.1 for 
illustrative purposes (20 watersheds and 70 watersheds), Fig. 1.3a,b 
illustrates the magnitude of change in priorities over time and Fig. 3c,d 
shows the number of species covered over time indicating the 
performance of the conservation planning process (see also Fig. S 1.3).In 
Fig. 1.3c,d, the lower set of vertical, black bars shows the numbers of 
species covered by solutions to the MCP over time. Compare this to the 
higher, horizontal, grey bars, which show how many species were known 
to occur in Tennessee in that year. The height of the lower bars relative 
to the higher bars shows how well the prioritization performed in each 
year. A comparison between Fig. 1.3c,d shows that a watershed budget of 
70 led to greater coverage of known species than using a lower budget of 
20 watersheds. We also assess the performance of prioritizations relative 
to the full dataset in Fig. S 1.3. 
In the first part of our analysis, we wanted to know if, in general, 
one year of additional EOs affects conservation priorities. Provided more 
than one watershed is being considered for conservation action, we found 
that one year of additional EOs significantly changed the ranking of 
watersheds (Table 1.1: second column). Values in the second column of 
Table 1.1 reveal the magnitude of overall changes in priorities brought on 
by additional EOs, with larger values indicating more change per year of 
additional EOs. Note that the overall magnitude of change brought on by 
additional EOs increases with the watershed budget (moving down 
second column in Table 1.1). 
 Next, we assessed how changes in priorities changed over time. 
Changes in priorities over time were pronounced (Fig. 1.3a,b, Table 1.1, 
Fig. S 1.4 maps the spatial changes in priorities through time). The 
exemplar budgets shown in Fig. 1.3a,b reveal how large changes in 
priorities near the beginning of the time period are followed by a steep 
decline earlier and steadier decline later, but differ in how steep that 
initial decline is and when it occurs. These differences are quantified in 
Table 1.1.  The fourth and fifth columns in Table 1.1 show the main 
results of our analysis of trends in changing priorities. In eight sensitivity 
tests, the degree to which priorities changed with one year of additional 
EOs decreased over time (Table 1.1: column 4). In seven of those eight 
tests, this result was true in both the first and second time periods 
(Table 1.1: columns 4,5). 
We also explored in more detail how trends in changing priorities 
differed between the first and second time periods in each sensitivity test. 
We did this by comparing the values in the fourth and fifth columns of 
Table 1.1 and illustrate this in Fig. 1.3a,b. There was support in most  
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Table 1.1. Effect of additional data on priorities overall and when regressed against time. Conservation priorities are 
sensitive to additional data, but that sensitivity declines with a smaller watershed budget and over time and may level out 
in the future. Sensitivity of the ranking method to the number of sites used in the prioritization was tested. Subsequently, 
(column 2) the overall magnitude of change brought on by one year of additional element occurrences (EOs) was tested, as 
well as (columns 3-8) the trend of changing priorities over time. Finally, the regression models were used to predict the 
change in priorities from additional EOs in (column 9) 2010 and (column 10) 2030 if current collection conditions hold. 
Sensitivity tests without [slope2] and [break] fields use a one-segment regression   
test med(V) intercept slope1 slope2 break R2 ΔAICc V2010 V2030 
1-watershed 0 - - - - - - - - 
5-watersheds 0.14 -1.0 0.6 - - 0.03 2 0.17 0.18 
10-watersheds 0.18 0.2 0.6 - - -0.01 1 0.19 0.19 
20-watersheds 0.20 84.6 -43.9 -1.3 1920 0.73 83 0.16 0.13 
30-watersheds 0.19 40.4 -20.7 -1.5 1937 0.88 118 0.13 0.10 
40-watersheds 0.22 37.9 -19.4 -1.3 1944 0.94 165 0.14 0.12 
50-watersheds 0.21 35.0 -17.8 -0.9 1954 0.97 199 0.14 0.12 
60-watersheds 0.20 29.8 -15.1 -0.1 1965 0.98 203 0.14 0.14 
70-watersheds  0.31 27.6 -13.9 -1.7 1971 0.98 177 0.09 0.06 
80-watersheds  0.37 24.9 -12.5 -2.0 1977 0.99 173 0.08 0.04 
90-watersheds 0.40 23.8 -12.0 -2.3 1978 0.99 146 0.09 0.05 
Table columns are [med(V)] = median of V across all years; [intercept] = model intercept; [slope1(2)] = 
slope of the first (second) segment in V ∙ yr-1 ∙ 10-3; [break] = breakpoint (year) of the two segments; [R2] 
= adjusted R2; [ΔAICc] = ΔAICc of the piecewise model not chosen.; [V2010] = predicted value of V in 
2010; [V2030] = predicted value of V in 2030 
Values in bold are significant at the 95% confidence level.   
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cases for distinguishing the two time periods evident in each sensitivity 
test, as can be seen in Fig. 1.3a,b and tested by AICc competition in 
column eight in Table 1.1. When using a watershed budget larger than 
10, there was a larger negative trend in changing priorities in the earlier 
time period than the later (Fig. 1.3a,b, Table 1.1: columns 4,5). Last, as 
we increased the watershed budget, the changing effect of additional EOs 
on priorities decreased more gradually in the first time period (moving 
down fourth column in Table 1.1). 
 Finally, we tested if the continuing change in priorities apparent in 
Fig. 1.3a,b might continue into the future if data collection conditions 
persist. The results of this analysis can be seen in the last two columns 
of Table 1.1. Bold values in the last two columns of Table 1.1 reveal that 
under several sensitivity tests we expect additional EOs to continue to 
affect priorities if collection conditions persist. For instance, when we 
used a watershed budget of 60, we predicted an effect of one year of EOs 
in both 2010 and 2030. Contrarily, in four cases additional EOs affected 
priorities in 2010 (Table 1.1: column 9) but are not predicted to do so in 
2030 (Table 1.1: last column). The even split in the results of this part of 
our analysis, along with the fact that we performed extrapolation, makes 
it unclear how common the continuing effect of additional EOs will be in 
the future for our study system. 
 In Appendix S1 we describe results for other sensitivity tests 
including our choice of conservation objective and controls for data 
reliability and sampling bias. 
1.5 Discussion 
How do additional observations of species change spatial conservation 
priorities? The importance of this question should be evident by the 
growing spatial prioritization literature (Kukkala & Moilanen 2013) as 
well as the ongoing use of opportunistically collected element 
occurrences (EOs) for prioritization. We addressed this question by 
examining how the ranking of watersheds in the U.S. state of Tennessee 
changed as species observations were recorded over the past century. We 
ranked watersheds by their complementary contribution to conserving 
species richness and assessed how our results were affected by the 
number of watersheds considered for conservation action. Our methods 
and results can give insight into state-level prioritizations for watershed 
actions that focus on across-watershed complementary richness, to 
areas early in data collection and to those with a long history of species 
observations. 
Perhaps our most important finding is that when additional data 
have a significant effect on priorities in 2010, additional data are also 
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likely (54% of cases) to have a significant effect in the future if data 
collection conditions hold. Because our complementarity analysis uses 
species identities to determine priorities, small additions of infrequently 
occurring species have a larger effect on priorities than when prioritizing 
by local species richness only (e.g. Appendix S1), and we expect this to 
persist in the future as long as data collection conditions continue.  
Another key take-home message from our analysis is that 
additional observations tended to have a decreasing effect on priorities as 
we amassed data. While this phenomenon is well documented in studies 
focusing on the accuracy of prioritizations (Grantham et al. 2008), we 
offer a novel data context and explanation for why this occurs. The 
causal mechanism is due to the complementarity goal we used: 
additional observations increased the evenness of assemblages across 
watersheds, lowering the probability that one more observation in a 
watershed made that watershed necessary for a high-richness solution.  
Our results have multiple competing consequences for 
conservation. In cases similar to ours, new observations may continue to 
significantly determine current spatial priorities and thus should be 
collected for that purpose. At the same time, current prioritizations will 
not necessarily match those for next year, so we do not expect additional 
observations to determine, on their own, long-term priorities. Our results 
also suggest that initial observations in data-poor regions will have the 
greatest effect on determining priorities. Subsequent observations then 
serve to refine those priorities. Finally, we found that our results were 
sensitive to conservation goals and to controls for data reliability and 
sampling bias (Appendix S1). Specifically, when ranking by local 
richness, the degree of decrease in priority changes over time was 
smaller as was the overall magnitude. Similarly, when ranking by local 
richness, future priorities are only expected to be affected by additional 
EOs when using a low tolerance for data reliability. The weaker effect of 
additional EOs on priorities when ranking by local richness is because 
the local richness objective ignores what is unique about different 
watersheds and thus misses influential variation in the data. Taking our 
results in aggregate, we suggest that the most effort in species 
observation be put forth early when a conservation group enters a new 
area. However, species observations should not cease since new 
observations will help refine priorities and update them as conditions 
change. In locations other than Tennessee, we expect similar patterns. 
The time in the collection record at which the qualitative shift from large 
changes in priorities with a rapid decrease in changes to smaller, but 
persistent changes in priorities – characterized in Fig. 1.3a,b – will 
depend on the conservation context. Managers in other locations could 
therefore use an analysis such as ours to determine the balance of data 
collection and conservation actions over time.  
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Measures of performance of conservation plans enable decision 
makers to assess whether more information is needed before acting 
(Polasky & Solow 2001), what management actions to take (Walters & 
Hilborn 1978), and to rank methods for creating new plans (Grantham et 
al. 2010). While we did focus on differences between priorities over time, 
the number of species covered by choices of watersheds for conservation 
drove the prioritization process (Fig. 3c,d, Fig. S 1.3). As such, our 
analysis is most similar to passive adaptive management (Walters & 
Hilborn 1978; Williams 2011), in that the decisions we make are refined 
as we gain information, but differs in that we do not assume that choices 
in one year affect those in the next year. 
We necessarily made several decisions that may have affected our 
results. First, priorities were updated annually, which may partially 
explain small priority changes overall. Longer update periods increase 
the median change in priorities (Fig. S 1.2). Second, we chose to use raw 
point occurrences rather than modelled data to prioritize watersheds. As 
a result, conservation actions focusing on the highest priority watersheds 
in any one year would be under-representative of potentially important 
areas (Rondinini et al. 2006). Aims to create comprehensive conservation 
plans should, when possible, use a mix of raw point occurrences and 
modelled data (Rondinini et al. 2006). That being said, we anticipate 
many of the effects we find will carry over to cases where practitioners 
are combining the two data types. Third, our ranking method used two 
pieces of information to come up with relative rankings of watersheds: 
the spatial locations and species identities of EOs. This was done 
intentionally so we could directly relate changes in species observations 
to changes in priorities. Additional information would increase the direct 
applicability of our results to Tennessee. For instance, the costs and 
patterns of land use change and management over time would have 
made apparent in priority setting the trade-off of these factors with 
species coverage. We could have also chosen to base our analyses on the 
un-ranked irreplaceabilities or local richnesses of watersheds rather than 
transforming to ranks first. Our assumption was that all decision 
variables required for a ranking of watersheds were encompassed in their 
irreplaceabilities and thus keeping additional information was 
unnecessary.  In reality, conservation actions will rely on relationships 
among players, detailed site histories, short-term opportunity, and other 
such information which is rarely recorded over such long time-spans. 
Finally, our statistical choices affect the inferences that can be drawn 
from our analyses. For example, the change in priorities in one year was 
calculated on two watershed rankings whose datasets overlapped 
substantially, and the overlap grew over time. Therefore, each ranking 
was not independent of the earlier rankings. As such, particular 
significance levels should be interpreted cautiously.  
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Prioritization is a common and necessary part of conservation 
planning. Here, we have provided insight into how regular updating of 
priorities is affected by additional data. Unlike previous studies, our 
study used a conservation-relevant dataset that spans 111 years, which 
enabled us to explore long-term trends others could not. Additionally, we 
used simple prioritizations that did not account for data weaknesses. As 
such, our results may reflect practice more closely than other studies. 
Our results suggest that conservation planners can expect additional 





1.6.1 Appendix S1. Additional sensitivity tests.  
To examine how the choice of conservation objective affected our results, 
we present variations to the complementarity-based analyses in the main 
text. These additional tests are based on the local species richness of 
sites; we thus name the ranking method and related sensitivity tests as 
Local Richness sensitivity tests. As with the complementarity case, there 
are multiple ways to construct sensitivity tests. Within the Local Richness 
ranking method are variations on the number of watersheds prioritized, a 
control for sampling bias, and controls for data reliability. 
Note, Fig. S1, S2, S3 and S4 are all separate from the Local 
Richness sensitivity tests and supplement the main text on 
complementarity based ranking. 
1.6.2 Ranking Watersheds by Local Species Richness 
1.6.2.1 Local Richness 
We first ranked all 925 watersheds by the number of unique species 
found within each watershed regardless of the abundance of that 
species. This is our base case for the Local Richness ranking method and 
we call it 925-watersheds (Table S 1.1).  
1.6.2.2 Number of Watersheds 
We also looked at sensitivity tests with fewer watersheds and did so for 
two reasons. First, the number of watersheds affects the size of the 
dataset in any one year and consequently the relative contribution of one 
year’s data to the current ranking of watersheds. Second, the 
distribution of EOs across any one subset of watersheds may be 
substantially different from the entire distribution and could 
consequently alter the effect of new observations on priorities. To come 
up with a subset of watersheds, we simulated a conservation plan in 
which only the most species-rich places are ever considered for 
conservation (Williams et al. 1996). We chose three subsets of 
watersheds from the total set of 925. We chose watersheds based on the 
worst ranking they achieved in the base case just described, such that 
we were left with close to 5, 50 and 100 watersheds. We used the 4, 48 
and 93 watersheds that ever achieved, at worst, a rank of 1.5, 12.5 and 
22.0, respectively in Local Richness: 925-watersheds. 
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1.6.2.3 Sampling Bias 
In the above four scenarios, the data are not standardized by sampling 
effort. Heterogeneous sampling effort could bias estimates of the relative 
richness of watersheds (Walther et al. 1995) and would consequently 
reduce the extent to which additional data change priorities. To explore 
the sensitivity of our results to spatial and taxonomic sampling bias, we 
performed rarefaction by systematically subsampling records in a subset 
of watersheds and repeating the prior analysis (Gotelli & Colwell 2001). 
Because many watersheds in our dataset have too few records to perform 
rarefaction effectively, we chose to look at only those watersheds (n = 85) 
which have at least 50 unique records by 2010. We started with the data 
for those 85 watersheds over the entire 111 year period. From these data, 
we chose 50 unique EOs from each watershed to create a rarefied dataset 
with 4250 unique EOs. These were used to rank watersheds by richness 
as we did before. We repeated this process 1000 times, creating 1000 
rarefied datasets, each with a new choice of 50 EOs from each 
watershed. Statistics were then averaged over all 1000 repeats. Finally, 
to make direct comparisons between the rarefied datasets and the 
original dataset, we performed the same ranking with the full set of data 
(each watershed had at least 50 unique EOs) from the 85 watersheds 
chosen for the rarefaction process. 
1.6.2.4 Data Reliability 
Observations made very early in the data record may be less reliable 
indicators of current presences of species than observations made more 
recently. This happens because technology improves, individuals and 
populations die and move, and entire species ranges shift. As such, a 
Table S 1.1. Detailed list of sensitivity tests performed for the (1) Local Richness 
ranking method, in which watersheds were ranked by their unique species richness. 
Sensitivity of the ranking method to (2) the number of sites used in the prioritization 
process, (3) sampling bias, and (4) data reliability, was tested. 
Code Description 
(1) 925-watersheds all watersheds (n = 925) 
(2) 4-, 48-, 93-
watersheds 
4, 48 and 93 best-ranked watersheds from 925-
watersheds 
(3) control-bias 85 watersheds with at least 50 records by 2010, 
using rarefied datasets 
(3) no-control-bias 85 watersheds from control-bias without 
controlling for sampling bias 
(4) 1-, 2-, 10-, 25-, 
50-year 





conservation group may choose to weight early EOs differently to more 
recent ones. To examine the sensitivity of our results to this practice, we 
removed old data while repeating the same ranking exercises. We 
considered five sensitivity tests which vary by their tolerance for data 
age. In the strictest test, only the most recent year’s data are kept. For 
instance, in 1950 we assumed that the only relevant data were those 
collected in 1950. In 1951, we used only the data from 1951, and so on. 
We call this the 1-year test (Table S 1.1). In the most lenient test, we kept 
all data, regardless of age. This test is the same as Local Richness: 925-
watersheds. The other tests kept the most recent 2, 10, 25 and 50 years 
of data. Other than removing old data from the dataset, the ranking 
process was the same as before. 
1.6.2.5 Statistics for the Local Richness tests 
All values of V from Local Species Richness sensitivity tests (Table S 1.1) 
were arcsine transformed to increase the normality of regression 
residuals. We found that V almost never exceeded 1. In the few cases this 
occurred – 16 data points from Local Species Richness: 1-year (85 data 
points) and 3 data points from 2-year (98 data points) – we withheld 
those data points to satisfy the upper bound of the arcsine transform. 
Finally, we did not perform piecewise regressions for Local Richness 
sensitivity tests because they did not show two distinct periods. 
1.6.3 Results for the Local Richness Tests 
1.6.3.1 Overall Results 
For any one sensitivity test, one year of additional element occurrences 
(EOs) significantly changed the ranking of watersheds (Table S 1.2: 
column 2). This was true for all sensitivity tests except the 4-watershed 
test for which sequential rankings were usually identical. Further, the 
overall magnitude of change brought on by additional observations grew 
with the number of watersheds prioritized (moving down column 2 in 
Table S 1.2). Of the ten sensitivity tests for which we assessed priority 
changes over time, nine showed a decreasing effect of additional EOs 
over time.  
1.6.3.2 Number of Watersheds 
Reducing the number of watersheds ranked by local richness reduced 
the overall effect of additional EOs on priorities (Table S 1.2: column 2), 
but had little other effect on the results (Table S 1.2). When we reduced 
the number of watersheds being ranked to 4, there was a qualitative 




Table S 1.2. Effect of additional data on priorities and when regressed against time for (1) Local Richness sensitivity tests. 
Sensitivity of the ranking method to (2) the number of sites used in the prioritization process, (3) sampling bias, and (4) data 
reliability, was tested. Subsequently, (5) the overall magnitude of change brought on by one year of additional element 
occurrences (EOs) was tested, as well as (6) the change in that value over time. Finally, the regression model used to create (6) 
was used to predict the change in priorities from additional EOs in (7) 2010 and (8) 2030 if current collection conditions hold. 
test 5. med(V) intercept 6. slope R2 7. V2010 8. V2030 
1. Local Richness       
925-watersheds 0.13 2.1 -1.0 0.20 0.08 0.06 
       
2. Number of 
Watersheds       
4-watersheds 0 - - - - - 
48-watersheds 0.07 1.9 -0.9 0.09 0.05 0.03 
93-watersheds 0.08 2.5 -1.2 0.21 0.04 0.02 
       
3. Sampling Bias       
no-control-bias 0.01 2.9 -1.5 0.22 -0.01 -0.03 
control-bias 0.11 1.0 -0.5 0.02 0.10 0.09 
       
4. Data Reliability       
1-year 1.07 4.9 -2.0 0.07 0.98 0.94 
2-year 0.65 2.8 -1.1 0.05 0.62 0.59 
10-year 0.26 2.2 -0.9 0.13 0.22 0.20 
25-year 0.16 1.4 -0.6 0.07 0.14 0.12 
50-year 0.13 1.7 -0.8 0.15 0.10 0.08 
Table columns are [med(V)] = median of V across all years; [intercept] = model intercept; [slope] = slope of the 
regression in V ∙ yr-1 ∙ 10-3; [R2] = adjusted R2; [V2010] = predicted value of V in 2010; [V2030] = predicted value of V in 
2030 




1.6.3.3 Sampling Bias 
Controlling for sampling bias had two notable effects on the results. 
First, there was a large increase in the overall effect of one year of EOs on 
priorities (Table S 1.2: column 2). Second, controlling for sampling bias 
erased the negative trend in changing priorities over time (Table S 1.2: 
column 4). 
1.6.3.4 Data Reliability 
Removing data older than some age produced more qualitative and 
quantitative changes than any other Local Richness sensitivity test. First, 
a low tolerance for data age produced the largest increase in the overall 
effect of additional EOs (Table S 1.2: column 2). This effect was lost by 
the time we allowed for data up to 50 years old since at that point most 
data were being kept. Second, controlling for data reliability led to 
stronger declines in the effect of additional EOs, though this was more of 
a quantitative result (Table S 1.2: column 2) and the result is not 
apparent inTable S 1.2. Finally, controlling for data reliability may 
increase the overall effect of additional data on priorities enough to 
maintain that effect into the future (Table S 1.2: last two columns).  
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Fig. S 1.1. Figures showing V plotted against time for all sensitivity tests. See main text 















Fig. S 1.2. Changes in priorities over time when budgeting 70 watersheds for 
complementarity as the length of delay between priority updates changes. top panel 
Each line represents a different update period between 1 and 101 years. The bottom 
blue line is the same as 70-watersheds in the main text where we update priorities 
annually. Higher lines use increasingly longer delays between updating priorities. For 
instance, the blue line labeled “15” represents the situation where we reassess priorities 
every 15 years. Intervals of 5-year update periods are labeled with colored numbers. 
bottom panel Median (point), 25% and 75% quartile (error-bars) of the lines in the top 





Fig. S 1.3. Performance of conservation prioritizations as element occurrences (EOs) 
accumulate over time. The measure of performance is the proportion of species with at 
least one occurrence in Tennessee in (a) the current year or (b) 2010 that were covered 
by solutions to the Maximal Coverage Problem (MCP). The bottoms and tops of vertical 
bars correspond to the minimum and maximum proportions of species covered, 
respectively. For instance, the blue bar at 1910 in (a), which corresponds to a 
watershed budget of 10, shows that solutions to the MCP covered ~73-79% of species 
known to occur in Tennessee in 1910. Note that the ranges of some watershed budgets 
are partially hidden due to plotting multiple budgets on one figure. The range is always 









Fig. S 1.4. Spatial distribution of watershed (top) irreplaceabilities and (bottom) 
richnesses at six snapshots in time. (top) Irreplaceabilities come from the sensitivity test 
where we choose 70 watersheds to solve the Maximal Coverage Problem and represent 
the proportion of a sample of near-optimal solutions in which a watershed occurred. 
The solution to the Maximal Coverage Problem in each year is based on the assemblage 
of species accumulated in each watershed since 1900 (see main text for details). 
(bottom) Richnesses are the number of unique species accumulated in that watershed 




Table S 1.3. Overall effect of additional data on priorities and when regressed against 
log10(size of dataset). Sensitivity of the ranking method to the number of sites used in 
the prioritization was tested. Subsequently, (column 2) the overall magnitude of 
change brought on by one year of additional element occurrences (EOs) was tested, as 
well as (columns 3-8) the trend of changing priorities as the dataset grew. Sensitivity 
tests without [slope2] and [break] fields use a one-segment regression. Values of V were 
natural logarithm transformed for Local Richness tests. 
test med(V) intercept slope1 slope2 break R2 ΔAICc 
Comp. 
Richness   
     
  
1-watershed 0 - - - - - - 
5-watersheds 0.14 0.04 -0.21 0.03 2.12 0.04 0 
10-watersheds 0.18 0.54 1.34 -0.02 1.79 0.10 10 
20-watersheds 0.20 -2.18 -0.80 -0.04 2.12 0.73 80 
30-watersheds 0.19 2.02 -0.75 -0.07 2.49 0.91 127 
40-watersheds 0.22 2.11 -0.53 -0.05 2.93 0.95 154 
50-watersheds 0.21 1.77 -0.52 -0.05 3.18 0.96 143 
60-watersheds 0.20 1.87 -0.49 +0.00 3.49 0.97 136 
70-watersheds 0.31 1.84 -0.47 -0.08 3.60 0.96 80 
80-watersheds 0.37 1.84 -0.42 -0.05 3.83 0.97 55 
90-watersheds 0.40 1.74 -0.41 -0.08 3.84 0.97 49 
        Local  Richness               
4-watersheds 0 - - - - - - 
48-watersheds 0.07 0.21 -0.03 - - 0.10 - 
93-watersheds 0.08 0.25 -0.05 - - 0.20 - 
925-
watersheds 0.13 0.24 -0.03 - - 0.17 - 
no-control-bias 0.01 0.24 -0.05 - - 0.21 - 
control-bias 0.11 0.18 -0.02 - - 0.02 - 
1-year 1.07 1.31 -0.07 - - 0.06 - 
2-year 0.65 0.79 -0.04 - - 0.04 - 
10-year 0.26 0.39 -0.04 - - 0.13 - 
25-year 0.16 0.23 -0.02 - - 0.06 - 
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2.1 Abstract 
Hydraulic fracturing and related ground water issues are growing 
features in public discourse. Few have given as much attention to 
surface impacts from shale gas development that result from building 
necessary surface infrastructure. One way to reduce future impacts from 
gas surface development without radically changing industry practice is 
by formulating simple, conservation-oriented planning guidelines. We 
explore how four such guidelines affect the locations of well pads, access 
roads, and gathering pipelines on state lands in Pennsylvania. Our four 
guidelines aim to (1) reduce impacts on water, reduce impacts from (2) 
gathering pipelines and (3) access roads, and (4) reduce impacts on 
forests. We assessed whether the use of such guidelines accompanies 
tradeoffs among impacts, and if any guidelines perform better than 
others at avoiding impacts. We find that impacts are mostly synergistic, 
such that avoiding one impact will result in avoiding others. However, we 
found that avoiding forest fragmentation may result in increased impacts 
on other environmental features. We also found that single simple 
planning guidelines can be effective in targeted situations, but no one 
guideline was universally best at avoiding all impacts. As such, we 
suggest that when multiple environmental features are important in an 
area, more comprehensive planning strategies and tools should be used. 
2.2 Introduction 
High-volume hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling combined with 
higher gas prices in the late 2000s led to the boom of shale gas 
development in the eastern United States. Hydrofracking is the high-
pressure pumping of water and sand to break shale and release gas. 
Horizontal drilling allows multiple wells to be drilled laterally from a 
location rather than a single well. In Central Appalachia, especially West 
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Virginia and Pennsylvania, U.S.A., where we illustrate a case study, over 
14,000 horizontal well permits have been granted since 2008. Many of 
these (~60%) have yet to be drilled (West Virginia TAGIS Unit 2014; 
Whitacre 2014), and many additional permits and wells are expected 
(Evans & Kiesecker 2014). Development of worldwide shale gas reserves 
(U.S. Energy Information Administration 2013) and accompanying 
surface infrastructure (Fig. 2.1) should raise concerns about associated 
environmental impacts. Since much of the potential gas development has 
not been realized, there are still significant opportunities to reduce future 
impacts through careful planning.  
Terrestrial impacts resulting from the spatial locations of gas 
surface infrastructure are an understudied and important issue. Impacts 
occur at all stages of the development process, from pre-production 
through post-production (Burton et al. 2014). Here we focus exclusively 
on pre-production activities and specifically the construction of well 
pads, access roads, and gathering pipelines, the impacts of which may 
play out at different rates and spatial extents. The magnitudes and types 
of impacts change from stage to stage, but it is clear that site 
construction incurs the most direct and thus quantifiable land use 
 
Fig. 2.1. Well pads (rectangular clearings), access roads (linear clearings in bottom-
right), and gathering pipelines (other linear clearings) pose many impacts on habitats 
in the Marcellus formation, including forest and wetland loss and fragmentation, 
displacement of species of conservation concern, erosion, and freshwater 




changes, which here are our focus. To date, most attention has been 
given to groundwater,  surface water, and air quality (Howarth, Ingraffea 
& Engelder 2011; Entrekin et al. 2011; Clark et al. 2012; Smith et al. 
2012; Olmstead et al. 2013). Attention to surface impacts has been less 
common, but is growing (Johnson et al. 2010; Davis & Robinson 2012; 
Slonecker et al. 2012; Drohan et al. 2012; Evans & Kiesecker 2014). 
Because the Marcellus shale formation is roughly uniform within a 
development site (Fig. S 2.1 in Appendix) and because horizontal drilling 
allows for many wells per pad, shale gas surface infrastructure in the 
Appalachian region can be evenly spaced and of low density. As such, 
terrestrial impacts from surface infrastructure are similar to low-density, 
rural housing development. Like houses, well pads are spaced hundreds 
of meters apart and connected by gravel roads (Fig. 2.1). Pipeline 
corridors are similar in width and surface maintenance requirements to 
underground electric transmission corridors. During construction, 
drilling, and hydraulic fracturing, gas development may have much 
larger cumulative impacts than other types of  development because of 
high-traffic trucking of materials, the size of temporary well pad staging 
areas, and the intensity of drilling noise and light. 
Much of shale gas development is occurring in areas of high 
biological diversity  (Gillen & Kiviat 2012; Kiviat 2013). In the Central 
Appalachian region, especially Pennsylvania, there are large areas of 
relatively intact forest on protected and unprotected lands. As of late 
2013, 32% of state-owned public land area in Pennsylvania host well 
permits (Whitacre 2014). More development is occurring on private, 
unprotected lands, much of which have high conservation value (Robles 
et al. 2008). At lease-hold and larger scales, the spatial configuration of 
gas surface infrastructure may greatly fragment forests (Slonecker et al. 
2012; Drohan et al. 2012; Racicot et al. 2014). Stream crossings for 
roads and pipelines may reduce stream connectivity and increase 
sediment delivery and risk of spills to streams. The construction of 
surface infrastructure disturbs soils, which changes local topography 
and may lead to increased erosion. When erosion and sedimentation 
controls are inadequate or fail, runoff can increase sedimentation in 
streams. In the event of hazardous waste spills, soils and streams may 
be contaminated and experience large die-offs of biota (Lustgarten 2009; 
Detrow 2012). For more details on potential environmental impacts of 
shale gas surface infrastructure, see Gillen and Kiviat (2012), Slonecker 
et al. (2012), Kiviat (2013) and others. 
In this paper we explore how multiple environmental impacts are 
associated with one another in shale gas infrastructure development. We 
specifically focus on using simple practices to plan well pads, access 
roads, and gathering pipelines, and we also assess the relative 
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effectiveness of our planning practices at avoiding impacts. Simple 
planning practices, which focus on achieving one or a few goals, may 
help developers incorporate additional environmental objectives into 
surface development without having to radically change practices. 
However, there is the risk that following simple practices will exacerbate 
tradeoffs among multiple environmental objectives since simple practices 
must be, by definition, narrowly defined. We use the Marcellus shale play 
in Pennsylvania as a case study. We planned well pad footprint locations, 
access road routes and gathering pipeline routes for twenty state forests 
and game lands, where shale gas development could occur. We 
attempted to follow the same planning steps in the order the gas industry 
uses and adhered to construction constraints imposed by state laws and 
development practices (Appendix). For each development site, we created 
four infrastructure layouts corresponding to four simple siting practices. 
For each infrastructure layout, we computed eight impact metrics that 
reflect the conservation objectives of stakeholders in the region. We 
looked for synergies and tradeoffs among impacts, i.e. whether some 
impacts were positively or negatively correlated. We also assessed 
whether some of our planning practices performed better than the others 
for some impacts, i.e. an impact metric was significantly lower when 
using one practice versus the others.  
Similar articles have focused on the hydraulic fracturing process 
(Kargbo, Wilhelm & Campbell 2010) at relatively small scales (Slonecker 
et al. 2012).  Racicot et al. (2014) undertook a similar planning exercise 
in which they planned well pads, access roads, and pipelines for a small 
region in Quebec, Canada. They looked at the potential impacts of 
surface infrastructure under various regulatory constraints, focusing on 
impacts with, versus without, additional ecological restrictions. Racicot 
et al. (2014) also analyzed the extent to which fairly simple ways of 
affecting development patterns in turn affected potential environmental 
impacts of that development. Our paper is novel in several ways. First, 
we look at impacts on a larger suite of environmental and human 
features, choosing to explore the broad spectrum of potential impacts 
since features will vary in importance from place to place. Second, we 
assess the synergies and tradeoffs among our suite of impacts and 
explore how our findings may affect more general planning of gas 
infrastructure. Third, we look at impacts over a large spatial extent, 
which may allow us to draw more general conclusions for the greater 
Appalachian region. Finally, we assess the relative effectiveness of simple 
planning practices across the suite of metrics, enabling us to see how 
simple practices may target one or several impacts. 
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2.3 Methods and Materials 
2.3.1 Shale Energy Industry Reference 
In planning surface infrastructure within our study sites, we attempted 
to follow the planning practices of the shale energy industry. Our main 
contact was Triana Energy, LLC, which is a privately held oil and gas 
exploration and production company based in Charleston, West Virginia, 
USA and operating in both West Virginia and Pennsylvania. We used 
Triana’s experience with shale energy development to inform the 
dimensions of production units, construction limits such as road grades, 
and surface infrastructure planning more generally. 
2.3.2 Study Site Selection 
We chose twenty case study sites from the 319 State Forests, State 
Parks, and State Game Lands underlain by Marcellus Shale in 
Pennsylvania (Fig. 2.2). Selection of study sites was done independently 
of current development status, severed mineral ownership, and the 
probability of future shale development. We chose Pennsylvania state 
lands as study sites for a few reasons. First, these public lands are 
managed by the state and are large tracts of consolidated land, which 
makes large-scale planning for multiple pads and thus potential gains 
from our study larger than in other areas. At the same time, mineral 
rights are severed from surface ownership on some public lands in 
Pennsylvania, which means that shale gas development can and is 
occurring on these lands. In areas with intact surface and subsurface 
ownership, some state forest lands and state game lands have also been 
leased for shale gas development. Finally, we chose to use highly forested 
public lands in a state with a large forest system because we wanted to 
highlight the potential impacts on relatively intact terrestrial habitats. 
State lands were first buffered by 100 m to remove small gaps 
between otherwise contiguous lands. We then combined any buffered 
lands that overlapped. We reduced our set of lands to those that could 
support between one and five full-size production units. A production 
unit is not physical infrastructure, but represents the area drained of gas 
by the wells of a single well pad (Fig. S 2.1). To reduce the set of lands, 
we first reduced the set of combined lands to those between 3 km2 and 
30 km2 (n=216). Next, we maximally covered each buffered land with 914 
⨉ 3352-m (3000 ⨉ 11,000-ft) production units rotated 27° (Triana 
Energy, LLC pers. comm.); the size of the production units is based on an 
assumption of 6 wells per pad. We considered a production unit 
economically feasible if at least 90% of its area was within the buffered 
land. Production unit placement was done visually and by hand. We 
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categorized the buffered lands into one of five size classes by the number 
of full-size production units we estimated they would support. Finally, we 
chose at random four buffered lands from each size class as our study 
sites. We note that the number of production units we visually estimated 
would fit in each buffered land is usually smaller than the total number 
we later placed when implementing our four siting practices. All GIS 
analysis was done in ArcMap 10.1 (ESRI). 
Cultural features were mapped using 2008 National Agricultural 
Imagery Program aerial images. All non-industrial cultural features, such 
as homes, agricultural buildings, retail businesses, and recreational 
fields overlapping the 20 chosen sites were mapped with free-hand drawn 
polygons. These were used to calculate distance to cultural features 
within the study sites. 
 
2.3.3 Siting Practices 
We chose to use four siting practices that are easy to understand, easy to 
implement, and that we expected to differentially achieve conservation 
 
 
Fig. 2.2. (large map) Pennsylvania State Forests, State Parks, and State Game Lands 
(green or darker gray) within the Marcellus gas formation (beige or lighter gray) serve 
as candidate lease areas from which we chose twenty public lands (black outlines) 
for our analysis. We chose to use state lands that could support one to five full-size 
production units after buffering individual lands and combining overlapping lands. 




goals. Our four siting practices are 1) site pads close to roads to reduce 
the impacts of access roads, 2) site pads close to pipelines to reduce the 
impacts of gathering pipelines, 3) site infrastructure away from water to 
reduce risks to aquatic systems, and 4) site infrastructure in disturbed 
areas to reduce impacts on intact habitats. We sited infrastructure four 
times at each study site, once per siting practice. In addition to following 
these practices, we adhered to existing regulatory and construction 
constraints (Appendix). We also attempted to follow existing industry 
planning practices, which are to site well pads/production units first, 
then to select routes for access roads and gathering pipelines (Triana 
Energy, LLC, pers. comm.). 
Before implementing a siting practice, we placed production units 
to maximally cover the study site. We started by placing full-size 
production units in the manner described in Study Site Selection. We 
then placed half-size production units in the same fashion. There is 
subjectivity in exactly where production units are placed, but we expect a 
human will find the maximum number of production units and near-
optimal locations.  
Next, well pads were placed within pad envelopes in the production 
units. A pad envelope is a smaller area within a static production unit 
that represents potential locations for a well pad while still draining the 
production unit (Fig. S 2.1). Moving the pad within its envelope changes 
the routes of wells. In a full-size production unit, the pad envelopes are 
1524 ⨉ 122 m. In a half-size production unit, pad envelopes are 122 ⨉ 
122 m. After restricting ourselves to the pad envelopes, we sited pad 
points (at the center of a raster pixel) to primarily adhere to the given 
siting practice. Secondarily, well pads were placed to center on the 
envelopes (or one envelope in the half-sized production unit), which 
reflects the developer practice of making all lateral wells close to a 
desired length (Triana Energy, LLC pers. comm.). Finally, if there were 
still options (especially in the case of half-production units) we put the 
well pads in the location closest to the nearest pad (siting done by visual 
inspection). We also adhere to Pennsylvania regulatory setbacks for well 
pads and other infrastructure. 
In most production units (63 of 93 or 68%), the “in disturbed 
areas” practice gave no direction about where to place well pads, because 
there were no cultivated or developed areas to bias placement. As such, 
most of the placement for these was done based on trying to center the 
pad in the envelope and/or put it near other pads. However, subsequent 
road and pipeline routes did depend on this practice. 
Well pads were connected to the existing road network using a 
least cost path method (ESRI 2013). The cost surface varied depending 
on the siting practice. When siting pads close to (1) existing roads or (2) 
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existing pipelines, the road cost surface was determined by the distance, 
elevation, and slope over which the road was built. These two factors 
reflect monetary costs of road construction materials and soil movement.  
When siting infrastructure (3) away from water, the cost surface was the 
inverse of the Euclidean distance from the water, such that cost 
increased with proximity. Where the distance to water was 0, we set the 
inverse distance to be 100 times larger than the maximum value in the 
rest of the raster. Finally, when siting infrastructure (4) in disturbed 
areas, we used the 2006 National Land Coverage Dataset to weight 
disturbed classes (Developed, Planted/Cultivated) as 100 times less 
costly than undisturbed classes and used that as the cost surface. 
Because the existing pipeline network is sparse, some study sites do not 
intersect with the network. We therefore buffered the study sites by 15 
km – chosen to ensure every study site intersects with at least one 
pipeline – before creating the placement regions for the pipelines and 
roads. We then built pipelines and roads outside of study sites where 
needed to complete the line, but clipped them off at the study site 
boundary and measured impacts only inside the study site. Pipelines and 
roads were sited using the same methods. Finally, we note that because 
the least-cost path method checks for a spatially additive impact, there is 
an implicit assumption that placing more infrastructures is always more 
impacting. As such, the placement algorithm is biased towards shorter 
roads and pipelines. In reality, some impacts like forest frag 1 below are 
spatially non-additive such that lower impacts can be achieved with more 
infrastructure in some cases. 
2.3.4 Environment Impact Metrics 
For each infrastructure layout, we calculated several environmental and 
cultural impact metrics. Metrics were calculated on a rasterized version 
of the study area, where cells are 30x30 m. We calculated the following 
metrics after each siting practice was implemented in a study site:  
 
1. cultural – risk to human cultural features; sum over the raster of 
proximity to cultural features, where proximity is defined as the 
inverse of the Euclidean distance of infrastructure to the nearest 
mapped cultural feature.  
 
2. erosion – erosion potential; sum over the slope raster of all cells 
occupied by infrastructure. 
 
3. forest loss – total number of previously forested cells in which 




4. forest frag 1 – effective mesh size; area of each patch if all the 
forest were combined and then divided into S equally sized patches 
with the same degree of landscape division as the original set of 
patches; similar to average patch size, but with more consistent 








 ∑  
 
 
   
 
 
where    is the number of cells in the analysis region, and    is the 
area of each forest patch after fragmentation. 
 
5. forest frag 2 – perimeter to area ratio; number of forest edge cells – 
those which border a non-forest cell – divided by total number of 
forest cells after development.  
 
6. rare spp – risk of displacing rare or other target species; sum over 
raster of expected number of occurrences of known locations (EOs) 
of rare species. To create this surface, a map of habitat types from 
the Northeastern Terrestrial Habitat Mapping Project () was 
overlaid with EOs from the Pennsylvania Natural Heritage Program 
(Table S 2.1). Each habitat type was assigned the number of EOs it 
contained. This was done without regard to species identity. This 
number was then divided by the total area of the habitat type to 
reduce areal effects. Finally, values were multiplied by one million 
to aid understanding. 
 
7. water 1 – reduction of stream connectivity; number of stream 
crossings; number of stream cells occupied by infrastructure. 
 
8. water 2 – risk to aquatic systems; sum over raster of proximity to 
water bodies, where proximity is defined as the inverse of the 
distance a liquid would flow from a cell over the surface to reach 
the first-encountered water body. This was calculated using 
ArcGIS’s Flow Direction tool. 
2.3.5 Analyses 
We tested two major hypotheses: 
 
1. Siting practices differentially affect metrics of impact. The goals 
here were to assess whether the choice of practice is important and 
if some practices are more generally effective than others. 
48 
 
2. Impacts are correlated across sites and practices. The goal here 
was to assess which impacts trade-off when planning 
infrastructure by simple planning guidelines. 
 
Before performing the tests below, we square-root transformed forest loss 
and cultural and log10 transformed all other data to increase normality. 
To test the first hypothesis, we built eight repeated measures ANOVAs, 
one for each metric as the response, where the study site was the 
“individual” on which repeated measures were being taken. The 
“treatments” on each individual were the practices themselves, and the 
ANOVA was used to test if practices created significant variation in the 
impact response of the site. We then used a post-hoc Tukey HSD test to 
determine, for those significant models, which practices differentially 
affected each impact metric. The ANOVAs were carried out using 
ezANOVA in R (v3). 
To test the second hypothesis, we calculated Pearson’s correlation 
coefficient between each pair of impact metrics, within each practice. For 
instance, one correlation was between forest loss and erosion when siting 
infrastructure in disturbed areas. We used a Bonferroni corrected alpha 
of 0.0018 (alpha = 0.05/28 = 0.0018) to test significance. We focused 
only on post-development correlations of impacts, but do explore the 
marginal change in impacts associated with following these simple 
planning practices in Appendix. 
2.4 Results 
Infrastructure layouts were qualitatively different based on which 
simple planning practice was followed (Fig. 2.3). For instance, Fig. 2.3 
shows four layouts resulting from our four planning practices for one 
development site. Note especially the lengths of gathering pipelines and 
that their routes differed markedly based on the locations of well pads, 
which were themselves in markedly different locations based on the 
planning practice. These same patterns hold for the other development 
sites (Fig. S 2.3). 
Differences in the locations of infrastructure led to varying 
impacts. While placing infrastructure away from water generally 
performed better across impacts than placing pads near existing roads or 
pipelines, or placing infrastructure in disturbed areas, no one practice 
was universally better across impacts than the others (Fig. 2.4). This 
should be expected since our simple practices purposefully target one or 
two objectives and cannot accommodate more without becoming 
intractable. Further, most impact metrics we measured were positively 




Fig. 2.3. Four layouts of well pads (■), roads (−), and pipelines (--) at one of our 
twenty sites (medium gray --). Other layouts presented in the Appendix. Existing 
roads are medium gray dots (…); proposed infrastructure is black. Each layout is the 
result of following a different simple siting practice (codes here). Each layout, if 
developed, would result in different impacts on forests (green or light gray), aquatic 
habitats (blue or medium gray), erosion, and cultural features (orange or dark gray 
with black outline) (Table S 2.2 for values). 
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better with others. However, one measure of forest fragmentation had 
consistent tradeoffs with other impacts (Fig. 2.4). This is an important 
caveat for Pennsylvania, where potential forest fragmentation is large 
(Johnson et al. 2010; Evans & Kiesecker 2014). 
We found that for this study region, set of impact metrics, and 
simple siting practices, impacts are more synergistic than antagonistic. 
This is revealed in Fig. 2.4 by the dominance of positive correlations (+) 
between impacts. The strongest and most numerous positive correlations 
occurred between the water 2 impact metric, a measure of proximity of 
infrastructure to water bodies, and other metrics. Conversely, there were 
no significant positive correlations between the rare spp metric and other 
metrics. However, there is a negative correlation between forest frag 1, a 
measure of forest fragmentation, and both forest loss and erosion 
potential. There is also a less strong but persistent tradeoff with water 
impacts. Tradeoffs involving forest fragmentation are especially important 
in Pennsylvania, where there are large areas of intact forest. Thus, if we 
prioritize minimizing forest fragmentation, this may come at the cost of 
increasing forest loss, erosion, and stream impacts.  
The bar charts and letters in the bottom of Fig. 2.4 reveal that 
while practices differ in how they affect each impact metric (different 
groups within each impact metric), no practice performed better (had 
lower means) than others across all impacts. This is expected, since our 
simple practices were chosen to achieve specific goals. For instance, 
putting infrastructure away from water (Fig. 2.4 “p1”) produced the 
lowest water impacts, but some higher forest impacts. That example also 
reveals that simple planning practices can be relatively effective at 
avoiding targeted impacts. Another example is that putting infrastructure 
in disturbed areas resulted in relatively lower levels of forest frag 2 and 
forest loss. Putting infrastructure close to (p2) existing pipelines or (p3) 
existing roads did not produce clear patterns in impacts relative to the 
other practices. This may indicate that planning practices that do not 
clearly target an environmental feature like water or forest are less likely 
to be effective in a predictable manner. That said, both practices 
performed the best with regards to erosion potential. Finally, the blank 
bars in Fig. 2.4 show that there was no significant difference in 
performance of planning practices with regards to forest frag 1 or rare 
spp. Both forest frag 1 and rare spp are metrics that will respond to fairly 
large landscape changes. Effective mesh size (forest frag 1) responds 
most when large patches are divided, which is relatively unlikely in this 





Fig. 2.4. Synergies and tradeoffs among impacts and practices. (grid) Correlations between impact metrics across all 20 
sites. Negative correlations (-) are tradeoffs; synergies are +. Symbol size reflects correlation magnitude. Significant 
correlations (black) were assessed with Bonferroni corrections. (bar charts) Performance of practices. Bars are mean 
values (+/- Tukey HSD confidence intervals) within the impact listed above on the diagonal, e.g. the left set of bars 
corresponds to the cultural impact of different siting practices. Non-overlapping errors bars and group letters indicate 
significant differences. Values are scaled 0 to 1, where 1 is worst. forest frag 1 and rare spp repeated measures ANOVAs 




To inform the use of simple guidelines for planning shale gas surface 
infrastructure, we wanted to know if the use of such guidelines 
accompanies tradeoffs among environmental impacts. We also sought to 
assess the relative effectiveness of guidelines for avoiding impacts. Using 
Pennsylvania public lands as a case study, we sited well pads, access 
roads, and gathering pipelines according to four guidelines that are easy 
to understand and implement. We calculated and correlated eight proxies 
for environmental impacts that would result from developing such 
infrastructure. 
We found mostly weak positive correlations between impacts, 
indicating that for our study area, multiple impacts could be avoided 
simultaneously with environmentally-oriented planning. More generally, 
some impacts will be negatively correlated – i.e. trade-off – in that trying 
to avoid one impact by changing the location of infrastructure necessarily 
leads to increasing another impact. In those cases, the best strategy to 
avoid impacts is to choose locations that balance antagonistic impacts. 
In this study, one measure of forest fragmentation - effective mesh size - 
was negatively correlated with several other impacts. This is likely due to 
both spatially intrinsic tradeoffs between impacts and the use of 
simplified planning guidelines (Fig. S 2.2). This result is important in 
Pennsylvania where reducing impacts on forest fragmentation are highly 
important and may come at the cost of increasing other impacts, 
regardless of planning practices. These patterns generally hold when 
looking at marginal – as opposed to absolute – changes brought on by 
development (Fig. S 2.2). 
We also found that simple guidelines for planning surface 
infrastructure can be relatively effective when focusing on one or a few 
impacts. For instance, our analysis revealed that, for this context, 
putting infrastructure away from water was more effective at avoiding 
water and cultural impacts than other simple planning guidelines. 
Unfortunately, no one simple guideline was universally better at avoiding 
impacts than all other guidelines. As such, when more targeted, site-
specific planning is possible, simple planning guidelines that encompass 
the planning context may be good enough.  
Since our results suggest that regulations targeting single impacts 
will not be universally effective, new regulations either need to be more 
comprehensive or site specific, e.g. through a review process similar to 
Pennsylvania’s Natural Diversity Inventory Environmental Review Tool 
(http://www.gis.dcnr.state.pa.us/hgis-er/Login.aspx). For instance, our 
results indicate actions that target reductions in forest impacts by 
placing infrastructure in disturbed areas (e.g. Fig. 2.3) will actually 
increase erosion potential, stream crossings, and cultural impacts 
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relative to alternative strategies (Fig. 2.4). Actions that incentivize 
developers to take an impact-comprehensive planning approach could be 
more effective, but will be more challenging to design and implement 
than simpler, targeted ones. Alternatively, implementing a site-level 
review process where regulator and developer work together to identify 
potential impacts and avoid them could be effective, though at an 
increased time and resource commitment for both sides. 
Our study joins the large and growing body of work on measuring 
and assessing the relationships between multiple indicators of 
environment and society for decision making. Increasingly common are 
studies of tradeoffs among ecosystem services (Bennett, Peterson & 
Gordon 2009; Raudsepp-Hearne, Peterson & Bennett 2010; Moilanen et 
al. 2011; Maskell et al. 2013; Howe et al. 2014). At the same time, multi-
objective planning is an essential part of conservation more generally 
(Cattaneo et al. 2006).  Our study incorporates elements of land use 
decision making, another arena in which ongoing research highlights 
that understanding the effects of land use on multiple indicators is 
important (Phalan et al. 2011; Sayer et al. 2013). 
We chose impact metrics to cover features and topics of concern to 
stakeholders and to illustrate synergies and tradeoffs between multiple 
objectives. These are clearly not exhaustive. We focused on impacts at 
one particular stage – site development – while impacts occur at all 
stages. In reality, impacts from surface infrastructure development 
extend beyond the scope of our study, and include both positive and 
negative effects. For instance, while we focus on known rare species, 
development also impacts common species and species not prioritized by 
conservation. We focus on known rare species because these are a 
greater focus for decision makers. Indeed, developers in Pennsylvania are 
required to avoid known locations of rare species through the 
Pennsylvania’s Natural Diversity Inventory Environmental Review 
process mentioned above. We also use a simple measure of impacts on 
humans that ignores some positive and negative socioeconomic effects of 
development (Sovacool 2014).Many such effects play out over scales 
largely independent of the scale of analysis here, while others could form 
alternative or additional components of a more comprehensive analysis 
at this study’s scale. Regardless, we were able to identify some synergies 
and tradeoffs with the impacts we did include. 
Future analyses similar to ours could benefit from a few 
methodological changes. First, while public lands served as an 
informative case study for testing impacts from development, shale gas is 
being extracted all over the Central Appalachian region, including private 
lands. Private lands tend to be more fragmented in ownership and land 
use, which would likely affect the resulting infrastructure layouts and 
impacts from that development. It is unclear how transferrable our 
results are to the private lands context. Second, we did not rigorously 
test the change in impact correlations before versus after surface 
54 
 
infrastructure was placed, choosing to qualitatively assess the change in 
correlations (Fig. S 2.2). While this does not affect our practice-specific 
conclusions described above, it does affect our ability to say with 
statistical confidence whether simple guidelines induced tradeoffs and 
synergies among impacts. 
Multiple routes can be taken to reduce impacts from development 
including regulation, land protection, and changing industry practices. 
Each of these routes is currently underutilized in the Central 
Appalachian region, but we expect this study will help inform future 
actions in each. First, federal and state regulations exist to restrict the 
placement of surface infrastructure but do not address some important 
ecological impacts such as habitat fragmentation. Furthermore, most of 
Pennsylvania’s current setback requirements that aim to protect 
sensitive habitats potentially can be waived with a request and 
justification by the gas developer. Second, the efficacy of traditional land 
acquisition and easement is uncertain in shale gas development sites 
where surface and subsurface rights to land are sometimes separately 
owned. Our results suggest an effective strategy for conservation groups 
and landowners - in conjunction with willing gas industry partners - is to 
inform site-specific planning where priority environmental or biological 
features are present. Third and finally, the gas industry currently does 
not have strong incentives to go above and beyond regulation to further 
reduce impacts. Increasing environmentally-oriented planning will 
require some effort to lower the threshold of entry for the gas industry. 
Simple planning practices can be more easily assimilated into existing 
planning than more complex tools and practices. However, more 
advanced tools and methods may be needed to help industry planners 
incorporate environmental objectives into their planning, especially when 




2.6.1 Change in impacts due to development 
In the main text we focus on correlations between impact metrics after 
development has occurred. In doing so we put emphasis on the absolute 
tradeoffs/synergies between impacts and consequently take a more 
holistic approach to reducing impacts rather than focusing on the 
practice-specific effects of development on impact metrics. Another 
relevant approach is to test the change in correlations between impacts 
induced by following our four simple planning practices. We briefly 
explored how correlations between impact metrics changed from before 
to after development occurred.  
Our methods for measuring correlations before development were 
very similar to that presented in the Analyses section in the main text: 
we measured the values of our impact metrics at each of the twenty 
development sites and assessed correlations between them. There are 
two important aspects that differ here. First, six of our eight impact 
metrics always have a value of 0 before development. Only forest frag 1 
and forest frag 2 have a non-zero value before development. In order to 
measure correlations between impacts for the six other metrics, we 
calculated, for each development site, the average value of the impact 
surface raster, since those six metrics are just spatially additive 
functions of the surface rasters. For instance, for the erosion metric, we 
took the average value of the slope raster. We only included in the 
average those values in the raster that were feasible locations for roads 
since the feasible road area is an intermediate between the pad and 
pipeline areas and we wanted to include those areas that might actually 
be developed. The second difference from our main text analysis is we did 
not differentiate between planning practices before development, since 
there would be no difference anyway. 
After calculating pre-development values and correlations, we 
looked at the difference in correlations between post and pre-
development. Since we did not differentiate between planning practices 
before development, we combined the post-development metric values 
across planning practices so there is only a single comparison for each 
pair of metrics. 
Fig. S 2.2 summarizes the results of this analysis. Before 
development (top of Fig. S 2.2), many impacts trade-off with one another, 
probably necessarily due to being affected in spatially disjoint areas. As 
the Difference table reveals (bottom of Fig. S 2.2), planned development 
would often increase synergies (red, positive correlations) between 
impacts (in 16 of 28 comparisons). At the same time, planned 
development would lead to relative tradeoffs (blue, negative correlations) 
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between impacts (in 12 of 28 comparisons). For the most part, the 
general patterns that we present in the main text (somewhat summarized 
in the After sub-table in Fig. S 2.2) hold when looking at marginal 
changes brought on by development (summarized in the Difference sub-
table). 
In some cases (e.g. forest frag 2 vs. forest loss), planned 
development could reverse the correlation between impacts (e.g. from -95 
to +13). Finally, the green, italicized numbers indicate that very few 
correlations were significant after Bonferroni correction. We did not do 
statistical testing for the significance of the Difference table values. 
2.6.2 Minimum Development Constraints 
We adhered to existing regulatory and construction constraints on the 
placement of gas surface infrastructure. Namely, 
2.6.2.1 pads 
 0 m from lease boundary 
 0 m from pad zones 
 100 m from wetlands > 1 acre 
 30 m from stream 
 152 m from cultural feature 
2.6.2.2 roads 
 0 m (but not in) wetlands > 1 acre 
 slope < 10000%. Note that generally roads would not be graded to 
larger than 15% slope and in steep places, construction of roads 
on steep slopes would be accomplished by switchbacks, which the 
least-cost path algorithm in ArcMap is not able to accomplish. As 
such, a few planned roads in our analysis may have been 
unrealistically steep. 
2.6.2.3 pipes 







Fig. S 2.1. Illustration of production units (pink rectangles), pad envelopes (white 
rectangles with black outline) and how they relate to the well pad (black squares) 
and associated well laterals (red lines) within a development site (dot-dash gray line). 
The larger, full-sized production unit has six wells, while the half-sized drainage unit 
has only three. As a result, the full-sized unit places the well pad in the center, while 
the half-sized unit places the well pad one of the ends. Note that regulations require 
wells to stay within the development site boundary, so one well from the full-sized 
unit is cut-off. We did not explicitly site well laterals, so the production unit 
boundaries do not correspond to what would be the final well trajectories. We 




cultural -48 -22 65 30 56 9 -3 
  erosion 23 -24 -24 -71 32 49 
  
 
forest loss -30 -95 19 -43 -26 
  
  
forest frag 1 30 29 13 -3 
  
   
forest frag 2 -8 49 36 
  
    
rare spp -39 -41 
BEFORE 
    
water 1  91 
          water 2 
        cultural 62 53 -18 52 53 52 74 
  erosion 64 -50 15 14 29 66 
  
 
forest loss -61 13 27 37 58 
  
  
forest frag 1 29 17 -24 -39 
  
   
forest frag 2 44 24 33 
  
    
rare spp 23 36 
AFTER 
    
water 1  84 
          water 2 
        cultural 110 75 -82 22 -3 43 78 
  erosion 41 -26 39 85 -4 17 
  
 
forest loss -31 107 8 80 84 
  
  
forest frag 1 -1 -12 -36 -36 
  
   
forest frag 2 52 -25 -3 
  
    
rare spp 62 77 
DIFFERENCE 
   
water 1  -7 
        water 2 
Fig. S 2.2. Results of comparison of impact correlations before and after development. Red cells are positive correlations. Blue cells 
are negative correlations. Bold, green, italicized text denotes significance at the 95% confidence level. Correlation coefficients are 
multiplied by 100 for ease of presentation
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Table S 2.1. Datasets used to place infrastructure and calculate impact metrics. 
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Table S 2.1 Continued 
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Fig. S 2.3. In this series of figures we show the infrastructure configurations created for 
3 representative development sites. Each figure contains four layouts of well pads (■), 
roads (−), and pipelines (--) at one of our twenty sites (gray). Existing roads and 
pipelines are brown; proposed infrastructure is black. Each layout is the result of 
following a different simple siting practice. Each layout, if developed, would result in 
different impacts on forests (green), aquatic habitats (blue), erosion, and cultural 













2.6.3 Analyses Results 
Table S 2.2. Impact metric values for each of the layouts shown above and including the “no-development” scenario (practice “pre”). 
Note the pre-development values are not measured the same way as post-development values (see Additional Methods above). These 
are untransformed values. 
  
Table S 2.3. Continued 
  
impact metrics 
site practice cultural erosion forest loss forest frag 1 forest frag 2 rare spp water 1 water 2 
1 p1 0.74 9511.66 317 21739.13 0.256 6241.51 0 0.97 
1 p2 0.62 3630.59 189 21739.13 0.251 2545.89 67 2.10 
1 p3 1.30 4000.03 249 21739.13 0.252 2145.84 170 3.59 
1 p4 1.41 8078.43 165 21739.13 0.250 2277.06 82 3.55 
1 pre 0.001 18.796 0.478 22222.22 0.248 2.894 0.056 0.007 
2 p1 0.22 2401.26 159 15151.52 0.111 2061.91 0 0.30 
2 p2 0.11 2045.48 168 14492.75 0.111 1869.36 0 0.24 
2 p3 0.40 1602.99 202 14925.37 0.116 2540.80 34 1.57 
2 p4 0.49 2466.99 138 15151.52 0.103 2173.17 8 0.84 
2 pre 0.001 10.317 0.810 15384.62 0.088 5.434 0.026 0.004 
3 p1 1.81 12048.07 519 52631.58 0.163 3350.06 3 1.83 
3 p2 1.21 6698.81 542 52631.58 0.164 4812.26 251 4.35 
3 p3 1.74 6857.29 499 52631.58 0.162 2980.85 249 3.58 
3 p4 1.91 13684.22 340 52631.58 0.153 2313.02 85 5.55 
3 pre 0.001 18.063 0.676 52631.58 0.146 2.363 0.047 0.006 
4 p1 1.09 2875.96 211 16129.03 0.189 4421.34 0 0.42 
4 p2 1.19 2456.47 233 15873.02 0.190 4311.15 20 0.97 
4 p3 0.80 3845.82 315 16949.15 0.199 5655.39 78 1.53 
4 p4 0.90 3884.77 113 15873.02 0.178 2227.30 9 1.32 




Table S 2.3. Continued 
  
impact metrics 
site practice cultural erosion forest loss forest frag 1 forest frag 2 rare spp water 1 water 2 
5 p1 0.70 5258.18 286 4424.78 0.277 1974.14 4 0.81 
5 p2 1.18 1764.74 184 4347.83 0.264 2001.67 48 1.72 
5 p3 1.36 2051.58 288 4366.81 0.273 647381.94 84 3.45 
5 p4 0.98 4700.61 118 4310.34 0.255 216134.83 24 2.31 
5 pre 0.002 8.333 0.444 4545.45 0.249 3.203 0.052 0.005 
6 p1 0.14 3020.49 81 13333.33 0.124 655.23 0 0.12 
6 p2 0.07 598.92 63 13157.89 0.123 1339.40 0 0.14 
6 p3 0.11 1055.46 72 13333.33 0.124 1030.55 0 0.15 
6 p4 0.10 1894.63 12 13333.33 0.120 184.30 7 0.65 
6 pre 0.001 14.574 0.717 13333.33 0.120 4.975 0.038 0.005 
7 p1 0.41 2799.89 340 35714.29 0.169 6299.90 2 0.62 
7 p2 0.42 2563.12 350 35714.29 0.171 22066.97 11 0.94 
7 p3 0.48 3034.22 361 35714.29 0.170 82877.62 24 1.45 
7 p4 1.64 7882.51 175 35714.29 0.160 77877.20 15 3.06 
7 pre 0.001 9.227 0.664 37037.04 0.155 5.241 0.040 0.005 
8 p1 1.02 3084.90 220 7518.80 0.284 18796.90 0 0.55 
8 p2 0.96 1034.21 156 7692.31 0.280 353768.56 35 1.10 
8 p3 1.26 1445.75 197 7692.31 0.285 370628.50 52 1.41 
8 p4 0.95 5759.22 111 5952.38 0.270 170054.69 21 3.11 
8 pre 0.002 9.944 0.516 7874.02 0.266 3.827 0.048 0.006 
9 p1 0.13 3450.25 127 10101.01 0.110 1829.85 0 0.15 
9 p2 0.04 973.69 60 10204.08 0.098 757.35 5 0.32 
9 p3 0.12 1132.58 74 10204.08 0.102 1333.76 7 0.61 
9 p4 0.04 1223.11 57 10204.08 0.098 660.54 3 0.22 




Table S 2.3. Continued 
  
impact metrics 
site practice cultural erosion forest loss forest frag 1 forest frag 2 rare spp water 1 water 2 
10 p1 0.16 1961.45 202 23255.81 0.135 3519.31 0 0.31 
10 p2 0.15 1620.88 232 23255.81 0.138 3556.95 38 1.38 
10 p3 0.17 1713.43 188 23809.52 0.134 2609.62 40 0.94 
10 p4 0.20 2591.10 190 23255.81 0.134 2181.54 8 0.99 
10 pre 0.001 8.693 0.718 23809.52 0.124 6.660 0.041 0.006 
11 p1 0.19 1664.89 169 41666.67 0.075 2359.23 0 0.47 
11 p2 0.15 1641.51 143 41666.67 0.073 2017.07 22 0.78 
11 p3 0.25 1429.56 143 41666.67 0.073 1140.00 43 0.87 
11 p4 0.15 3040.84 127 41666.67 0.072 801.58 17 1.43 
11 pre 0.001 8.208 0.851 41666.67 0.067 6.698 0.035 0.005 
12 p1 0.44 12666.93 485 25641.03 0.114 2431.98 4 1.16 
12 p2 0.50 5597.44 458 25641.03 0.102 1365.40 150 2.49 
12 p3 0.53 4871.99 374 25641.03 0.095 1091.21 138 2.54 
12 p4 0.28 10429.01 224 25641.03 0.085 289.85 34 2.90 
12 pre 0.001 25.140 0.872 26315.79 0.069 0.762 0.046 0.006 
13 p1 0.09 1059.29 132 12500.00 0.122 1832.60 0 0.14 
13 p2 0.23 1348.39 215 12345.68 0.132 5484.25 21 0.86 
13 p3 0.11 881.23 166 12345.68 0.127 2872.77 2 0.29 
13 p4 1.53 3905.93 153 12345.68 0.119 3148.98 8 1.14 
13 pre 0.002 8.363 0.753 12658.23 0.108 6.427 0.030 0.004 
14 p1 0.44 11737.51 617 58823.53 0.102 8313.79 3 1.11 
14 p2 0.58 8949.48 685 58823.53 0.105 9147.52 83 3.41 
14 p3 0.74 7990.75 684 58823.53 0.106 9351.45 112 3.82 
14 p4 1.74 17552.61 557 40000.00 0.101 18896.08 68 5.48 




Table S 2.3. Continued 
  
impact metrics 
site practice cultural erosion forest loss forest frag 1 forest frag 2 rare spp water 1 water 2 
15 p1 0.45 8437.78 446 66666.67 0.149 790.53 0 1.57 
15 p2 0.78 6223.11 704 66666.67 0.156 745.11 96 3.59 
15 p3 0.53 4550.11 551 66666.67 0.152 572.20 89 2.23 
15 p4 0.99 9245.37 352 66666.67 0.146 745.94 32 3.52 
15 pre 0.000 16.526 0.698 71428.57 0.137 0.825 0.048 0.006 
16 p1 2.29 12147.42 963 29411.76 0.150 18662.62 5 1.76 
16 p2 1.57 5443.25 615 28571.43 0.136 24734.86 54 3.60 
16 p3 1.89 5108.42 713 29411.76 0.140 25629.98 91 4.65 
16 p4 2.89 8104.22 365 29411.76 0.125 126910.11 22 3.44 
16 pre 0.001 8.541 0.719 30303.03 0.116 6.552 0.021 0.004 
17 p1 0.17 4283.59 365 20000.00 0.111 4162.54 0 0.48 
17 p2 0.16 1700.87 335 20000.00 0.108 5030.55 0 0.46 
17 p3 0.18 2199.23 353 20000.00 0.110 5172.63 0 0.56 
17 p4 0.51 8496.39 260 10526.32 0.102 32221.05 23 2.68 
17 pre 0.001 18.599 0.747 20408.16 0.088 1.540 0.024 0.004 
18 p1 0.67 7658.05 508 30303.03 0.242 5762.46 6 1.13 
18 p2 1.36 5157.50 573 28571.43 0.245 78492.70 190 4.58 
18 p3 1.44 5279.11 742 27027.03 0.256 2969.75 326 6.60 
18 p4 1.02 9820.28 249 29411.76 0.227 18051.86 27 4.18 
18 pre 0.001 9.923 0.481 30303.03 0.217 2.988 0.028 0.004 
19 p1 0.65 6139.97 477 43478.26 0.172 6276.80 0 0.79 
19 p2 1.08 3558.60 510 43478.26 0.174 34686.67 84 2.33 
19 p3 1.11 4106.18 582 41666.67 0.177 66242.91 170 3.41 
19 p4 1.23 7077.80 353 43478.26 0.164 50512.85 27 3.66 




Table S 2.3. Continued 
  
impact metrics 
site practice cultural erosion forest loss forest frag 1 forest frag 2 rare spp water 1 water 2 
20 p1 0.44 3992.51 301 22727.27 0.253 3108.47 0 0.64 
20 p2 0.77 3079.36 344 22222.22 0.255 4552.39 125 3.04 
20 p3 0.70 2865.79 345 22727.27 0.255 3511.98 146 3.11 
20 p4 0.85 7910.96 160 22727.27 0.244 1394.25 81 5.04 




Fig. S 2.4. (above diagonal) Pearson’s correlations between impacts within practices. Each correlation is taken across all 20 sites. 
Colors correspond to the strength and direction of the correlation. Numbers are correlation coefficients multiplied by 100. 
Significance of correlations was computed using a Bonferroni correction where k = 28. Significant correlations are in bold. (below 
diagonal) Scatter plots of impacts within practices and impacts. These were used to create the correlation coefficients above the 
diagonal. Practice codes are p1: put infrastructure away from water, p2: put pads close to existing pipelines, p3: put pads close to 




Table S 2.3. Results of repeated measures ANOVAs and Tukey HSD tests for practices 
within impacts. Note, for “forest frag 1” and “rare spp,” the non-significant ANOVA does 
not mean that development had no effect on those metrics. It only means that different 
practices did not differentially affect the metric. 
 
Metric SS Error p-value 
 
 





CL† 97.5% CL† Group 
p1 0.71 0.65 0.78 a 
p2 0.74 0.67 0.81 a 
p3 0.81 0.74 0.87 ab 
p4 0.92 0.85 0.98 b 
     
 
Metric SS Error p-value 
 
 





CL† 97.5% CL† Group 
p1 3.66 3.61 3.71 b 
p2 3.41 3.36 3.47 a 
p3 3.43 3.38 3.49 a 
p4 3.75 3.70 3.80 b 
     
 
Metric SS Error p-value 
 
 





CL† 97.5% CL† Group 
p1 17.84 17.11 18.57 a 
p2 17.49 16.76 18.22 a 
p3 18.01 17.28 18.74 a 
p4 13.83 13.10 14.55 b 
     
 
Metric SS Error p-value 
 
 





CL† 97.5% CL† Group 
p1 4.35 model was not significant, so no 






   







Table S 2.3 Continued 
 
Metric SS Error p-value 
 
 
forest frag 2 0.01 3.12E-08 
 
p1 mean 2.5% CL† 
97.5% 
CL† Group 
p2 -0.81 -0.82 -0.81 a 
p3 -0.82 -0.82 -0.81 a 
p4 -0.81 -0.82 -0.81 a 
 
-0.84 -0.85 -0.83 b 
     
 
Metric SS Error p-value 
 
 
rare spp 11.11 3.02E-01 
 
 
mean 2.5% CL† 
97.5% 
CL† Group 
p1 3.55 model p-value is >0.05, so no 






   
     
 
Metric SS Error p-value 
 
 
water 1 8.95 3.51E-16 
 
 
mean 2.5% CL† 97.5% CL† 
Grou
p 
p1 0.24 0.07 0.40 b 
p2 1.45 1.29 1.62 a 
p3 1.64 1.47 1.81 a 
p4 1.34 1.18 1.51 a 
     
 
Metric SS Error p-value 
 
 
water 2 1.66 3.40E-14 
 
 
mean 2.5% CL† 97.5% CL† 
Grou
p 
p1 -0.23 -0.30 -0.16 b 
p2 0.12 0.05 0.19 a 
p3 0.21 0.14 0.29 a 
p4 0.33 0.26 0.40 a 
† These confidence limits are derived from the Tukey HSD test. They represent half the 
confidence interval based on the standardized error of the repeated measures ANOVA 
and the critical value from the studentized range distribution, which depends on the 
critical p value (0.05), the number of degrees of freedom in the model error (57), and the 
number of practices being compared (4). The Tukey HSD test could produce different 
confidence ranges for each pair of practices being compared, but all confidence ranges 
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are the same in this case because we have equal sample sizes (n=20) across all 
practices. The relationship between the model mean squared error (SS Error / 57 [deg. 
freedom]) and the confidence intervals when comparing two practices is. 
 ̅   ̅   (       )√









 where   ̅   ̅ are the means of impact values for practices   and  , q is the critical value 
from the studentized range distribution,     is the mean squared error of the within-
groups mean squared error, and       are the number of data points from practices    .  
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Chapter 3: The cost of avoiding 
environmental impacts from shale gas 




A version of this article will be submitted for peer reviewed publication. 
Austin W. Milt, Tamara D. Gagnolet, and Paul R. Armsworth. “The 
cost of avoiding environmental impacts from shale gas surface 
infrastructure at the lease-hold level.” 
 
Austin Milt performed the secondary data collection, data processing, 
analysis, interpretation, and writing for this article. Tamara Gagnolet 
assisted in data collection, and both co-authors contributed intellectually 
to the design, interpretation, and revision of the article.  
3.1 Abstract 
Shale energy development is receiving increasing attention due to its 
potential to supply short term domestic fossil energy and due to concerns 
about its environmental impacts. All energy development harms the 
environment, but surface impacts from shale energy development might 
be minimized through careful spatial planning of infrastructure at the 
lease-hold level. Doing so would come at some financial cost. Here we 
estimate the relative financial cost of reducing impacts on forests, 
wetlands, rare species, and flowing freshwater from shale energy 
development within lease-hold scale sites. At a median site, up to 40% of 
impacts could be avoided before further avoidance became cost 
prohibitive. However, this aggregation conceals considerable variation 
among sites. Low-cost reductions in impacts are possible in many areas 
and not others, such that increasingly ambitious commitments to 
avoiding potential impacts could drive many sites out of production. 
Feasible regulations may be able to target one or two impacts that 
dominate aggregate impacts, though this depends on the choice of 
metrics and expected impacts in a region. Our results indicate that 
regulations seeking to reduce impacts from future development may be 
possible for moderate reductions in impacts and doing so may be 
relatively inexpensive, though not extremely so. Cost effective regulations 
will need to account for heterogeneity in the ability of and relative cost at 
sites to avoid impacts.  Our analysis is unique in its combination of 
scale, comprehensiveness in surface infrastructure planning, and explicit 
consideration of the tradeoffs between reducing impacts and increasing 
construction costs. As such, we are uniquely able to inform the 
implications of reducing environmental impacts from shale gas surface 




Shale gas production in the U.S. has grown markedly since the start of 
the boom around 2008  and as of 2012 made up a larger portion of 
overall gas production than any other source (Annual Energy Outlook 
2014 2014). Countries other than the U.S., most notably the U.K. (Hays 
et al. 2015) and China, are currently deciding on how to proceed with 
their own unconventional gas development. Rising with shale gas 
production and exploration are concerns about its environmental, 
human health, social, and economic consequences (Hays et al. 2015). 
Unconventional gas surface infrastructure can negatively affect 
terrestrial and freshwater biodiversity through habitat loss and 
fragmentation (Gillen & Kiviat 2012; Kiviat 2013; Jones et al. 2014) and 
pollution and sedimentation (Kassotis et al. 2013; Olmstead et al. 2013).  
All energy infrastructure development produces environmental 
impacts, but the amount of impact and ability to avoid impacts are 
important factors in determining how much development, if any, is 
permissible. Types and amounts of impact will be context specific. Here, 
we focus on the surface terrestrial and freshwater impacts of well pads, 
access roads, and gathering pipelines accompanying directional drilling 
and hydraulic fracturing at the lease-hold level. Lease-holds are 
aggregations of tens of adjacent mineral and/or other subsurface rights 
of land parcel size into single planning units. Our sites are 
approximations of lease-holds. More specifically, we quantify and plan 
infrastructure to avoid forest loss and fragmentation, reductions in 
stream quality, wetland encroachment, and risk to rare species. Because 
we suspect most readers have not visited shale gas construction sites 
(Fig. 3.1), we invite the reader to imagine them as similar rural home 
development. Well pads are dispersed in space, separated by hundreds to 
thousands of meters. Access roads, which connect well pads to the 
existing road network, are generally short (~0.1 km here), narrow (12 m 
here), gravel roads. And gathering pipelines, which allow gas to be 
transported off-site, are similar in corridor size and straightness to 
buried electrical transmission lines. 
When relatively large areas are planned as a single unit, there may 
be scope to move planned well pads, access roads, and gathering 
pipelines to partially avoid local impacts. The spatial planning problem 
this presents is not trivial to solve. A cost- or impact-minimizing 
configuration of wells, well pads, access roads, gathering pipelines, and 
other infrastructure requires the spatial coordination of all these 
infrastructures. Here, we present an analysis using spatial optimization 
software that plans surface infrastructure locations with the 
interdependence of infrastructure in mind, and does so while reducing 




Fig. 3.1. Well pads (rectangular clearings), access roads (linear clearings in bottom-
right), and gathering pipelines (other linear clearings) pose many impacts on habitats 
in the Marcellus formation, including forest and wetland loss and fragmentation, 
displacement of species of conservation concern, erosion, and freshwater 
sedimentation and fragmentation. Courtesy of M. Godfrey, The Nature Conservancy. 
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Reducing impacts from surface infrastructure is likely to increase 
construction costs. While infrastructure planning practices will vary by 
place and planner, planning is unlikely to fully assimilate environmental 
objectives. Further, costs and impacts may be negatively correlated in 
space, such that reducing one increases the others, as is commonly the 
case with multiple spatial objectives (e.g. Raudsepp-Hearne, Peterson & 
Bennett 2010; Ruijs et al. 2013; Qiu & Turner 2013). As with other 
financially focused endeavors, infrastructure planning will focus on 
minimizing costs while adhering to constraints imposed by regulation 
and construction limitations, some of which are oriented towards 
protecting the environment. More environmentally-oriented planning will 
move the gas industry away from the financial bottom-line. Therefore, 
quantifying the costs of reducing environmental impacts may be vital to 
changing industry practice. In Pennsylvania where our study 
concentrates, directional drilling and hydraulic fracturing are the most 
expensive parts of development (Hefley & Seydor 2015), but these costs 
do not vary much in space under normal development conditions. We 
concentrate on major costs that vary with the spatial locations of surface 
infrastructure: moving earth, clearing land, stream crossing 
infrastructure, and construction materials plus any associated labor 
(Triana energy, pers. comm.). 
With the quantification of site-level costs of reducing 
environmental impacts as a goal, we present a case study of 
environmentally-oriented shale energy surface infrastructure planning in 
Pennsylvania. In particular, we (1) developed a novel, advanced spatial 
optimization algorithm to plan well pad locations and access road and 
pipeline routes at 84 sites in 5 counties in Pennsylvania (Fig. 3.2), and 
(2) quantified the tradeoff between reducing environmental impacts and 
increasing construction costs of alternative development plans. We 
aggregated the site-level tradeoffs between impacts and costs to arrive at 
a general tradeoff graph for our Pennsylvania sites that shows the 
relative cost of reducing impacts by a specific amount.  
When the results of our analysis revealed overall promising but 
heterogeneous potential to reduce impacts at reasonable costs, we 
further explored causes for site-level differences in cost-impact tradeoffs. 
There are many possible sources of heterogeneity of costs and impacts 
across sites, all of which play out by affecting two things: the cost of 
moving infrastructure relative to the resulting change in impacts and the 
number of alternative configurations of infrastructure. For instance, 
larger sites may have more potential locations for infrastructure and 
thus increase the amount that impacts can be avoided. Some impacts 
may dominate others in a site, but may be limited in the potential to 
avoid them, and this would result in little scope to reduce impacts. Some 




Fig. 3.2. Development sites (green polygons), with grouped well permits (gray) and 
the Marcellus shale play (beige). Sites were derived by overlaying production units on 
existing well permits and taking contiguous land parcels under those production 
units by a single operator. In all, 84 sites were developed. 
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little effect on aggregate impacts. Finally, there may be attributes of the 
financial bottom-line configuration of infrastructure that prevent large 
reductions in potential impacts, such as that configuration is already in 
a low-impact area. We explore all these possibilities and others.  
3.3 Methods 
We used Pennsylvania as a representative state for shale energy 
development in the eastern U.S. Over 9,620 horizontal wells were drilled 
in Pennsylvania between 2008 and 2014 according to the Pennsylvania 
Department of Environmental Protection’s permit reporting database. As 
we discuss in Chapter 2, Pennsylvania is an ideal state to study 
development because of the large amount of development that has 
occurred, especially since it overlaps with areas of high conservation 
priority. 
We planned and analyzed shale energy development at the lease-
hold scale. This is the scale at which well pads, access roads, and 
gathering pipelines are currently planned. As such, it is the planning 
scale which most directly affects the terrestrial and freshwater 
environment. The lease-hold scale is larger than parcel scale and tends 
to be several hundred to 10,000 hectares. 
Our sites were derived from locations of horizontal wells drilled 
from 2008-2013 (Table S 3.2). Grouped well points were merged into a 
single point to estimate locations of well pads. Each well pad point was 
overlaid with a 6-well production unit 3352.8 m tall by 914.4 m wide 
(3000 by 11000 ft) and rotated 27° counter-clockwise (Triana Energy, 
LLC, pers. comm.). The Production Unit is the area under each well pad 
that can be drained of its gas when using a six-well configuration.  The 
angle of rotation matches the grain of the shale. Though this angle 
changes from place to place, it takes geologic surveys to know what the 
angle should be, and so we use an angle representative of examples we 
have seen from the gas industry. Production units were overlaid on land 
parcels. The set of contiguous land parcels shared by the production 
units of a single operator became one site. In all, this process produced 
176 sites, 84 of which the software was successfully able to place 
infrastructure in (Fig. 3.2). Those areas which the software failed to place 
infrastructure in typically had no feasible layouts possible because of 
lack of road or pipeline access to potential well sites or existing road and 
pipeline networks. 
Several additional datasets are needed to place infrastructure in a 
site, including environmental data that inform infrastructure constraints, 
impacts, and construction costs (Table S 3.2). One such dataset is the 
existing pipeline network, which serves as connection points for 
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gathering pipelines. In our experience, there are no sufficiently complete 
pipeline datasets that can be acquired for a state-wide, multi-company, 
site-level analysis such as ours. Instead, we used an admittedly sparse 
pipeline dataset and rather than force gathering pipelines to connect to 
existing pipelines far outside of the development boundary, we required 
they connect to a portion of the development boundary in the direction of 
the nearest existing pipeline. This served our analysis well, since our 
focus is on costs and impacts within single sites. 
The Impact Score of a layout is a weighted sum of individual, 
normalized impact metrics (p. 94) and which we used to place 
infrastructure. We used five metrics in our planning and analyses. First 
we calculated the amount of forest acreage lost (forest loss) by 
development of forest pixels. Second, we calculated the total edge-to-area 
ratio (forest frag.) of forest after construction as one measure of forest 
fragmentation. Third, we calculated wetland encroachment (wetlands) as 
the percent of a 61-91 m (200-300 ft) buffer around wetlands occupied 
by infrastructure. Fourth, we calculated potential sedimentation in water 
bodies (sediment; p. 98). Fifth and finally, we calculated the expected 
impact on rare species (rare spp.) as the expected number of known rare 
species occurrences impacted by infrastructure based on habitat 
associations across the state. For this analysis, impact metrics were 
weighted equally, except for forest acreage lost and forest perimeter to 
area ratio. Each of these received half the weight of the others such that 
each category of impacted features was given equal weight. We describe 
how impact metrics were normalized on p. 108. Bungee – spatial 
planning software described in the next paragraph – allows users to 
adjust the weights of impact metrics, thereby tailoring the behavior of the 
tool to the priorities of stakeholders in the planning area. Such weights 
could come from valuation exercises or other studies (e.g. Banzhaf et al. 
2014). 
We developed novel spatial planning software – Bungee – with the 
chief aim of informing the gas industry of ways to reduce environmental 
impacts from surface infrastructure at reasonable costs. Bungee stands 
for “Balancing Unconventional Natural Gas Extraction and the 
Environment,” but we use it colloquially without capitalization. Bungee 
performs spatial optimization of surface infrastructure at the lease-hold 
level (p. 107). Bungee attempts to minimize environmental impacts from 
infrastructure while limiting the total construction budget. For a single 
site, Bungee proposes multiple alternative layouts – configurations of 
well pad locations and access road and gathering pipeline routes – that 
differ in their impacts and costs (e.g. Fig. 3.3). Associated with an 
infrastructure layout are summary statistics about the individual impact 




Fig. 3.3. Example layouts and their estimated impacts produced by our 
infrastructure planning software. The choice of layouts was made to illustrate how 
layouts differ spatially when going from (left column) lower costs and higher impacts 
to (right column) higher costs and lower impacts. (table) Spatial differences in 
layouts lead to differences in impact and costs. Individual impact metrics (p. 94) are 
rare spp. – expected number of known rare species locations encountered, wetlands 
– percent of buffer around wetlands occupied by infrastructure, sediment – sediment 
load in moving water bodies by disturbing soil, forest loss – area of forest cleared, 
forest frag. – forest edge-to-area ratio after development. Impact Score is an aggregate 
of the individual impact metrics. Impact Scores at different sites are not comparable. 
We use a monotonic, non-linear color scaling on the impact surface to enhance 
heterogeneity of impact values. 
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construction costs. Impact metric values and costs are based on GIS 
layers and consultation with The Nature Conservancy and the gas 
industry. Our main gas industry contact for this study was Triana 
Energy, LLC, which is a privately held oil and gas exploration and 
production company based in Charleston, West Virginia, USA and 
operating in both West Virginia and Pennsylvania. We used Triana’s 
experience with shale energy development to inform the dimensions of 
production units, construction limits such as road grades, and surface 
infrastructure planning more generally.  
Infrastructure layouts were planned using our hierarchical, 
heuristic, least-cost based spatial optimization software, Bungee. Before 
placing well pads, access roads, and gathering pipelines, Bungee 
determines both the number and approximate locations of well pads in a 
site by maximally packing production units within the site polygon. As 
such, the final number and locations of well pads was not directly 
determined by the existing well permits. To pack production units into 
sites, Bungee iteratively adds production units to the site and uses a 
simulated annealing algorithm to make room for new production units. 
Production units were allowed to partially overlap other production units 
as well as go outside the site as long as the total unused area of each 
production unit did not exceed 20%. We further explain the packing 
process on p. 109 and Bungee documentation (available upon request). 
Infrastructure layouts were placed after production units, which 
determine the approximate areas where well pads will go. Each 
infrastructure layout consists of a set of pad locations, access road 
connection routes, and gathering pipeline connection routes (e.g. Fig. 
3.3). The infrastructure layout creation portion of Bungee relies on (1) 
feasible locations for infrastructure, (2) an impact objective, and (3) cost 
constraints. The first of these requirements is determined by regulatory 
setbacks and technological constraints. The impact objective is the 
Impact Score, which we have already described. The third requirement is 
determined by the cost of an estimated least-monetary-cost layout. All 
layouts are produced by first proposing locations of well pads. Once 
locations are chosen, well pads become terminals for roads and 
pipelines. Roads and pipelines are routed using a least-cost path 
algorithm that is a modified version of Dijkstra’s algorithm (Dijkstra 
1959). The surface over which access roads and pipelines are routed is a 
spatially additive approximation of the Impact Score, which is non-
additive in nature. Access roads and gathering pipelines must connect to 
their respective existing infrastructure networks. Each layout must 
adhere to a monetary construction budget which is iteratively relaxed to 
trace the tradeoff curve for a site. The optimal layout at one construction 
budget is determined by a genetic algorithm optimization of the locations 
of well pads and order of construction of linear infrastructure (p. 107). 
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This method will likely produce local (rather than global) optima, so we 
planned layouts five times for each site and took those layouts that were 
not simultaneously more impacting and more costly than any other 
layout, i.e. they are closer to the Pareto-frontier. 
3.4 Results 
3.4.1 Infrastructure Layouts 
Using existing well locations to approximate lease-hold scale site 
boundaries, we planned shale energy surface infrastructure in 84 sites in 
5 counties in Pennsylvania (Fig. 3.2). We were limited to five counties 
with shale energy development because of limits on parcel data. At each 
site, we used Bungee to automatically assess the tradeoffs between 
reducing environmental impacts and increasing construction costs. The 
software produced 2-20 layouts at each site. This number varies because 
(1) the software is heuristic, (2) the flexibility of planning at each site 
differs, and (3) the shape of the tradeoff curve varies by site.  
There are spatial patterns in layouts across sites (Fig. 3.3). At low 
costs, access roads and pipelines tend to be straight (Fig. 3.3a,c) and 
short. As the amount spent increases, the routes of linear infrastructure 
begin to meander as the software tracks the lower-impact areas (Fig. 
3.3b,d). These differences between layouts are often subtle, but even 
subtle differences can greatly affect impacts and costs. For instance, in 
the table in Fig. 3.3 we show how the differences in layouts (a) and (b) 
increase costs by ~1.5 million USD while reducing most impacts, but 
increasing impacts on wetlands. Sites differ by the number of pads since 
sites have different sizes and shapes. All layouts within a site are 
constrained to have the same number of pads. 
3.4.2 Tradeoff Curves 
We used an aggregate measure of environmental impact (p. 100) along 
with estimated construction costs of each layout to produce a tradeoff 
curve for a site (Fig. 3.4). We linearly interpolated between points 
corresponding to the infrastructure layouts to construct each site’s 
tradeoff curve. Although tradeoff curves are generally thought of as 
smoothly concave or convex, our tradeoff curves are by nature of their 
construction not smooth and vary in their convexity. Discontinuity is 
created by the discreteness of layouts, which produce the points used to 
construct the tradeoff curves. The set of Pareto-improved layouts within 
a site tend to be separable into subsets, where each subset contains 




Fig. 3.4. Cost of reducing impacts at the development-area scale as the commitment 
to reducing impact increases. (gray lines) Tradeoff curves for individual sites, 
illustrating that the general shape of tradeoff curves, the maximum reduction in 
Impact Score and the resulting increase in construction costs all vary across sites. 
The lines are interpolated between individual layouts and are shown for clarity, while 
in reality the tradeoff curves will not be smooth. (blue line) Median of the tradeoff 
curves where truncated curves are given a very high cost at higher levels of impact 
reduction. This illustrates the overall cost of reducing the Impact Score by some 
amount when using one type of uniform policy across sites. 
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small Pareto-improvements, such that points in the tradeoff curve for 
similar layouts are close together. Spatial differences between subsets of 
layouts tend to be large and result in large changes in Pareto-optimality. 
Thus, tradeoff curves tend to be characterized by clusters of points 
separated by large gaps, i.e. are not smooth. Variations in tradeoff curve 
convexity arise from a complex combination of the spatial relationship 
between costs and impacts in a site, as well as environmental, 
developmental, and regulatory constraints on infrastructure placement, 
which in combination are difficult to tease apart. In order to compare 
across sites, which may have very different costs and impacts, we 
calculated the percent increase in construction costs and percent 
reduction in Impact Score relative to the least-cost layout; the ratio of the 
first value to the second gives the impact elasticity of cost for a particular 
layout. As such, the dotted line in Fig. 3.4 is the line of unit elasticity, 
along which a 1% decrease in the Impact Score requires a 1% increase in 
construction costs. Layouts above the unit elasticity line are 
proportionally more expensive than the resulting reduction in impact, 
while layouts below are proportionally cheaper for the impact reduction. 
As Fig. 3.4 shows, sites varied markedly by the shape of their tradeoff 
curves. Some curves lie primarily above the unit elasticity, while most lie 
below. Some curves are concave overall, while most are convex. The 
variation in the shapes of the tradeoff curves is to be expected, since our 
sites may differ by how constrained infrastructure locations are, to what 
degree impacts and costs vary over the site, and the relative magnitude 
of change in impacts and costs brought on by moving infrastructure (i.e. 
% change). Below we do more analyses to understand what caused the 
general patterns we observed. 
3.4.3 Cost of Reducing Impacts 
On average, we found that although large reductions in Impact Score can 
often be achieved for little cost, this was true only for some sites. In Fig. 
3.4 (gray lines), we plot the distribution of tradeoff curves showing the 
cost of reducing the Impact Score by a specific amount. We also plot a 
summary tradeoff curve that aggregates across sites. The blue line in Fig. 
3.4 shows the median value of the cost of reducing the Impact Score 
when we artificially assign a very high cost to reducing impacts for 
curves that have no layout at the current impact reduction. This line 
represents overall costs of reducing impacts when using a median-based 
uniform regulation across sites. The median increase in construction 
cost increases almost linearly up to ~38%, such that a given percent 
reduction in the Impact Score requires half that percent increase in costs. 
The median escalates quickly around 40% reduction in the Impact Score. 
Further reductions in the Impact Score would require an inordinate 
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amount of money on the median site. In other words, the impact 
elasticity of costs is about one-half up to ~38% and becomes almost 
perfectly elastic after 40%. Of our 84 sites, 43 could achieve this 40% 
reduction in impact at a cost of 0.8-3.8 million USD per pad. 
There was considerable variation in site-level ability to and relative 
cost of reducing potential impacts. Note that raw Impact Scores cannot be 
directly compared across sites, so we summarize by percentage changes 
relative to the least-cost layout. The site with the largest potential to 
avoid impacts could reduce the Impact Score up to 75% for 4.1 million 
USD (1 million USD per pad). At the other extreme, another site could 
reduce the Impact Score only 2% at a cost of 7.7 million USD (1.1 million 
USD per pad). Most sites (75 of 84 or 89%) had tradeoff curves mostly 
below the line of unit elasticity, indicating it is relatively cheaper to 
reduce potential impacts by some amount in those sites. However, as can 
be seen in Fig. 3.4, curves below the line of unit elasticity are fairly 
evenly distributed in their overall shapes. 
3.4.4 Understanding Causes of Heterogeneity of Tradeoff 
Curves 
What site-level differences distinguish those sites with short versus 
long tradeoff curves and cheap versus expensive reductions in impacts, 
and which, in aggregate, lead to the median line in Fig. 3.4? We chose to 
explore our results in three additional ways. First, we explored how site 
characteristics might influence our results. Second, we looked at the 
breakdown of impact metrics contributing to reductions in the Impact 
Score to see which impacts are responding the most to moving 
infrastructure. Third, we qualitatively assessed the spatial characteristics 
of impact surfaces and least-cost layouts at sites to determine the 
amount of reduction likely at a site and thus the shape of the site’s 
tradeoff curve. 
Simple ordinary least-square regression revealed tenuous support 
that site attributes reflecting the flexibility of planning can predict the 
amount that impacts can be avoided or a combination of the cost and 
impact without planning infrastructure (p. 92). The strongest of these 
results relied on site-level cost and impact surfaces. The cost surfaces 
are pixel-by-pixel estimates of construction cost at a site, with one cost 
surface for each type of infrastructure. The impact surfaces are pixel-by-
pixel approximations of the Impact Score made by assuming each pixel is 
developed independently of others (p. 108). We found that higher 
variation in the impact surface as well as higher variation in the ratio of 
impact to cost (return on investment; ROI) surfaces explained larger 
impact reductions and lower relative costs of avoiding impacts (p. 92 and 
Table S 3.1). With R2=15% for both models, variation in the impact 
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surface explained most of the variation in our two responses (p<0.001). 
However, there was obvious uneven sampling over the range of values of 
the variation in the impact surface (Fig. S 3.2). We accounted for this by 
splitting the data into two parts with even sampling and modeling the 
parts separately. We then compared the original one- and new two-part 
models using AICc competition, which evaluates the parsimony of models 
by rewarding models for higher explanation of variance and punishes 
them for using more parameters (Crawley 2007). Model competition 
supported the two-part model, which was non-significant. This result 
weakens support that variation in the impact surface can be used to 
explain our responses. Variation in the ROI surface explained 9% of the 
variation in our responses (p≈0.004). Bonferroni correction for multiple 
comparisons did not reverse the significance of the ROI models. Thus, 
areas with higher variation in ROI will, on average, be able to reduce 
impacts further and at lower relative costs. Other site attributes, 
including site area, number of well pads, the slope and correlation 
between impact and cost surfaces, and existing road and pipeline density 
were unrelated to our responses (Table S 3.1).  
Individual impact metrics differentially contributed to reductions in 
the Impact Score relative to the least-cost layout (Fig. S 3.3). Since the 
Impact Score is a sum of the (normalized) impact metrics, we can 
attribute changes to the Impact Score to changes in each of the impact 
metrics. Reductions in the rare spp. metric contributed to 40% +/- 5% 
(mean +/- std. err.) reduction in the Impact Score across sites (Fig. S 3.3). 
Following rare spp. were sediment yield (25% +/- 5%), forest loss (19% 
+/- 3%), forest p2a (-0.1 % +/- 0.2%), and wetlands (-1.2% +/- 0.8%). 
Three things explain the variable contributions of impact metrics to 
reductions in the Impact Score. First and foremost, the disparity between 
rare spp. and other metrics is likely due to the large variance of rare spp. 
over small spatial scales. The pixel values of rare spp. may vary multiple 
orders of magnitude between adjacent pixels, such that a small shift in 
infrastructure results in a large reduction in impacts. Couple this with 
the lack of a direct cost analog to the rare spp. metric – unlike forest loss, 
whose cost analog is forest clearing costs – and relatively inexpensive 
reductions to rare spp. can be made with small changes to 
infrastructure. Similarly, some of the contribution of forest loss can be 
attributed to high variance over small scales, though it has a cost analog, 
such that the least-cost layout already avoids those areas to some extent. 
Second, some impacts are small in the least-cost layout, such that there 
is little scope to reduce those impacts further. The wetlands 
encroachment metric is restricted to areas surrounding wetlands, which 
are relatively sparse. As a result, wetlands encroachment impacts from 
the least-cost layout tend to be small and as a result impact-reducing 
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layouts have little scope to reduce this metric. Finally, but rarely, 
reductions in one impact metric resulted in increases in another relative 
to the least-cost layout, which explains why, on average, wetlands 
encroachment had a negative contribution to reductions in the Impact 
Score. 
In most cases, the difference between sites that could achieve large 
reductions in the Impact Score for little cost (25 of 84 or 29%), i.e. those 
with tradeoff curves in the lower right of Fig. 3.4, and those sites which 
could do very little (17 of 84 or 20 %), could be explained by visually 
comparing layouts overlaid on the spatially additive impact surface. The 
spatially-additive impact surface approximates the Impact Score on a per-
pixel basis, while the true Impact Score depends on the entire layout. 
From this exercise, two conditions distinguish the aforementioned 
groups: first, whether the least-cost layout has at least some 
infrastructure in high-impact areas, and second, whether there are 
lower-impact areas for infrastructure to be placed. Those 25 sites in the 
first group tended to have roads or pipelines in high-impact areas in the 
least-cost layout (21 of 25 sites). Much less often (4 of 25 sites) well pads, 
but not roads or pipelines, were in high-impact areas in the least-cost 
layout. Those 17 sites in the second group, which achieved either no 
large or very costly reductions in the Impact Score, tended to be 
constrained by impacts in one way or another. Many sites (9 of 17) were 
constrained by a lack of low-impact alternatives for pipelines and pads. 
Often, sparse existing pipeline infrastructure, to which gathering 
pipelines had to connect, forced gathering pipelines through high-impact 
areas. Alternatively or in addition, feasible well pad locations, from which 
gathering pipelines start and well pads are located, were in high-impact 
areas. In other sites (6 of 17), reductions in some impacts led to 
increases in others, such that the aggregate Impact Score did not change 
much. Finally, in 3 of 17 sites, the least-cost layout was already in a low-
impact area such that there was little scope to reduce impacts further. 
3.5 Discussion 
Shale gas development will continue worldwide, but there are 
opportunities to reduce potential impacts through environmentally 
oriented planning. Here we presented an analysis that looks at the 
monetary cost of such planning at the site level, and found scope to 
reduce impacts, though doing so is not generally cheap. More 
specifically, we found that most sites do not have the scope to reduce the 
Impact Score more than ~40%. For those sites, reducing the Impact Score 
up to ~38% requires <20% additional investment, but further reductions 
become very expensive. For many of those sites that can achieve larger 
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reductions in impact at reasonable costs, doing so is inexpensive. For 
instance, a reduction in the Impact Score of up to 60% required <5% 
increase in costs at several sites (Fig. 3.4). There was only marginal 
support that simple statistics on the spatial variation of impacts and 
costs within a site can be used alone to partially predict the nature of 
tradeoffs in a site, while other site characteristics do not appear to be 
informative. Some impact metrics dominated others in their contribution 
to avoiding aggregate impacts. 
Our results can be used most directly by policy makers. There is 
scope to reduce the aggregate Impact Score up to ~38% with ~20% 
increase in costs when following a median-based uniform policy. 
However, a 20% increase in costs is not small, requiring ~400,000 USD 
per well pad to reduce impacts by 38% in our case study. That said, the 
construction costs represented here are for surface infrastructure alone, 
so total costs to a developer would increase by less than 20%. As such, 
regulations that target a 38% reduction in aggregate impacts without 
compensating developers need not result in a 20% increase in gas prices. 
Regulations that target one or two impacts independently may do fairly 
well at reducing aggregate impacts. We found that ~65% of reductions 
across sites in the Impact Score over the least-cost baseline were 
attributable to just two impact metrics, which measured impacts on 
high-quality habitats and freshwater sedimentation (Fig. S 3.3). Further, 
only very rarely did impacts trade-off with one another when compared to 
the least-cost layout. This is a qualitatively similar result to Chapter 2 
even though the assessment and set of impacts differ somewhat. As 
such, it is possible that regulations could target one or two metrics to 
reduce aggregate impacts in a predictable way up to a point. In 
Pennsylvania, for instance, restrictions on the amount of infrastructure 
placed in high-quality habitats and high-slope areas could be feasibly 
implemented, since these data can be at least partially remotely sensed 
and impacts assessed by overlaying planned infrastructure with these 
data. There is already a minimum setback requirement for infrastructure 
placed in high-quality watersheds in Pennsylvania. Outside of our study 
area, it will be important to assess potential impacts before implementing 
such a regulation, since the necessary qualities of the impacts here may 
not extend elsewhere. Finally, we found that some site attributes 
partially explain the ability to reduce impacts at a site as well as the 
relative cost of doing so. However, the low (R2~9%) explanatory power of 
these attributes likely precludes them from being used independently 
from other analyses to predict potential tradeoffs at a site. 
It may be possible to regulate aggregate impacts efficiently, i.e. to 
simultaneously reduce multiple distinct impacts with a single regulation. 
If this can be done, it presents two major advantages. First, regulating 
aggregate impacts enables regulators and/or developers to tailor 
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individual impacts at the site level rather than be forced to focus on 
impacts they may not be able to avoid. Second, a general regulatory tool 
for aggregate impacts could work in multiple regions where regulating 
single impacts might not. As our results show (Fig. 3.4), uniform policies, 
e.g. that require all sites reduce impacts by a certain amount, may be 
unnecessarily costly. More flexible regulations may be able to take 
advantage of the heterogeneity of site-level tradeoffs between cost and 
impact to reduce impacts across all sites. There are many economic tools 
and existing programs that can cost efficiently allocate single impacts 
across sites and can serve as a basis in this context (Ferraro 2008). 
Market-based mechanisms such as cap and trade can exploit 
heterogeneity across sties, incentivizing those who cannot reduce 
impacts by much or for cheap to compensate those who can and will. We 
explore this further in Chapter 4.  
There are two major barriers to implementing any aggregate impact 
regulation in this context. First, there must be some information 
exchange between regulators and developers. We think at minimum that 
regulators must share their environmental priorities in order for 
developers to assess alternative infrastructure layouts that may reduce 
aggregate impacts. Existing command-and-control regulations do this to 
some degree by restricting infrastructure in areas of high environmental 
value. To avoid aggregate impacts, regulators would need to make 
explicit how infrastructure layouts are used to evaluate aggregate 
impacts. In addition to sharing environmental objectives, we think 
developers will need to share some layouts, which is already done for 
other permits. Regulators need such layouts to estimate impacts in the 
absence of additional regulations so they can effectively limit impacts. In 
the cap and trade system we explore in Chapter 4, regulators would not 
need to know construction costs, though this additional information may 
be helpful. Bungee, the planning software we presented here, provides an 
existing system for this information exchange and is set up in such a 
way that planning and monitoring would be very inexpensive. 
The second barrier to implementing a regulation of aggregate 
impacts is the difficulty of finding and using a metric of aggregate 
impact. The Impact Score – the measure of aggregate impact we use here 
– is a site-specific metric. It lends itself well to optimization at the site-
level and could be used to implement a uniform policy such as described 
above, but it could not be used in its present form to allocate allowed 
impacts across sites. We return to this point in Chapter 4, in which we 
faced this issue. One example of a aggregate score currently used to 
allocate conservation funds is the Conservation Reserve Program’s 
Environmental Benefits Index (United States Department of Agriculture 
Farm Service Agency 2011). The Environmental Benefits Index is 
measured qualitatively and is used to rank applicants, whereas a metric 
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better suited to our system would be calculated directly from estimated 
impacts and that could be traded or allocated continuously across sites. 
Bungee can be used by regulators, policy makers, conservation 
NGOs, large land owners, and the shale energy industry to reduce 
potential impacts from future development. Regulators whose job it is to 
assess development plans for permits could use our software to evaluate 
the relative impacts of a proposed infrastructure layout to a lower-
impact, more “ideal” layout. Then, threshold allowances could be applied 
to judge with some objectivity if the proposed layout meets environmental 
standards. Policy makers could use the software to estimate potential 
gains from new regulations. Applied in a new context, Bungee could 
inform the magnitude of subsidies or taxes to affect a target level of 
impact avoidance by the shale energy industry. Conservation groups who 
are working in collaboration with the gas industry can use Bungee to 
inform planning practices at a site. Such collaborations between 
conservation and industry may be necessary since conservation groups 
will be better informed about the important impacts in an area and how 
to evaluate them. Large landowners who have access to ArcGIS can use 
our software to propose alternative layouts when shale development 
plans clash with site features the landowner wants protected. That said, 
our experience has been that the shale energy industry is attuned to 
such conflicts and, when well informed, wants to avoid them. Finally, the 
gas industry is perhaps the best positioned to benefit from the use of our 
software. The scale at which it operates, its flexibility in use, and its 
incorporation of costs mean that Bungee can be an effective tool for going 
above and beyond for a progressive company. 
Our study is a novel contribution to the shale energy policy 
literature. In addition, Bungee is a novel planning software in multiple 
regards. Our methods focus on site-level planning, which is the scale at 
which decisions about shale gas development most directly affect the 
environment. As such, we are uniquely able to inform policies and 
actions at this scale. Bungee attempts to simultaneously site multiple 
types of infrastructure with very different planning characteristics. The 
spatial optimization problem it solves and the methods used to do so 
have, to our knowledge, never been so comprehensively attempted in 
conservation planning. While the software is specialized to work in the 
shale gas planning context, the methods could be easily transferred to 
other development problems that involve connecting potential 
development sites to infrastructure networks while considering costs and 
impacts. 
Several steps could be taken to improve future analyses such as 
ours. First, we feel that a more informative analysis would explicitly 
compare existing shale gas development to proposed layouts at the 
development-area scale. Such an analysis would require having site 
91 
 
boundaries from many shale energy companies as well as more complete 
pipeline data. Both datasets are difficult to come by and cannot be easily 
derived from available remotely sensed data. As a compromise, we used 
publicly available well permit locations and our knowledge of drilling 
practices to estimate development boundaries. This enabled us to plan in 
locations where development has occurred, but not to compare to 
existing development directly. Second, the planning framework and 
methods in Bungee are advanced, but the software performs a fairly 
narrow heuristic search for potential infrastructure layouts. We were 
forced to compromise known optimality for reasonable run speeds. Our 
results must therefore be interpreted as conservative, since it is likely the 
layouts produced are not Pareto-optimal. Improvements to the 
optimization method could improve the optimality of results without 
prohibitively increasing the run time. 
3.6 Conclusion 
Shale energy development will likely play an increasingly important role 
in energy production over the coming decades. Our study and others like 
it can contribute to a conservation oriented development paradigm, in 
which the cost of impacting the environment is explicitly accounted for 




3.7.1 Additional/Detailed Methods and Results 
3.7.1.1 Regressions to explain impact reductions 
We wanted to know if site attributes related to the flexibility of 
infrastructure planning would explain how much impacts could be 
reduced, what this would cost, or a combination of the two. In other 
words, can we predict the end-points of the tradeoff curves in Fig. 3.4 
without planning infrastructure? Addressing this question would allow 
us to understand what makes some sites able to avoid impacts cheaply 
as opposed to not being able to avoid impacts at all or for it to be very 
expensive to do so. 
To answer the above question, we identified several predictors 
related to the flexibility of planning of infrastructure. We define flexible 
sites as those where there are many feasible, spatially distinct 
infrastructure layouts with a wide range of Impact Scores. An inflexible 
site is one where feasible layouts are tightly constrained to specific areas 
or where there is little heterogeneity in impacts and costs. First and 
second, we used the density of existing road and pipeline networks as 
predictors since larger/denser existing infrastructure provides more 
connection points for proposed infrastructure. This was calculated as the 
number of pixels of existing road (or pipeline) infrastructure per pixel of 
the site. Third, we used the variation of the pipeline impact surface 
across pixels (see 3.7.7.5 Estimate additive impact surfaces), since 
higher variation of impacts might create more alternative routes for 
pipelines and roads. This was calculated as   ( )      .̅ We used the 
pipeline impact surface because it covered the entire site and the spatial 
structure of the impact surfaces are very similar across types of 
infrastructure. Fourth, we use the variation of the pipeline cost surface 
for a similar reason to the pipeline impact surface and calculated the 
same way. Fifth, we used variation in the ROI surface, which is the ratio 
of the impact surface to the cost surface. We expected the ROI surface to 
be the strongest predictor since Bungee is planning according to impacts 
and costs (see 3.7.7.6 Create final layouts and 3.7.9.3 Linear 
infrastructure route optimization). Sixth, we used the correlation 
between the impact and cost surfaces. Highly negatively correlated 
impact and cost surfaces might lead to costly avoidance of impacts, 
whereas highly positively correlated surfaces might lead to an inability to 
reduce impacts since the least-cost layout would already be in low-
impact areas (Babcock et al. 1997). Seventh and eighth, we used the size 
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(in hectares and number of well pads) of sites, since larger areas, by 
definition, have more locations for infrastructure to be placed. 
For the regressions, two response variables were identified that 
describe attributes of the least-impact layout relative to the least-cost 
layout. These two layouts form the end-points of the tradeoff curves in 
Fig. 3.4 (see Fig. S 3.1 for example). First, we used the impact reduction 
of the least-impact layout measured as the X position of the least-impact 
layout (Fig. S 3.1). Second, we calculated the ratio of the cost increase 
and impact reduction of the least-impact layout, also known as the 
impact elasticity of cost of the least-impact layout (Y/X in Fig. S 3.1). 
As Table S 3.1 below shows, four models were significant (p<0.05). Visual 
inspection of the plots using log10(CV(impact)) as a predictor (Fig. S 3.2) 
show uneven sampling across the values of log10(CV(impact)). We explored 
the effects of treating the dataset as composed of two parts, each with 
even sampling across log10(CV(impact)). To do so, we split the dataset at 
log10(CV(impact)) = -1.0 and ran separate ordinary least-squares 
regressions on each part.  In both cases, the two-part model had an AICc 
score more than five units below the one-part model (titles in Fig. S 3.2), 
indicating a two-part model is more parsimonious. Combined with the 
non-significance of the two-part model, this result weakens support that 
log10(CV(impact)) explains variation in our responses. 
3.7.1.2 Summary of metric contributions to reductions in Impact Score 
We wanted to see if reductions in the Impact Score relative to the least-
cost layout were being driven mainly by one or a few impact metrics. If 
so, then regulations concentrating on those most responsive metrics 
 
Fig. S 3.1. Example showing how response variables for regressions were derived. 
The relative cost (Y) and impact reduction (X) of the least-impact layout are 




could reduce aggregate impacts. In addition, if there was little scope to 
reduce one of those metrics at a site, then there may be little scope to 
reduce the Impact Score. We also wanted to see if some metrics tended to 
trade off with others, which would reduce the effectiveness of some 
impact-specific regulations and would explain why some sites have short 
tradeoff curves. 
To address these interests, we broke down the Impact Score for 
each infrastructure layout into its weighted, normalized impact metric 
constituents. We calculated the proportional change of a metric in each 
layout from the least-cost layout. Next, we divided this proportional 
change for each metric by the total change across metrics for the layout 
to get each metric’s contribution to the reduction in Impact Score. To 
partially control for site differences, we averaged across layouts within a 
site to get the site’s mean contribution to reductions in the Impact Score 
(gray circles in Fig. S 3.3). We then averaged across sites to get the mean 
contribution of each impact metric across all sites (bars in Fig. S 3.3). 
3.7.2 Impact Metrics 
This section contains detailed descriptions of each impact metric used in 
the analysis, including how each metric is calculated. Metrics were 
chosen based on their likelihood to occur, their magnitude when they do 
occur, and their priority for Pennsylvania. 
3.7.2.1 forest frag 
This is a measure of forest fragmentation, specifically edge-to-area ratio. 
We chose this metric because of the high potential for forest 
fragmentation caused primarily by new pipelines and access roads. We 
calculate forest frag as follows: 
1. forested areas overlain by proposed infrastructure are removed 
from the forest raster (Table S 3.2) the number of pixel edges 
joining a forested area and non-forested area are tallied 
2. the total number of forested pixels are tallied 
3. forest frag = [step 2] / [step 3] 
3.7.2.2 forest loss 
This is a measure of direct forest habitat loss from clearing forested 
areas. We chose this metric because of the high potential for forest loss 
caused by surface development. We calculate forest loss as the total 
number of forested cells in the forest raster overlain by proposed 
infrastructure (Table S 3.2). This value is converted into hectares for 




Table S 3.1. Simple ordinary least-squares regressions of attributes of the least-impacting layout relative to the least-cost 
layout against site attributes. Predictors are log10(CV(impact)) = log-transformed coefficient of variation of the pipe impact 
surface, CV(ROI) = coefficient of variation of ROI surface, and CV(cost) = coefficient of variation of cost surface. Responses are 
impact reduction = percent impact reduction of least-impact layout as in Fig. 3.4, log10(elast(impact, cost)) = log-transformed 
ratio of least-impact layout cost to least-impact layout impact relative to least-cost layout in Fig. 3.4, cost increase = percent 
cost increase of least-impact layout as in Fig. 3.4, corr(impact, cost) = Pearson’s correlation of the pipe impact surface with 
the pipe cost surface, CV(cost) = coefficient of variation of the pipe cost surface, pipe density = density of existing pipeline 
network (# pipe pixels / area of site in pixels), road density = density of existing road network (# road pixels / area of site in 
pixels), log10(# pads) = log-transformed number of well pads in site, and log10(area) = log-transformed area of site in hectares. 
Several variables were log-transformed to increase normality of regression residuals. 
Predictor Response Rationale Slope 
Std. 
Error R2 p 
log10(CV(impact)) impact reduction layouts produced at sites with larger 
variation in impact will span a 
greater range of impact including 
relatively lower impact options 
0.25 0.066 0.15 0.0003* 
log10(CV(impact)) log10(elast(impact, 
cost)) 
the average – represented by least-
impact layout – unit cost of reducing 
impacts at a site is constrained by 
impact, and layouts produced at sites 
with larger variation in impact will 
span a larger range of impact 
0.21 0.055 0.15 0.0003* 
CV(ROI) impact reduction the maximum amount of impact 
reduction at a site is constrained by 
low cost options for reducing impacts 
0.77 0.264 0.09 0.0044 
CV(ROI) log10(elast(impact, 
cost)) 
the average – represented by least-
impact layout – unit cost of reducing 
impacts at a site is constrained by 
low cost options for reducing impacts 
0.64 0.221 0.09 0.0049 
* Results for one-part model. Two-part model favored by AICc competition was not significant. 
   
Predictor Response Rationale (all results non-significant) 
corr(impact, 
cost) 
impact reduction sites where low-cost pixels are also low-impact will not be able to reduce 
impacts much because the lowest-cost layout will also be low-impact 
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Table S 3.1 Continued 
Predictor Response Rationale (all results non-significant) 
CV(cost) impact reduction layouts produced at sites with larger variation in cost will span a greater 
range of impact including relatively low-impact options 
pipe density impact reduction variations on layouts are constrained by connection points for gathering 
pipelines, so sites with more pipeline connection options will be able to 
reduce impacts more 
road density impact reduction variations on layouts are constrained by connection points for access 
roads, so sites with more road connection options will be able to reduce 
impacts more 
log10(# pads) impact reduction larger sites (that support more pads) will have a larger number of feasible 
layouts that can span a larger range of impacts, including relatively low-
impact options 
log10(area) impact reduction larger sites will have a larger number of feasible layouts that can span a 
larger range of impacts, including relatively low-impact options 
CV(cost) log10(elast(impact, 
cost)) 
the average – represented by least-impact layout – unit cost of reducing 
impacts at a site is constrained by cost, and layouts produced at sites with 
larger variation in cost will span a larger range of costs 
pipe density log10(elast(impact, 
cost)) 
variations on layouts are constrained by connection points for gathering 
pipelines, so sites with more pipeline connection options will be able to 
reduce impacts cheaply 
road density log10(elast(impact, 
cost)) 
variations on layouts are constrained by connection points for access 
roads, so sites with more road connection options will be able to reduce 
impacts cheaply 
log10(# pads) log10(elast(impact, 
cost)) 
larger sites (that support more pads) will have a larger number of feasible 
layouts that can span a larger range of impacts and do so at lower costs 
log10(area) log10(elast(impact, 
cost)) 
larger sites will have a larger number of feasible layouts that can span a 




Fig. S 3.2. Illustrating uneven sampling present in regressions of the variation in the 
additive impact surface with a) maximum impact reduction, and b) the impact 
elasticity of cost. Blue lines show regression lines for full dataset, while red lines 
show regression lines when splitting data into two parts to explore effects of treating 
data in two separate parts. Two-part regressions are not significant. Residuals on 




3.7.2.3 sediment yield 
This is a measure of potential sediment mobilization and load on streams 
caused by disturbing soil during construction. We chose this metric 
because of the high biodiversity value of streams in Pennsylvania and 
their sensitivity to changes in quality. This sediment yield rasters differ 
between well pads and linear infrastructure. For linear infrastructure, 
sediment yield in a pixel is calculated as the number of metric tons per 
year of sediment resulting from replacing existing land cover with a well 
pad for each individual pixel. This was modeled using the methodology 
described in Fernandez et al., 2003.1 For well pads, the sediment yield in 
a pixel is the sum of the previous raster’s pixels covered by a well pad 
centered on that pixel. 
3.7.2.4 wetlands encroachment 
This is a measure of indirect impacts on wetlands through degradation or 
removal of buffering habitat. We chose this metric because of the 
importance of wetlands in Pennsylvania. We calculate wetlands 
encroachment as follows: 
1. wetlands (Table S 3.2) are buffered by different amounts for each 
type of infrastructure. For well pads, the buffer is 61 m. For roads 
and pipelines, the buffer is 91 m. This produces three presence-
absence rasters that include the buffer and original wetlands. 
2. Each present pixel from step 1 is given the same value, which is 
the percentage of all buffers that each pixel represents, such that 
the sum across all three rasters is 100%. 
3. Each infrastructure type is overlaid with its corresponding raster 
from step 2 and the sum of those pixels is calculated. 
4. wetlands encroachment = [sum of three values from step 3] 
3.7.2.5 rare spp. 
This is a measure of risk to rare species in Pennsylvania, or alternatively 
to the habitats in which rare species are found. We chose this metric 
because of the high priority of rare species in Pennsylvania. This metric 
is calculated as follows: 
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Fig. S 3.3. Contributions of individual impact metrics to reductions in the Impact 
Score relative to the least-cost layout (n=84 per bar). Bar heights are means of site 
mean contributions (gray circles) along with the standard error (red error bars). 
Significant differences are rare spp. > sediment ≈ forest loss > forest frag. ≈ 0 > 
wetlands. Jitter was added to gray circles to ease interpretation. 
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 A map of habitat types from the Northeastern Terrestrial Habitat 
Mapping Project (Table S 3.2) was overlaid with element 
occurrences from the Pennsylvania Natural Heritage Program 
(Table S 3.2). Each habitat type was assigned the number of 
element occurrences it contained. This was done without regard to 
species identity. This number was then divided by the total area of 
the habitat type to reduce areal effects. Finally, values were 
multiplied by one million to aid understanding. 
 rare spp. = [sum of pixels of raster from step 1 overlain by any 
infrastructure] 
3.7.2.6 Impact Score 
This metric is an aggregation of the others and is used for the 
optimization of infrastructure layouts, as well as a summary of the total 
potential impact of a layout. Because individual impact metrics may be 
spatially non-additive, the Impact Score is generally spatially non-
additive. In other words, it cannot be calculated exactly until all 
infrastructure has been planned. The Impact Score is basically a 
weighted sum of the individual impact metrics. However, several 
requirements of the optimization process cause the final form of the 
equation for the Impact Score to be more complex. Below, we describe 
each of these requirements and describe how they affect the Impact 
Score. Further down we summarize and show mathematically how each 
requirement affects the Impact Score.  
Strictly positive values 
Dijkstra’s least-cost-path algorithm, on which road and pipeline route 
planning is based, requires strictly positive values in each pixel of the 
planning surface. We required the Impact Score to be non-negative. When 
using the spatially additive approximation of the Impact Score to plan 
road and pipeline routes (see Additive Layout Creation Methods), we 
added a small constant to all pixels so that any zero values would 
become positive. 
Direction of impact undetermined 
In this study, all metrics are worse when the values are larger. However, 
built-in to Bungee is the potential to handle metrics that are worse when 
they are smaller. We assumed that ‘impact’ is always either 
monotonically increasing or decreasing with metric values. To handle the 
direction of impacts somewhat generally, Bungee compares metric values 
to a baseline value, which is the best-case or, alternatively, the no-
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impact scenario. In this analysis, we use a no-impact baseline for all 
metrics, such that the baseline values for all metrics are zero. 
Metric scales differ 
Because metric scales differ, they cannot be directly combined. Instead, 
they are first normalized by dividing by a normalization constant (see 
3.7.7.4 Determine normalization constants), which puts them on a 
similar scale close to one. 
Impact priorities differ 
The conservation priorities of impacts are different, since some are more 
important to stakeholders than others. We account for this in Bungee by 
allowing for metric weights to be specified. In this study, we weight each 
category of impacted features equally: forest loss and forest frag each 
received a weight of 0.5, while all others received a weight of 1.0. Bungee 
automatically makes all impact weights sum to 1, so this results in 
weights of 0.125 and 0.25. 
Normality of values 
Although not a requirement of the optimization process, impact metrics 
that are more normally distributed – as opposed to highly skewed or 
multi-modal – enable the optimization algorithm to explore more of the 
solution space. We used a natural-log transform to help make metrics 
more normally distributed. 
Impact Score calculation 
With the above considerations in mind, the Impact Score is calculated as 
follows:  
             ∑    (
| (    )    |   
|     |   
  )
   
 
where impact   in the set of impact metrics   is evaluated using the 
function  . The function  , as described for each impact in the sections 
above, operates on the Boolean rasters and well pad centroids   for the 
infrastructure layout and the set of additional inputs    needed for the 
metric. The metric is compared to its baseline value,   , and that quantity 
is divided by the normalization constant,   . Finally, the metric is 
weighted by its priority   .  
The considerations described in the previous subsections of 3.7.2.6 
Impact Score enter into the formula in various places: 
    comes from Impact priorities differ 
    comes from  Direction of impact undetermined 
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    comes from Normality of values 
 The natural-logarithm comes from  Normality of values 
 The three ones come from Strictly positive values. The one in the 
denominator avoids divide-by-zero issues. The one in the 
numerator reduces skewing caused by the one in the denominator. 
The furthest-right one ensures the normalized metric will be non-
negative after the natural-log transform. 
3.7.3 Cost Metrics 
There are many costs associated with shale energy surface infrastructure 
development. For our analysis, the important ones are those that vary in 
space or with changing amounts of infrastructure, since this produces 
variable costs with changing infrastructure locations. Bungee also 
includes other non-spatial, large costs associated with surface 
infrastructure. This serves two purposes: to produce more accurate 
estimates of development cost and two more realistically bound 
construction costs when reducing impacts.  
In describing the cost metrics, we will refer to both a standard cost 
per some unit and the per-pixel cost. The former cost is easier to 
interpret and translates directly from the construction action incurring 
that cost, while the latter is used by Bungee to estimate the cumulative 
cost of a layout by summing over the pixels occupied by infrastructure. 
In general, we assume that well pads pixels occupy the entire 30 × 30 m 
pixel, while road and pipeline pixels occupy the entire length of a pixel, 
but only part of its width. The width of road and pipeline corridors was 
set to 15 m such that each type of infrastructure occupies 50% of a pixel. 
We make note where these assumptions do not hold. 
Unlike the impact metrics, cost metrics are assumed to be a) 
spatially additive, and b) independent across infrastructure types. As 
such, each type of infrastructure has its own cost surface, which is a 
summation of the individual cost metrics. All cost values are taken from 
discussion and data sharing with Triana Energy, LLC. 
3.7.3.1 base 
Base costs are the costs of construction materials and labor beyond all 
other costs. Generally we think of base costs as the cost of infrastructure 
in flat areas without trees or other significant features that require 
special construction. This cost includes things like the cost of gravel, pad 
materials, etc. This cost surface does not vary in space, but is different 
for each type of infrastructure. The base costs of well pads, access roads, 
and gathering pipelines was 35.84 USD m-2 (32,256.00 USD pixel-1), 
18.84 USD m-2 (8,478 USD pixel-1), and 656.18 USD m-1 (19,685.4 USD 
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pixel-1) respectively. Note that pipeline base cost is defined on a per-
length rather than per-area basis. 
3.7.3.2 slope 
Slope costs are the costs of construction and materials over and above 
base costs when developing on non-flat areas. These costs typically just 
apply to roads and pipelines, which may be developed in non-flat areas. 
They are analogous to cut-and-fill costs for well pads, although the two 
types of costs may only partially overlap. The slope costs are defined by 
how much additional cost is incurred by developing on an increasingly 
steep slope. The slope costs for both access roads and gathering pipelines 
was 0.22 USD %-1 m-2 (100.90 USD %-1 pixel-1). The slope cost is 
multiplied by a percent-slope raster to get the spatially variable slope 
cost surface. 
3.7.3.3 forest clearing and timber 
Forest clearing and timber costs are the costs of clearing trees and 
reimbursing landowners for foregone timber profits. We used the binary 
forest (Table S 3.2) raster to assess whether a cost is incurred and an 
equal cost per-area (16,679.61 USD ha-1) for all types of infrastructure, 
though the size of infrastructure types produces different per-pixel costs. 
The forest clearing and timber costs for well pads, access roads, and 
gathering pipelines was 1,501.16 USD pixel-1, 750.58 USD pixel-1, and 
750.58 USD pixel-1 respectively. 
3.7.3.4 stream crossing 
Stream crossing costs include the cost of materials, labor, and permits for 
construction of stream-crossing infrastructure such as culverts or small 
bridges for access roads and pipelines. We assumed that each pixel of 
water incurred the same stream crossing cost. The stream crossing cost 
for both access roads and gathering pipelines was 50,000 USD crossing-1 
(50,000 USD pixel-1). 
3.7.3.5 cut and fill 
Cut and fill costs are the equipment rental and labor costs of moving soil 
around within a site in order to flatten construction areas. Though the 
construction of access roads and gathering pipelines does require cut 
and fill, we assumed these costs were sufficiently described by the slope 
costs. As such, only well pads were assumed to incur a cut and fill cost, 
which was set to 6.54 USD m-3 (5,885.74 USD m-1 pixel-1). This cost was 
then multiplied by a cut-and-fill depth raster to get the spatially varying 
cut and fill cost. The cut-and-fill depth raster is based on the DEM raster 
(Table S 3.2) and was calculated as the height of soil added to or removed 
from a pixel to bring it to the average height of its eight neighbors. 
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3.7.3.6 pad and well permit 
Pad and well permit costs are the costs of permitting wells on a well pad. 
In our analysis, each unique well pad is always assumed to have the 
same number of wells regardless of where Bungee proposes to place it. 
As such, this cost does not vary in space. However, it does vary with the 
number of wells. We set the well permit cost to be a baseline of 65,000 
USD pad-1 with an additional 6,000 USD well-1. In our analysis, all well 
pads had six wells such that the total pad and well permit cost was 
101,000 USD pad-1.  
3.7.4 Setbacks and Other Restrictions 
Pennsylvania regulations prevent the placement of some surface 
infrastructure in certain areas.  Often times it is difficult to assess a 
priori whether a particular restriction will be activated, and in general, 
most such restrictions can be waived upon application from the 
developer. Regardless, we implemented several setbacks and other 
restrictions under the assumption that developers would follow existing 
regulations without applying for exceptions. In all, we implemented the 
following setbacks and other restrictions: 
 pads 30 m from water bodies (Table S 3.2) 
 pads 30 m from wetlands (Table S 3.2) 
 pads 100 m from development-area boundaries 
 pads 152 m from buildings and other ‘cultural’ features (Table S 
3.2) 
 roads and pipelines 15 m from buildings and other ‘cultural’ 
features (Table S 3.2). Note this is to ensure realistic construction 
rather than adhere to a regulation. 
 pads and roads sited in areas between 0 and 20% slope (Table S 
3.2). Note this is to ensure realistic construction rather than 
adhere to a regulation. 
3.7.5 Derived Pipeline Methods 
Gas wells must be connected to the existing pipeline network to transmit 
gas to the market. Many of our derived sites are many kilometers away 
from the nearest gas pipeline; a distance unrealistically far for 
development due to its cost and logistical difficulty. We know that the 
derived sites have been partially developed because we use only active or 
once-active wells to derive them. Because gas pipeline data are 
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pipeline dataset we purchased from MapSearch has many larger 
pipelines that could be connected to, but misses many of the other 
available tie-ins (Table S 3.2). 
To get around the sparsity of our pipeline dataset, we made the 
assumption that new gathering pipelines would be developed in the 
direction of the nearest known pipeline in our dataset. We based our 
pipeline connections on the rectangle bounding the site with its sides 
parallel to the cardinal directions (“bounding rectangle” hereafter). First, 
we assumed any gathering pipelines could connect to any existing 
pipelines intersecting the bounding rectangle. When no known pipelines 
intersected the bounding rectangle, we assumed new gathering pipelines 
would be developed in the direction of the known pipeline closest to the 
centroid of the site. In some cases, the nearest pipeline was over ten 
kilometers away. We forced gathering pipelines in this latter category to 
connect to a section of the bounding rectangle intersected by a 45° wide 
wedge oriented with its point in the centroid of the site and the angle 
towards the nearest pipeline.  
3.7.7 Bungee Workflow 
Bungee is software that combines variations of many well known 
optimization techniques to plan locations of well pads, access roads, and 
gathering pipelines in a way to avoid some environmental impacts while 
explicitly accounting for and limiting construction costs. Due to its size, 
we cannot fully document Bungee here. Instead, we describe the 
optimization components of Bungee and how these components fit 
together. We refer the reader to the Bungee user guide and technical 
documentation for a more complete understanding of its methods.  
 The Bungee code is a set of Python scripts written almost 
exclusively in Python 2.7.2, with some optimized code written in Cython 
0.19.1. Bungee consists of two major parts: a) the Python module, which 
can be imported and used like any other Python module, and b) Bungee 
GIS, which is a Python toolbox for ArcGIS. Both require ArcGIS 10.1+ 
with the Spatial Analyst Extension. The module structure of Bungee is 
similar to ArcGIS’s arcpy module, with major tools composing the main 
steps of the workflow as well as some minor but useful tools all directly 
accessible within the Python environment. Using Bungee GIS with 
default settings, analyses take on the order of hours to days, where the 
scaling of runtime increases nonlinearly with the size of the analysis 
area. Runtime also increases with the number of well pads, but less 
closely. For instance, Bungee placed infrastructure in a 12 km2 area in 
45 min on a typical desktop computer. By comparison, Bungee required 
multiple days but less than one week to plan infrastructure in the largest 
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of the sites in this analysis (area=72 km2). At the time of writing, access 
to Bungee can be obtained by emailing the corresponding author. 
The Bungee optimization workflow for a single site consists of six 
major steps: 
3.7.7.1 Place production units 
Production units (or Drainage units) – the area being drained by a single 
pad – are placed in the lease-hold to maximally drain gas while 
minimizing the number of pads being developed. The output of this step 
is a set of 1) production unit polygons and 2) pad envelopes, which show 
the restricted area within each drainage unit where a well pad may be 
placed. See 3.7.8 Production Unit Packing Methods. 
3.7.7.2 Set up infrastructure restrictions 
Constraints on the locations of well pads, access roads, and gathering 
pipelines are set up. In this analysis, we follow those constraints 
described in 3.7.4 Setbacks and Other Restrictions. This step produces 
rasters which denote allowable areas for each type of infrastructure. 
3.7.7.3 Determine construction budget 
Bungee creates an infrastructure layout that attempts to minimize 
construction costs. For this analysis, Bungee then enforced a maximum 
budget that was twice as large as the least-cost layout. During the 
optimization, Bungee actually incrementally increases the budget, from 
the least-cost amount up to the maximum budget and creates layouts at 
each incremental budget. In 3.7.9 Additive Layout Creation Methodswe 
describe the algorithm used to create layouts. To get the least-cost 
layout, Bungee uses the cost surfaces in place of impact surfaces and 
uses an unlimited budget. 
3.7.7.4 Determine normalization constants 
As described in Impact Score calculation, each impact metric is 
normalized using a normalization constant. To determine this constant 
for a single impact metric and site, Bungee creates many layouts 
(n=1000 in this analysis) that attempt to minimize the value of the 
current impact metric. The minimum value of the metric across those 
layouts is the normalization constant. In 3.7.9 Additive Layout Creation 
Methods we describe the algorithm used to create layouts. In addition, 
the average construction cost across metrics from this step is used as a 
normalization constant for costs. 
3.7.7.5 Estimate additive impact surfaces 
After step 4, Bungee can calculate the Impact Score. At this point, 
Bungee estimates spatially additive surfaces of the Impact Score, one for 
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each type of infrastructure, and which are important inputs into the final 
step. In each pixel of one such surface for a single infrastructure type is 
the Impact Score if only that infrastructure were developed only in that 
pixel. As such, the true aggregate Impact Score is underestimated in 
each pixel, since non-additivity among multiple pixels of one 
infrastructure or multiple infrastructures is not taken into account. 
3.7.7.6 Create final layouts 
The outputs of the previous steps enable Bungee to create feasible 
layouts, which adhere to setbacks and construction budgets. At this 
point, Bungee creates layouts that attempt to minimize the aggregate 
Impact Score. To do so, Bungee incrementally increases the construction 
budget from the least-cost-layout’s cost up to the maximum cost. For 
this analysis, we used 40 increments. At each increment, the additive 
impact surfaces and normalized cost surfaces are weighted and added 
together to form a hybrid objective surface. This hybrid surface 
encourages Bungee to balance impacts and costs. The impact weight in 
each increment is given by 
        
       
         
 
where    is the construction budget at the current increment,      is the 
cost of the least-cost layout, and      is the maximum construction 
budget, which here was      . The weight of the normalized cost surface 
is          . 
Bungee plans layouts according to the hybrid objective surfaces 
(see 3.7.9 Additive Layout Creation Methods). At the same time, it uses 
the aggregate Impact Score to judge each layout once the full layout has 
been proposed. It also limits the layout’s budget and calculates 
construction costs based on the non-normalized cost surfaces.  
Finally, Bungee keeps only those layouts that are not simultaneously 
more impacting and more costly than any other layouts, i.e. are Pareto-
improvements. This forms the set of final layouts for each site. In our 
analysis, we ran 3.7.7.6 Create final layouts five times and repeating the 
Pareto-optimality filtering across runs to increase the chances Bungee 
actually found Pareto-optimal solutions. 
3.7.8 Production Unit Packing Methods 
Production units are sited as a means to determine the number and 
approximate locations of well pads within a site. A production unit is the 
potential area drained by a well pad once all its wells have been drilled. 
Since real well pads have variable numbers of wells in variable 
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configurations, production units must also be various shapes. Bungee is 
able to accommodate a range of number of wells per pad and optimizes 
the number of wells within this range, their configurations, and locations 
of the production units accordingly. In this analysis, we took a simplified 
approach and had Bungee place only 6-well production units 3352.8 m 
tall by 914.4 m wide (3000 by 11000 ft) and rotated 27° counter-
clockwise. As such, we also simplify the explanation of the production 
unit packing algorithm for brevity and clarity. 
Production units are packed into the site by iteratively adding 
production units to the site and then using simulated annealing to 
shuffle them and free up space. The objective of the optimization is to 
minimize the un-drained area of the site.  The optimization acts on a 
raster/array basis, such that production units, the site, production unit 
locations, and the objective function all operate on a pixel-by-pixel basis. 
The algorithm proceeds as follows: 
1. Add a 6-well production unit in the location that minimizes its bad 
overlap. ‘bad overlap’ for a single production unit is its area of 
overlap with a) other production units and b) areas outside the 
site. 
2. If any present production units exceed the overlap threshold 
(v=10% of production unit area), proceed to step 3. Otherwise, 
return to step 1. 
3. Perform simulated annealing. Shuffle production units to free up 
space in the site. For a fixed number of iterations (n=5000): 
a. For each production unit: 
i. Move it one pixel in a random direction and calculate 
its bad overlap.  
ii. If the bad overlap is reduced from its previous 
position, keep the new position. Otherwise, keep the 
new position with some probability (pstart=0.1). 
b. Calculate the un-drained area of the site. If the un-drained 
area decreased, keep this new configuration of production 
units. Otherwise, keep the new configuration with some 
probability (same as 3.a.ii.). 
c. Decrease the probability that worse solutions are kept such 
that by the end of step 3, the probability of keeping worse 
solutions is zero. 
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4. Repeat the check in step 2. If it still fails, remove the last 
production unit and return the set of production units placed. 
Otherwise, return to step 1. 
The optimization determines the number of production units and their 
locations. To get the pad envelopes, which define the regions where a pad 
may be placed before setbacks are enforced, we center a 304.8 m wide by 
1524 m tall (1000 by 5000 ft) rectangle in each production unit. Note 
that, like the production units, the shapes of pad envelopes vary with the 
number and configurations of wells per pad. 
3.7.9 Additive Layout Creation Methods 
3.7.9.1 Simplifying assumptions 
Bungee simplifies the infrastructure planning problem so that impact-
avoiding layouts can be proposed on a desktop computer in a reasonable 
amount of time (one to several hours or days). There are two important 
characteristics of the planning problem which Bungee’s algorithm 
partially avoids. An explanation of these is necessary to understand the 
approach we took in deriving Bungee’s layout planning methods. First, 
the Impact Score is a spatially non-additive function of infrastructure 
layouts, such that it cannot be fully assessed without the entire layout. 
This poses a difficulty due to the large solution space of layouts and few 
ways to narrow down proposed layouts to avoid searching the whole 
solution space. Second, the optimal (i.e. Impact Score minimizing) 
positions of well pads, access roads, and gathering pipelines are all 
interdependent since each type of infrastructure can affect the locations 
of others. This difficulty occurs even if the Impact Score were spatially 
additive. We programmed Bungee to deal with these difficulties by 
simplifying the infrastructure planning algorithm. We make the following 
assumptions 
 The Impact Score can be estimated on a pixel-by-pixel basis by 
treating each pixel as if it were developed independently of others. 
 The optimal route of an access road or gathering pipeline depends 
only on infrastructure that has already been proposed and on the 
pixel-by-pixel estimate of the Impact Score. 
Since layouts are based on the spatially additive approximation of the 
Impact Score, we call them additive layouts. 
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3.7.9.2 Additive layout attribute optimization 
With these assumptions in mind, we developed a hierarchical algorithm 
for planning infrastructure layouts. In the higher level, a genetic 
algorithm is used to optimize the attributes of a layout - well pad 
locations and the order of planning of access roads and gathering 
pipelines. For instance, in a site with two well pads, the attributes might 
look like 
Attribute Ya Xa Yb Xb L1 L2 L3 L4 






Roadb Pipea Pipeb Roada 
where Y and X are the vertical and horizontal positions of well pads a 
and b, and Li denotes the order of development of linear infrastructure 
corresponding to each well pad. Note that the order of linear 
infrastructure is important because Bungee “fixes” each planned route – 
treats it as already developed -such that subsequent linear infrastructure 
can be co-located with or terminated at that infrastructure (see Bungee 
documentation for more). 
The objective of the optimization is to minimize the Impact Score given 
a budget constraint. Bungee uses a least-cost path algorithm in the lower 
level to plan the routes of access roads and gathering pipelines, which 
provides the information needed to evaluate the layout for its Impact 
Score. We describe the higher level of the algorithm in the paragraphs 
below and the lower level in 3.7.9.3 Linear infrastructure route 
optimization. We use an asterisk (*) to denote details further described in 
the Bungee documentation. 
1. Propose parent population (n=20) of layout attributes. Each layout 
is proposed by: 
a. Decide pad centroid locations. Bias pads towards lower-
impact areas.* 
b. Decide the order of linear infrastructure planning by random 
draw. 
c. Evaluate layout: 
i. Overlay pad footprint on pad centroids. 
ii. Plan routes of access roads and gathering pipelines 
(see 3.7.9.3 Linear infrastructure route optimization). 
iii. Calculate Impact Score and construction cost. If too 
expensive, discard the layout. 
113 
 
2. Add lowest-impact layouts (n=3) to offspring population without 
altering them. 
3. Choose two parent layouts to crossover/mate. Bias choices to 
those with lower Impact Scores. 
4. Crossover parent layouts with some probability (p=0.7) to form an 
offspring layout. If not crossed-over, the offspring is an identical 
copy of the first parent. Otherwise: 
a. Randomly draw each pad location from one parent or the 
other. 
b. Decide offspring’s infrastructure order. For each order slot Li: 
i. Choose at random one parent to take from. 
ii. Fill in the slot with the next un-used infrastructure 
(e.g. Roadb) from the parent chosen in 4.b.i. 
5. Mutate/alter new offspring layout created in 4: 
a. Move each well pad some number of times* in one-pixel 
steps.  
b. Shuffle infrastructure order. Loop through each slot and 
with some probability (p=0.1) swap the infrastructure in this 
slot with the next slot. 
6. Evaluate offspring layout as in 1.c. 
7. If offspring layout has lower Impact Score than both parents, add it 
to the offspring population. Otherwise, add it anyway with some 
probability (p=0.05). 
8. If some number (n=5,000) of layouts have been proposed and kept 
or discarded, return the lowest-impact layout from the offspring 
population. Otherwise, go to 9. 
9. If the offspring population is full (n=20 layout attributes), go to 10. 
Otherwise, go to 3. 
10. Check for convergence. If the lowest-impact layout in the 
offspring population has not changed in some number of 
generations (n=7), propose a new set of layout attributes (n=17) as 
in 1, but keep the current lowest-impact layouts from 2. 
Otherwise, replace the current parent population with the offspring 
population and go to 2. 
3.7.9.3 Linear infrastructure route optimization 
In 3.7.9.1 Simplifying assumptions we describe assumptions that 
allowed us to entirely represent a layout by the locations of well pad 
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centroids and order of development of linear infrastructure. To go from 
its attributes to the binary rasters necessary to calculate the Impact 
Score and construction cost, we need only to overlay a well pad footprint 
on the well pad centroids and plan the routes of linear infrastructure. We 
can plan the route of a piece of infrastructure using a least-cost-path 
algorithm.  
The least-cost-path algorithm we use is a modified version of 
Dijkstra’s algorithm2 and guarantees that the route found is globally 
optimum given the assumptions we outlined. Due to its complexity, we 
do not list the algorithm steps here, but instead describe how our 
algorithm builds on Dijkstra’s algorithm. We fully describe the 
optimization in the Bungee documentation. 
Dijkstra’s algorithm works on raster (or array) data to find the 
least-cost route from a set of source/starting pixels to a set of destination 
pixels. It assumes that the total cost of traversing a complete or 
incomplete route is the sum of the costs of each pixel along the route, i.e. 
the cumulative cost is spatially additive. In this context, the source pixels 
are well pads including their footprints and the destination pixels are 
existing and already planned roads or pipelines, depending on the 
infrastructure being planned. The cost surface over which a route is 
planned is the hybrid impact-cost surface described in 3.7.7.6 Create 
final layouts. 
Our least-cost-path algorithm adds two features to Dijkstra’s 
algorithm. First, we add a binary “traversability” raster which denotes 
areas that are off-limits for the infrastructure being planned. This raster 
includes, for instance, those pixels in high-slope areas. Those off-limit 
areas are not considered when planning routes. Second, we add a 
secondary cost surface which is used to invalidate routes. The secondary 
cost surface is the construction cost of either road or pipeline in each 
pixel. As the updating procedure central to Dijkstra’s algorithm proceeds, 
the cumulative cost of the route passing through each pixel is stored. If a 
pixel’s cumulative cost exceeds the cost budget, then the route passing 
through that pixel is invalidated, even if that route is the lowest-impact 
route. In this way, routes that are too expensive are not proposed. 
  





 Dijkstra EW (1959) A Note on Two Problems in Connexion with Graphs. Numer Math 1(1):269–271. 
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Chapter 4: Comparing policies for the 
reduction of potential environmental impacts 




A version of this chapter will be submitted for peer-reviewed publication. 
 Austin W. Milt, Paul R. Armsworth. “Comparing policies for the 
reduction of potential environmental impacts from shale gas surface 
infrastructure.” 
4.1 Abstract 
Governments across the globe at multiple levels have shown interest in 
avoiding the environmental and human health impacts created by shale 
energy production. In areas where shale energy production is currently 
allowed, regulations restricting environmental impacts tend to be limited 
in scope and flexibility. We present a study looking at the cost 
effectiveness of implementing a new regulation that affects the spatial 
locations of well pads, access roads, and gathering pipelines with an aim 
at reducing aggregate environmental impacts from shale gas 
development. Specifically, we compare the outcomes of two policies: (1) a 
uniform and inflexible cap on site-level impacts, and (2) a cap and trade 
system which allows developers to trade permits for impacts. Both of 
these are also compared to optimum outcomes produced by planning by 
an omniscient social planner. We measure the total cost and impact of 
the system under each scenario. We analyze a case study of 56 sites in 
Pennsylvania, U.S.A., a location which has experienced extensive gas 
development already. We find that under ideal conditions cap and trade 
performs as well as an omniscient social planner, producing lower 
impact outcomes much less expensively than the uniform inflexible 
policy. Cap and trade could reduce impacts by as much as ~36% at an 
increased cost of 0.05% of not developing while still allowing all 
development to proceed. Having found large potential gains from trade, 
we explore how the cost effectiveness of a cap and trade system depends 
on the ability of the regulator to estimate impacts in the absence of 
additional regulation. In extreme cases, error in that estimate could 
make cap and trade less cost effective than the uniform inflexible 
approach. Our results clearly indicate that for intermediate levels of 
impact avoidance, cap and trade is a highly cost-effective alternative to a 
more traditional approach provided that the regulator is able to 
accurately estimate impacts in the absence of additional regulation. 
4.2 Introduction 
Shale gas development is an increasingly global issue due to energy and 
environmental concerns. In the United States, shale gas production has 
increased steadily over the past decades and now makes up ~40% of gas 
production (Annual Energy Outlook 2014 2014). Concerns have been 
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raised about the environmental (Gillen & Kiviat 2012; Kiviat 2013; 
Olmstead et al. 2013; Jones et al. 2014) and human health (Perry 2012) 
effects of shale energy production (see dissertation Introduction and 
Chapter 2), leading to careful consideration of how to protect society and 
nature from those effects (Howarth, Ingraffea & Engelder 2011; Hays et 
al. 2015) and at times outright bans on development. Though policies 
and regulations in regions proceeding with development do exist, new 
regulations can expand their environmental scope to include priorities 
currently unregulated. These new policies and regulations will differ in 
their acceptability and cost effectiveness.  
Shale gas production takes place in many stages (Burton et al. 
2014) at multiple spatial scales. Throughout Chapters 2-4 we focus on 
one stage and one scale. Specifically, we focus on the construction of 
surface infrastructure at the least-hold scale. Lease-holds (“sites” 
hereafter) are boundaries of development that aggregate multiple gas 
leases and tend to range in size from several hundred hectares to many 
thousands of hectares. Shale gas extraction requires significant below-
ground infrastructure which is often the focus of environmental studies 
(Hays et al. 2015). However, extraction requires significant surface 
infrastructure to access drilling sites, process gas, and transport it to 
market. We focus on well pads, access roads, and gathering pipelines, 
infrastructure which is common at all gas extraction sites and which has 
measurable environmental effects. The spatial planning of these three 
types of infrastructure is a complex process from a cost-minimization 
perspective. The cost-minimizing configuration of infrastructure relies on 
the simultaneous consideration of interactions among infrastructure 
locations. For instance, well pads form a terminus for access roads – 
wells affect roads, but roads cannot be built on very steep slopes up to a 
plateau where a well pad might be located – roads affect well pads. 
Potential environmental damage (“impacts” hereafter) from shale 
gas surface infrastructure can be partially avoided by informed spatial 
planning (as discussed in the dissertation Introduction and Chapters 2-
3). Many environmental features are impacted by shale gas surface 
infrastructure (Gillen & Kiviat 2012). Roads and pipelines fragment 
habitats, which increases habitat edges, produces dispersal barriers, and 
reduces core habitats. Construction exposes and mobilizes surface soils, 
potentially leading to erosion and subsequent sedimentation in water 
bodies. Stream-crossing infrastructure reduces freshwater connectivity 
by limiting upstream and downstream dispersal. These are a few of the 
common and pervasive impacts from surface infrastructure, all of which 
depend on the spatial configuration of infrastructure – “layout” hereafter 
– and which can be partially avoided by changing the layout. In the 
simplest case, reducing the amount of infrastructure reduces the area of 
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land disturbed and thus some impacts. However, the shortest route for a 
road may be more fragmenting than an alternative route which 
circumnavigates an important habitat. And the least-expensive layout 
may be largely unrelated to the resulting impacts. Thus, impact 
avoidance through spatial planning of infrastructure can be a complex, 
many-dimensional decision process. 
Current environmental regulations for shale gas surface 
infrastructure tend to be limited in their type and scope. In many places 
globally, there are either moratoriums or outright bans on shale gas 
development (http://keeptapwatersafe.org/global-bans-on-fracking/ 
visited 23 April, 2015). While these prevent environmental damage in the 
short term, it is possible that development will proceed as fossil fuels 
become more limited. The main form of regulation for sanctioned 
development is uniform command-and-control (Richardson et al. 2013), 
in which restrictions are uniform and absolute. However, the uniform 
strictness of such regulations is often offset by an ability to avoid them. 
For instance, in Pennsylvania well pads cannot be placed within 30 m 
(100 ft) of wetlands larger than 0.4 ha (1 acre), but exceptions can be 
granted at the site level when sufficient protective measures are proposed 
(Pennsylvania legislation Title 58 3215(b)(3)&(4)). Other environmental 
policies include performance practices which are usually not enforced 
but are encouraged (Richardson et al. 2013). These current regulations 
tend to focus on water features, an important part of environmental and 
human health concerns but of limited scope. 
Market-based regulations can solve some issues with uniform and 
inflexible command-and-control approaches. First, market-based 
mechanisms exploit heterogeneity across regulated participants to 
achieve optimal outcomes (Hartwick & Olewiler 1998). Contrarily, a 
uniform command-and-control approach ignores this heterogeneity and 
leads to situations where development cannot occur or exceptions are 
granted, thereby achieving no effect. For instance, regulating forest loss 
by limiting it to 10 ha in each site might preclude development in fully-
forested areas, which may be a desirable or undesirable outcome. 
Alternatively, a market-based mechanism might incentivize developers at 
fully-forested sites to compensate developers at moderately-forested sites 
to reduce their forest destruction even further than 10 ha. Second, 
market-based mechanisms could theoretically reduce some 
administrative costs of environmental regulation by reducing information 
and analysis requirements. In the shale gas context, a command-and-
control attempt to tailor restrictions at a site might require much 
information about that site as well as the development process to decide 
on an optimal infrastructure layout. Contrarily, a market-based 
approach could incentivize developers to explore development 
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alternatives using information they already have and without any need 
for the regulator to be directly involved in the planning process at a site. 
At the same time, regulations differ in how much information is 
needed and how that information is used in implementation. First, 
uniform regulations may have low information requirements. Here, for 
instance, we distinguish between a scenario where caps are set uniformly 
across sites and another scenario where caps are site specific. Setting 
site-specific caps requires some additional information. Second, market-
based regulations may have relatively high implementation costs because 
they require the regulator to institute, monitor, and regulate a market. 
Most regulations will have lower information requirements and 
implementation costs than an omniscient social planner. This omniscient 
social planner is a hypothetical construct that optimizes the system as a 
whole rather than individual sites and can be used as a benchmark for 
evaluating alternative policy designs. In order to affect optimum 
outcomes, the planner is assumed to have perfect information about the 
system and an ability to affect all decisions. In some cases this is not far 
from reality, e.g. when a sole owner holds all development rights. 
Several aspects of regulating impacts in this context are of general 
interest. First, we are interested in the regulation of aggregate impacts 
rather than treating impacts individually. Regulating a single aggregate 
metric across multiple sites requires that the metric be comparable 
across sites, which may necessitate a sacrifice of the site-specific nature 
of some impacts. Second, regulating an aggregate metric also permits 
flexibility in which impacts are reduced and how they are reduced, e.g. 
by not necessarily penalizing sites that cannot perform well in one metric 
if they can offset that assumed performance with another. Note however 
that our analysis would apply readily to single-impact contexts. Third, 
options for how much impacts are produced in a site are discrete 
because the choices of layouts are limited, with several layouts being 
similar to one another followed by large changes to those layouts. 
Fourth, impacts in this context are one-off since changes to the land 
surface are irreversible and long-lived. As such, impacts at a site are not 
regulated over time. 
In a recent special issue of Ecological Economics concerned with 
market-based instruments for ecosystem services, Gómez-Baggethun & 
Muradian (2015) summarize some of the strengths, weaknesses, and 
controversies surrounding market-based-instruments for environmental 
purposes. They point out that market-based-instruments have increased 
in popularity for policymakers and scientists (Pagiola & Platais 2002; 
Engel, Pagiola & Wunder 2008; Miles & Kapos 2008; Lockie 2013; 
Lapeyre, Froger & Hrabanski 2015) at the same time that trust in the 
power of markets has fallen (Sandel 2012; Gómez-Baggethun & 
Muradian 2015). Many of the issues surrounding market-based-
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instruments have to do with how purported market-based-instruments 
are structured and implemented and in what situations they are applied 
(Gómez-Baggethun & Muradian 2015). Even when properly structured 
and applied, the theoretical cost effectiveness of market-based-
instruments (Foster & Hahn 1995; Goulder et al. 1999) depends on the 
ability of regulators to set optimal conditions for the market (United 
Nations Development Program 2011; ten Brink et al. 2012), which itself 
may require accurate estimates of benefits and costs (Salzman & Ruhl 
2000; Kroeger & Casey 2007). Indeed we find that to be the case here. 
Regardless, market-based-instruments can have many strengths over 
rigid command-and-control approaches (Gómez-Baggethun & Muradian 
2015). 
While other peer-reviewed studies have looked at the current 
regulatory framework for shale gas development, to our knowledge none 
have quantitatively analyzed the environmental and monetary effects of 
implementing new regulations. Konschnik and Boling (2014) describe the 
current regulatory framework for shale gas in the U.S and go on to 
propose a framework for further governance of shale gas and how that 
could be applied for environmental or sustainability goals. Most other 
studies focus on a review of current regulations (Rahm 2011; Clark et al. 
2012; Wiseman 2014) or on the assessment of risks or damages for 
future regulations (Clark et al. 2012; Hays et al. 2015). We draw on the 
foundational knowledge of these studies, which point to the limitations of 
existing regulations, and combine that knowledge with spatial planning 
of infrastructure for multiple environmental impacts at the site scale to 
address the implications of an additional regulation. 
In this paper we explore the cost effectiveness of different 
environmental regulations for shale gas surface infrastructure, especially 
how regulations compare to one another and to an idealized benchmark. 
Specifically, we explore three scenarios. First, we explore a regulation 
that reflects the most common type of environmental regulation, which is 
a uniform - ignores site characteristics - restriction on impacts and is 
inflexible in how that restriction is met. Second, we explore and focus on 
how tradable permits in a cap and trade system reduces the cost of 
reducing impacts compared to the first scenario while leaving 
development decisions in the hands of developers. Third, we evaluate 
whether and idealized cap and trade system performs as well as an 
omniscient social planner, something expected in theory (Hartwick & 
Olewiler 1998). As discussed earlier, the cost effectiveness of market-
based instruments depends on the market context created by the 
regulator. Consequently, we then discuss how error in the ability of the 
regulator to estimate impacts in the absence of an additional regulation 
affects the cost effectiveness of cap and trade. We then analyze a case 
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study of development in Pennsylvania and discuss its implications for 
cap and trade in similar and broader contexts 
4.3 Methods and Materials 
4.3.1 Overview 
In the following sections we describe our methods for analyzing the 
costs and impacts associated with regulating shale gas surface 
infrastructure using different regulations. In §4.3.2-4.3.5, we describe 
our general methods for analysis of two policy scenarios and an idealized 
benchmark, followed by an application of these methods to a case study 
described in §4.3.5. In §4.3.2 we describe the regulatory context, 
including our assumptions about the system, the goals and decisions 
made by a regulator committed to reducing environmental impacts from 
surface infrastructure, and the goals and decisions made by developers 
attempting to make profits from extracting gas from their sites. In §4.3.3 
we describe the mathematical formulation and solution methods for the 
two policy scenarios and idealized benchmark. In §4.3.4 we expand our 
analysis to consider the counterfactual situation where the regulator 
does not perfectly know how large impacts will be in the absence of 
additional regulation. This introduces error in setting the site-specific 
cap for cap and trade. We discuss how three directions of error affect 
outcomes of the system. Finally, in §4.3.5 we describe the application of 
our methods to a case study set of 56 sites in Pennsylvania, USA. This 
application requires some additional data and analyses, some of which 
come from a previous study (Chapter 3); the rest is described in §4.3.5.  
4.3.2 Regulatory Context 
We follow several assumptions about the development context that 
affect how we analyze new regulations. First, the development rights at a 
site belong to only one developer and each developer has development 
rights to exactly one site. Thus, decisions about how to develop a site are 
site/developer specific. We change this assumption when exploring a 
sole-ownership scenario. Second, every layout option – configuration of 
well pads, access roads, and gathering pipelines – for a site has the same 
number of wells, all wells drain the same amount of gas, and all wells 
cost the same to drill. Thus, layouts for a site differ only in the cost of 
developing surface infrastructure. Third, the construction of 
infrastructure produces many environmental externalities (impacts), 
which it is the task of the regulator to internalize to the gas industry 
through a new regulation. Fourth, impacts incurred at a site are 
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independent such that the aggregate impact of development of the 
system is just the sum of site-level impacts. Finally, all sites are 
developed simultaneously such that delays in gas production do not 
occur and the costs and profits from developing sites are independent of 
the start of production. We recognize these are simplifying assumptions 
of the system which limit our ability to fully predict outcomes of different 
regulations. However we feel this study is still an important first step 
toward understanding the implications of new shale gas regulations. 
The regulator is responsible for creating a new regulation that 
forces developers to internalize environmental impacts created by surface 
infrastructure. The regulator would like to maximize social welfare by 
minimizing both environmental impacts and the monetary cost of 
internalizing those impacts. However, the regulator has a limited ability 
to do so for two reasons. First, the regulator does not know the social 
value of environmental impacts and so cannot directly maximize social 
welfare. Instead, the regulator can only choose a level of impact to 
achieve, which will result in some cost to the gas industry. Second, in the 
cap and trade system the regulator sets an individual cap for each site 
based on an estimate of the impact of the least-expensive layout at that 
site, which is the layout that would be developed without the regulation. 
There is error associated with that estimate, which prevents the regulator 
from knowing whether the choice of cap will lead to a larger or smaller 
total impact than estimated (described more in §4.3.4). 
Each developer wants to maximize the net present value of his site, 
which is dependent on several factors. A site contains some amount of 
gas, the present value of which depends on the flow rate of gas from each 
well, the number of wells, the price of gas, and the monetary discount 
rate (p. 140 in Appendix for methods). To get profits from the gas, the 
developer must construct infrastructure to access the site, extract the 
gas, and pipe it to the market. There are many infrastructure layouts for 
a site, and each layout has an associated construction cost and 
environmental impact. We denote the discrete cost and impact functions 
for a site by   ( ) and   ( ), respectively, where   ( ) is the cost of 
constructing layout   at site  . These functions are monotonically 
increasing and decreasing respectively and thus their combination 
adheres to one important Pareto-efficiency condition (Varian 2003). We 
set up our analysis in such a way that there is no incentive to develop a 
layout that is simultaneously more impacting and more costly than any 
other layout. Because of the setup described here, a developer can 
maximize the net present value of his site by minimizing the cost of 
construction plus any additional costs from the new regulation. The 
specific form changes with each scenario (Table 4.1). 
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4.3.3 Scenarios and Solutions 
We explore the two policy scenarios and one idealized benchmark already 
described above. In every scenario, the regulator puts a cap on impacts 
from development and the developer(s) choose layouts at each  site to 
adhere to the cap while minimizing development costs. We show the 
optimization problem for developers in each scenario in Table 4.1. In 
each scenario, we find solutions for a range of caps and record the total 
cost – sum of costs across all sites – and total impact – sum of impacts 
across all sites. 
We define the layout choice   with several characteristics to 
facilitate solving the planning problems. First,     represents the least-
expensive and most impacting layout in a site, while          is the 
layout with the highest cost and lowest impact where development still 
occurs. We define a special “dummy” layout for the decision to not 
develop a site. The choice to not develop occurs when the cost of 
development exceeds the profits from development. The layout that 
reflects this choice, denoted             , has characteristics   ( )    
and   ( )    , where    is the present value of gas in the site.  
Solving the first and last problems shown in Table 4.1 is fairly 
simple. In Uniform Cap without Trading, each developer chooses the 
least-expensive layout that meets the cap. If the cap is lower than the 
impact of the        layout then the site is not developed. In Omniscient 
Social Planner, the one decision maker chooses the cumulatively least-
expensive combination of layouts across all sites that meets the cap. 
Because we assume impacts are additive across sites, this is a linear 
problem. To solve it, we start with all    . We then calculate the return-
on-investment (ROI) of switching each site’s layout to the     layout, 
where. We iteratively swap the layout at the site with the highest ROI 
until the impact constraint in Eq. ( 3 ) is met. This method produced 
identical solutions to a global branch-and-bound solver. 
Solving the outcome of the market in Cap and Trade is somewhat 
more difficult. Each developer can choose to be a supplier of permits if 
  ( )    ̂ ( )    or a demander of permits if   ( )    ̂ ( )   , and the 
optimum choice depends on the price of permits in the market (Table 
4.1). Because the impact production at each site is discrete, it is 
impossible in a small market to have supply exactly equal demand. 
Consequently, there will always be some excess supply or demand. Our 
earlier assumptions dictate that if there is excess demand, some sites are 
not developed.  
To find the final market price of permits (  ), the choice of layout 
for each site, and the total cost and impact of the system, we perform a 
two-level search for    (Fig. 4.1). We start with some additional 
assumptions: 1) the market is perfectly competitive, 2) the market has  
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Table 4.1. Developer optimization problems for policy scenarios, including the objective and 
constraint, which is set by the regulator. 
Policy Developer Objective Impact Constraint Eq. 
Uniform Cap without 
Trading 
   
 
  ( )   ( )       ( 1 ) 
Cap and Trade    
 
  ( )   (  ( )    ̂ ( ))   ( )     (    )    ̂ ( ) ( 2 ) 
Omniscient Social 
Planner 
   
      
∑  ( )
  
 ∑  ( )
  
  ∑  ( )
  
 ( 3 ) 
  = site/developer index 
  = layout index 
   = set of layouts at site   
  = set of all layouts 
  ( ) = cost of developing layout   at site   
  ( ) = impact of developing layout   at site   
  = uniform site-level cap 
  = proportional cap on impacts 
  = price of permits in market 
 ̂ ( ) = regulator’s estimate of impact of least-cost layout 




been established long enough to reach an equilibrium price, and 3) all 
developers simultaneously enter the market and trade. At the first level, 
we find the range of   where excess supply is minimized and there is no 
excess demand (  -   in Fig. 4.1) – to avoid forcing some sites out of 
development. There is a range of   that meets this condition because 
layout choices are discrete and as such there will be a range of   within 
which changes to   do not change the set of layouts chosen. At the 
second level, we find the   within this range that minimizes the total cost 
of the system (   in Fig. 4.1). Finally, because there will still be excess 
supply at the final   , suppliers will lose some potential profits and we 
add these lost profits (equal to excess demand times  ) to the total cost of 
the system. Because of the way we analyze the market, our analysis is an 
optimistic estimate of the outcomes of using cap and trade. 
4.3.4 Regulator’s Error in Estimating  ̂ ( ) 
The total cost and impact of the cap and trade system depends on the 
cap set for each site. To illustrate, take one site in isolation. At the 
extremes, the cap may be so low or so high that the developer cannot 
develop or does not reduce potential impacts, respectively. Within the 
range [  (      )   ( )) the cap has some effect on the developer’s choice of 
layout while still allowing development. In Uniform Cap without Trade, we 
 
Fig. 4.1. Stylized illustration of the two-part process we use to estimate the final 
market price (  ) of impact permits in Cap and Trade. (stepping black line) difference 
between supply and demand at market price  . First part of the search for    occurs 
along this curve. (gray curve) total cost to all developers in the market, which may be 
concave or monotonic within the range   -  .   




assume the regulator ignores this effect because the most common 
environmental regulations currently do not tailor restrictions to each 
site. However, it is reasonable that the regulator could estimate impacts 
in the absence of the new regulation, e.g. by examining existing 
development, and thus increase the chance that restrictions on impact 
lead to development choices within the above range. 
 In Cap and Trade, we assume that the regulator has some ability 
to estimate site-level impacts in the absence of additional regulation, 
denoted   ̂ ( ). This estimate has some error associated with it due to the 
regulator’s lack of perfect information. In the case study below, we start 
with the case where the regulator can perfectly estimate impacts in the 
absence of additional regulation ( ̂ ( )    ( )) and then perform several 
sensitivity tests, including the regulator’s estimate is 1) systematically 
high ( ̂ ( )    ( )), 2) systematically low ( ̂ ( )    ( )), and 3) incorrect but 
without bias. We will show that error in   ̂ ( ) does not change the 
possible outcomes of the system, but affects which outcomes are 
revealed and how the regulator’s choice (mis)matches with the outcome 
produced. 
4.3.5 Case Study 
We applied our framework to the Marcellus shale play in Pennsylvania, a 
place where enough development has occurred and enough knowledge 
about the development context exists to infer with some confidence the 
cost effectiveness of a cap and trade system. Over 9,000 horizontal wells 
have been drilled in the Marcellus region of Pennsylvania since 2008 – 
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection’s permit reporting 
database – and many more are likely to come. The construction of well 
pads, access roads, and gathering pipelines is occurring in areas of high 
conservation priority (Johnson et al. 2010) resulting in degradation and 
destruction of many environmental features including forests, wetlands, 
streams, and other features important for biodiversity and recreation in 
the area (Johnson et al. 2010) (also see dissertation Introduction).  
We used the results of the previous chapter for our analysis here 
(Chapter 3). In our previous study, we created a spatial planning 
software call Bungee to place well pads, access roads, and gathering 
pipelines at 85 sites in Pennsylvania. Site boundaries were derived by 
overlaying production units on existing well locations and then joining 
adjacent land parcels to fully contain those production units. In that 
study, production units were 914 ⨉ 3353 m (3000 ⨉ 11000 ft) rectangles 
rotated 27° counter-clockwise and which represent the area of gas 
extracted by a well pad with 6 wells. Bungee uses a complex spatial 
optimization algorithm to find many infrastructure layouts within a site 
(Chapter 3 Appendix). The first such layout is a cost-minimizing layout 
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that ignores environmental impacts other than those already imposed by 
regulation. Subsequent layouts reduce impacts at increasing cost, such 
that no final layout is simultaneously more impacting and more costly 
than any other. 
We were forced to adjust the Impact Scores associated with layouts 
produced by Bungee in order to use them in our analysis here. The 
Impact Score aggregates across several metrics of environmental impact 
to represent the total impact of a layout in a site (Chapter 3 Appendix). It 
is formulated in such a way that Impact Scores at one site cannot be 
directly compared to Impact Scores at another site, which violates two 
conditions necessary for this analysis, including that impacts can be 
added across sites and that impacts can be traded (or offset) from one 
site to another. To get around this, we recalculated the Impact Scores 
associated with each of our layouts to make them comparable (p. 139). 
After transformation 28 sites had layouts that violated the Pareto 
conditions necessary for the analysis. We chose to exclude those 28 sites, 
leaving us with 56 sites in total (§4.6.1 in Appendix). Those 56 sites range 
in size (1-14 well pads or 6-84 wells) and number of layouts (2-16). 
We also adjusted the construction costs estimated by Bungee to fit 
with this analysis. Bungee already estimates the construction cost of 
surface infrastructure, but this excludes many other costs associated 
with developing a site, including acquisition and leasing, below-ground 
infrastructure, and processing of gas (Hefley & Seydor 2015). We used 
the costs calculated for a single well and summarized in Table 8 of Hefley 
and Seydor (2015), excluding ‘Permitting’ and ‘Site Preparation’, which 
Bungee already includes. For most costs, we multiplied these single well 
costs by the number of wells in a site and added it to the surface 
infrastructure costs. For acquisition costs, we multiplied by the number 
of well pads in a site since Hefley and Seydor (2015) base acquisition cost 
on a single drilling unit corresponding to one pad. This approach likely 
overestimates the costs of developing a site. To calculate the present 
value of gas in a site which is used to create the “dummy” layout 
described in §4.3.3, we used a linear estimate of the flow rate of gas from 
wells in our study area and combined that with a constant market price 
of gas and monetary discount rate (p. 140). Gas was assumed to flow 
until the rate became zero, i.e. the gas ran out. We assumed every well 
would produce the same amount of gas at the same rate and simply 
multiplied the number of wells in a site by the present value of gas in a 
well to get the present value of gas in the site. 
We analyzed the total cost and total impact across our 56 case 
study sites for various caps on impact and many sensitivity tests of the 
error in  ̂ ( ). For Uniform Cap without Trade, we analyzed the system for 
40 values of   between 0 and 5. The lower bound was chosen to 
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show where zero impact was allowed, while the upper bound ensured 
that the cap would exceed any single site’s maximum impact. For 
Omniscient Social Planner, we analyzed the system for 40 values of   
between 0 and 1 to look at the full range of impacts. For Cap and Trade, 
we analyzed the system for combinations of   and error in  ̂ ( ). As 
before, we looked at 40 values of   between 0 and 1. To look at the 
scenario where  ̂ ( ) is high or low systematically, we added or 
subtracted, respectively, some portion   ( ) (Table 4.2). When looking at 
the effects of random error, we added   ( ) by a uniformly drawn random 
portion between –   and  , the maximum amount of error. In other words, 
some sites received a positive error while others a negative error. We 
repeated this process 100 times for each   and summarize the range of 
results. For instance, an error of       would result in  ̂ ( )       ( ) for 
the systematic case and       ( )   ̂ ( )       ( ) for the random case. 
We summarize these scenarios in Table 4.2. 
4.4 Results 
4.4.1 General 
 Fig. 4.2 summarizes our results conditioned on 1) the regulator does not 
know or use site-specific information to set the cap for Uniform Cap 
Table 4.2. Analysis parameters showing various caps on impact set by the 
regulator as well as error in the regulator’s estimate of impacts in the absence 
of additional regulation. Cap is absolute and at the site-level for Uniform Cap 
without Trading and relative to total impact and site-level impact for 
Omniscient Social Planner and Cap and Trade, respectively. Error is a 
proportion of the impact from the least-cost layout (   ) added to that impact. 
Scenario Cap (A or  ), n=40 
Uniform Cap without Trading 0, 0.13, 0.26, …, 5 
Cap and Trade 0, 0.03, 0.05, …, 1 
Omniscient Social Planner 0, 0.03, 0.05, …, 1 
  
Cap and Trade Error Direction Error Level ( ) 
Uniform Unbiased 0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1 
Systematic Overestimate 0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1 




without Trading , 2) the 
regulator knows   ( ) perfectly 
for Cap and Trade, which is 
benchmarked against an 
Omniscient Social Planner with 
perfect information. Later we 
relax the assumption the 
regulator knows   ( ) exactly. In 
the figure, outcomes in the 
lower-left corner represent the 
business-as usual situation 
where no attempt is made to 
regulate impacts and all sites 
develop their least-cost, 
highest-impact layout. The total 
impact avoided is zero while the 
total cost is ~0.05% of the 
situation where no sites are 
developed. In the upper-right of 
Fig. 4.2a is the outcome where 
no impacts are allowed and as a 
result no sites are developed. 
The total impact avoided is 
100% while the total cost is the 
cost of foregone profits from all 
sites (100%). Between these 
extremes developers vary the 
choice of layout in their site or 
choose not to develop such that 
some (black) or all (gray) sites 
are developed.  
Uniform Cap without Trading 
 There are several 
interesting characteristics of 
outcomes from implementing a 
Uniform Cap without Trading 
regulation. First, outcomes sit 
near an imaginary one-to-one 
line up until about 35% of 
potential impacts are avoided 
(Fig. 4.2a, triangles left of 35% Impact Avoided). For instance, avoiding 
32% of potential impacts would require 31% of the cost of developing no 
sites. After 28%, there is a large amount of potential impacts that could 
 
Fig. 4.2. Outcomes of implementing various 
policies as regulator’s commitment to 
reducing impacts increases over a) entire 
range of possible outcomes and b) over range 
of outcomes where all sites develop. Triangles 
(△) are Uniform Cap without Trading, crosses 
(⨉) are Omniscient Social Planner, and circles 
(○) are Cap and Trade when regulator is 
perfectly able to estimate impacts in the 
absence of additional regulation. Vertical axis 
is percent of outcome where no sites develop. 
Gray symbols show where all sites are 
developed. Black symbols show where at least 
one site is not developed. There are three 
outcomes where all sites are developed in 





be avoided for relatively little additional cost. For instance, reducing 
potential impacts from ~30% to ~50% would be ~4% more costly (Fig. 
4.2a, middle plateau of triangles). After avoiding 61% of impacts, further 
avoidance becomes quickly more expensive up to 100% avoidance (Fig. 
4.2a, triangles right of 61% Impact Avoided). Moving down to Fig. 4.2b 
reveals that there are three options for Uniform Cap without Trading 
where all sites are developed and these reduce potential impacts very 
little. 
Cap and Trade and Omniscient Social Planner 
Both Cap and Trade and Omniscient Social Planner start with very 
low costs to avoiding impacts (Fig. 4.2a circles and crosses). Up to 36% 
impact avoidance, the cost of avoiding impacts appears to be almost zero, 
though inspection of Fig. 4.2b shows that these costs are very low 
(<0.06% of maximum cost), but nonzero. Further impact avoidance 
greater than 40% incurs quickly escalating costs. For instance, avoiding 
impacts up to 80% requires about 40% of maximum costs (Fig. 4.2a, 
circles and crosses). Nearing 100% impact avoidance greatly escalates 
costs (Fig. 4.2a circles and crosses right of 80%).  
Does Cap and Trade achieve minimum costs? 
As expected by theory (Hartwick & Olewiler 1998), implementing 
Cap and Trade results in outcomes that are nearly identical to 
Omniscient Social Planner. As can be seen in Fig. 4.2b, we estimate even 
lower costs at the same level of impact reduction when implementing Cap 
and Trade, but this is due solely to the way we estimate the outcomes of 
a cap and trade system. A more accurate analysis would show that Cap 
and Trade performs no better than Omniscient Social Planner. We focus 
on the comparison of Cap and Trade and Uniform Cap without Trading 
hereafter. 
How do policy scenarios compare when the regulator perfectly estimates 
impacts in the absence of additional regulation? 
There are important differences in the total cost and impact of 
implementing different regulations. Cap and Trade achieves a lower cost 
at a given level of impact avoidance than Uniform Cap without Trading. 
This improvement is not small over most of the range of possible 
outcomes, and is as large as ~30% when avoiding ~36% of total impacts 
(Fig. 4.2). The two most likely regulatory scenarios differ wildly in how 
much potential impacts can be avoided (Fig. 4.2b). If Cap and Trade is 
implemented, up to ~36% reduction in potential impacts can be achieved 
for only 0.05% of the maximum cost while still allowing all sites to be 
developed. Compare this to the Uniform Cap without Trading scenario, for 
which very little (~0.1%) impact avoidance is possible while allowing all 
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development. In addition, there are many more options for how much 
impacts are avoided while allowing all development under the Cap and 
Trade scenario. 
The distribution of outcomes along the horizontal axis in Fig. 4.2a 
is also interesting. First, Uniform Cap without Trading exhibits a less 
smooth spacing of outcomes, which is a result of the way the regulation 
is implemented. Outcomes that are close together are similar in that the 
set of sites developed does not change from one outcome to the next, but 
only the set of layouts chosen for development. Large jumps between 
clusters of outcomes are due to one or more sites being pushed out of 
development by a reduction in the site-level cap. This discontinuity in 
outcomes means that small regulatory adjustments may have little effect 
on resulting impacts and costs. Contrarily, the other policy scenario has 
a smoother distribution of outcomes because the regulation allows more 
flexibility in how sites are developed. As a result, small policy 
adjustments more often affect the system. 
4.4.2 How is the cost effectiveness of Cap and Trade affected 
by the regulator’s ability to estimate   ( )? 
Idealized Scenarios 
Having identified Cap and Trade as a potentially very cost effective 
policy choice, we now explore how sensitive that finding is to our 
underlying assumptions. Specifically, we focus once again on our 
information assumptions. This time, though, we emphasize   ( ) used to 
set the site-specific cap, which is an obvious target for a sensitivity test 
because it is a quantity which developers will know much better than the 
regulator and which developers will have an incentive to hide. Note that 
in Uniform Cap without Trading, we hold to the previous assumption that 
the regulator does not know or chooses not to implement a site-specific 
cap.  
In Fig. 4.3, we summarize the results of our sensitivity tests to 
explore how the cost effectiveness of Cap and Trade is affected by error in 
the regulator’s ability to estimate impacts in the absence of additional 
regulation, denoted  ̂ ( ). We calculated cost effectiveness as the ratio of 
system total absolute impact avoidance to total cost in billion USD. To 
plot all policy scenarios on the same horizontal axis, we transformed the 
cap ( ) for Uniform Cap without Trading to a relative scale by dividing by 
the maximum value. 
Before discussing the results of the error analysis, we first orient 
the reader to the idealized cost effectiveness curves (black open symbols 
in Fig. 4.3a-c). At regulator choices below ~0.15, there are no outcomes 
for Uniform Cap without Trading where sites are developed. The next two 
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outcomes are two of the most cost effective for Uniform Cap without 
Trading because they reduce impacts a little while still allowing all 
development to proceed. At further commitments to reducing impacts, 
Uniform Cap without Trading outcomes have a low but increasing cost 
effectiveness, with a peak near (0.55, 0.01).  
Cap and Trade and the idealized benchmark Omniscient Social Planner 
both exhibit almost identical outcomes. Increasing commitment to 
reducing impacts lead to increasingly more cost effective outcomes up to 
the point just before one site is pushed out of production. Peak cost 
effectiveness where all sites are developed occurs at (0.64, 8.5) in Fig. 
4.3. 
In the ideal case, Cap and Trade is generally more cost effective 
than Uniform Cap without Trading; only at the extreme regulator choices 
do the two scenarios converge, which is a necessary result. Although 
both scenarios have peak effectiveness up to the point just before one 
site is pushed out of production (highest triangle and circle in Fig. 4.3), 
the cost effectiveness of Cap and Trade at its peak is more than two 
orders of magnitude more cost effective than Uniform Cap without 
Trading at its peak. At higher commitments to reducing impacts (Fig. 4.3 
right of ~0.4), the two scenarios have more similar cost effectiveness, but 
Cap and Trade is still five times more cost effective than Uniform Cap 
without Trading on average. 
Error in  ̂ ( ) affects the outcomes of implementing Cap and Trade.  
We explored three types of error in  ̂ ( ): uniformly distributed (Fig. 4.3a), 
systematically high (Fig. 4.3b), and systematically low (Fig. 4.3c). 
Because outcomes are based on the choice of layouts at sites and these 
choices are highly discrete, error in  ̂ ( ) serves mainly to stretch or 
compress the distribution of outcomes as the regulator’s choice changes 
rather than reveal entirely different outcomes. 
Uniformly random error in  ̂ ( ) 
When error in  ̂ ( ) is uniformly random across sites, outcomes 
may be more or less cost effective at a particular regulator choice. For 
instance, when  ̂ ( ) is up to 100% different from   ( ) (lightest gray 
region in Fig. 4.3a), the regulator’s decision to reduce potential impacts 
by 30% may lead to a cost-effectiveness a full order of magnitude lower 
than if the regulator can perfectly estimate   ( ). Uniformly unbiased 
error tends to lead to lower cost-efficiency outcomes rather than higher 
as reflected by the wider range of outcomes below/left of the perfect-




Fig. 4.3. Effect of error in regulator’s estimate of impacts in the absence of additional 
regulation ( ̂ ( )) for Cap and Trade when error is a) uniform but unbiased, b) 
systematically high, and c) systematically low. Horizontal axis ranges from no 
commitment to reducing impacts (0.0) up to no allowance of impact (1.0). In all 
panels, outcomes from a zero-error estimate are shown in black, while increasingly 
lighter gray shows outcomes with increasing error. Triangles (△) are Uniform Cap 
without Trading, crosses (⨉) are Omniscient Social Planner, and circles (○) are Cap 
and Trade. Error levels are summarized in Table 4.2. In a) shaded regions show a 





Systematically overestimating   ( ) 
Systematically overestimating   ( ) compresses the possible outcomes 
from Cap and Trade, which has several effects on regulation (Fig. 4.3b). 
Low levels of commitment to reducing impacts may not reduce impacts 
at all, since developers will not have to change their choice of layout to 
meet the impact cap (leftmost points for Cap and Trade in Fig. 4.3b). 
Once the cap is high enough to affect developer’s choices, a systematic 
overestimate of   ( ) will lead to lower cost efficiency of outcomes up to 
the point where all sites are developed in the   ( )   ̂ ( ) case. After this, 
a systematic overestimate of   ( ) leads to higher cost efficiency of 
outcomes. Again, this is due to the fact that it takes larger commitments 
to reducing impacts to achieve the same outcomes as when   ( )   ̂ ( ). 
At larger error levels, higher cost-efficiency outcomes are more likely, but 
at a much increased risk of having no effect on development at lower 
commitments to reducing impact. 
Systematically underestimating   ( ) 
Systematically underestimating   ( ) stretches the possible 
outcomes from Cap and Trade, which has several effects on regulation 
(Fig. 4.3c). When error is low, lower commitments to reducing impacts 
lead to higher efficiency outcomes. However, at error levels larger than 
25%, any commitment to reducing impacts will lead to a lower efficiency 
outcome. At very high error levels, the cost efficiency of Cap and Trade 
may even be lower than Uniform Cap without Trade (lightest gray circles 
are below some triangles in Fig. 4.3c). Since the regulator is 
underestimating impacts at sites, caps on impact will be almost 
guaranteed to affect developers’ choices of layouts and consequently lead 
to lower-impact outcomes, yet this comes with a risk of lower-efficiency 
outcomes and increased probability of pushing sites out of production. 
4.5 Discussion 
Ongoing shale gas development creates environmental externalities 
which may be internalized and reduced at reasonable costs through cap 
and trade. We have analyzed two policy scenarios that may be 
implemented and how these compare to one another and a best-case 
scenario in terms of their total resulting impact and monetary cost. We 
found that the policy scenario most reflective of current regulations 
(Uniform Cap without Trading), which forces developers to reduce impacts 
in a uniform fashion or not develop, may lead to expensive outcomes 
with few options to reduce impacts while still allowing all development to 
proceed (Fig. 4.2a). In contrast, a cap and trade scenario (Cap and Trade) 
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could perform as well as would an omniscient social planner by avoiding 
impacts across 56 sites in Pennsylvania by ~36% for 0.05% of the cost of 
not developing any sites and while still allowing all development to 
proceed (Fig. 4.2b). A similar level of impact avoidance in the Uniform 
Cap without Trading scenario would be close to 35 percentage points 
more costly. The relative costs of Cap and Trade versus Uniform Cap 
without Trading converge at higher or lower levels of avoidance. For 
instance, at 20% and 80% impact avoidance the difference between the 
two scenarios is 20 and 25 percentage points, respectively. However, we 
also determined that the ability of a regulator to match its commitment 
to reducing impacts to actual outcomes depends on the regulator’s ability 
to estimate impacts in the absence of the new regulation. For instance, 
Cap and Trade could be totally ineffective if the regulator systematically 
overestimated those impacts and had a low commitment to reducing 
impacts (Fig. 4.3b). Similarly, the cost effectiveness of Cap and Trade 
could be almost three orders of magnitude lower than ideal if the 
regulator systematically underestimated those impacts by more than 
25% (Fig. 4.3c). 
Our results have several implications for policy design and 
implementation. Cap and trade can offer large savings over a more 
traditional uniform and inflexible approach, which agrees with theory 
(Hartwick & Olewiler 1998; Goulder & Parry 2008). Further, we find it 
can reduce impacts much more while allowing all development to 
proceed. At the same time, implementation efforts are not the same for 
the two approaches. In either scenario, the regulator needs to enable the 
gas industry to evaluate impacts produced by an infrastructure layout, 
which requires the regulator know what impacts are relevant, what 
priority they have, and how they are calculated. Additionally, both 
scenarios require the monitoring of surface development, which could be 
attached to current drilling permitting processes. Intentionally cost 
effective cap and trade as outlined here requires that the regulator must 
be able to estimate impacts in the absence of the new regulation. This 
requires some knowledge of the development process in the regulatory 
region. At minimum, a regulator could evaluate existing development. A 
more detailed method that models development could ensure higher cost 
effectiveness. Cap and trade also relies on the distribution, tracking, and 
enforcement of tradable permits, which could be accomplished with an 
online market system. We expect the total cost of implementing cap and 
trade at intermediate levels of impact avoidance would be compensated 
by the long-term savings over the other inflexible approach we explored 
(see Fig. 4.2). 
Although the level of commitment to reducing impacts would 
ideally be determined by society’s value of impact avoidance, our results 
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do suggest that moderately low commitments will be most cost effective 
(Fig. 4.3) with cap and trade. In our case study, the highest cost-
effectiveness was achieved by committing to impact reduction around 
36%, which is contingent on being perfectly able to estimate impacts in 
the absence of the cap and trade system. At commitments lower than 
36%, Cap and Trade was still more cost effective than commitments 
larger than 36%. Interestingly, the hump shape of the cost effectiveness 
curve which leads to this outcome is due to a combination of two things. 
First, our estimates of the cost of developing a site is much lower than 
our estimates of the profits from gas extraction. As a result, not 
developing a site leads to large increases in the cost of the system. 
Second, there is large potential to reduce impacts of the system while 
still allowing all development to proceed (Fig. 4.2). Combined, large 
reductions in impacts can be achieved without increasing costs a lot 
relative to profits gained from development (Fig. 4.2 gray circles). When 
commitments to reducing impacts exceed a certain level (36% here), 
some sites are forced out of production leading to large increases in cost 
for relatively little change in overall impacts, which greatly reduces the 
cost effectiveness of the system (Fig. 4.3: switch happens where the slope 
of Cap and Trade becomes negative as regulator choice approaches 1).  
One purpose of this study was to apply existing knowledge about 
the relative cost effectiveness of market-based policies to inflexible 
uniform policies in the shale gas context. We show clearly some of the 
potential gains from trade created by a cap and trade system that 
regulates an aggregate impact metric. Other approaches may also be 
effective in this and other contexts. For instance, cap and trade for 
individual metrics (e.g. forest clearing) might increase the transparency 
and understanding of the market and increase support, though at an 
increased implementation cost due to maintaining multiple markets. In 
addition, a bubble-offsets approach might obviate the need for a market, 
especially when there is large spatial heterogeneity in the cost of 
reducing impacts at individual sites. A bubble policy would treat a subset 
of sites that are close to one another or have the same developer as a 
single unit (“bubble”), putting a cap on total impacts within the bubble 
(Tietenberg 1985). Similarly, when development rights across all sites are 
held by just a few developers, enforcing a cumulative cap for each 
developer could be effective. To be effective this would require that each 
developer has development rights at sites with heterogeneous costs of 
impact avoidance. Many other alternatives exist. We took an approach 
that should be generally applicable across regions where many sites are 
ready for development, where developers have rights to one or a few sites, 
and where reducing aggregate impacts is the major goal. 
More complete analyses could benefit from several adjustments to 
our methodology. First we assume that each developer has rights to only 
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one site being developed. In Pennsylvania, there are many developers, 
but the distribution of development is skewed towards developers with 
many holdings (Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection’s 
permit reporting database). When combined with assumptions about 
market dynamics, it is likely that those developers with many sites would 
exert a measurable effect on the market and could compromise the 
effectiveness of the market (Hartwick & Olewiler 1998). Second, we 
assume all sites are to be developed simultaneously and thus enter the 
market simultaneously. A more complete analysis on a small market 
would include the staggering of development over time and adjust 
developer’s decisions about when to develop (i.e. enter the market). 
Third, we assume impacts are independent across sites and thus can be 
combined additively. One alternative approach would be to treat nearby 
or adjacent sites as having dependent impacts, e.g. by combining their 
development boundaries to treat them as one unit when evaluating 
impacts. This approach would require a more complex decision process 
as well as stricter assumptions about the simultaneity of development 
across sites. Finally, we chose to focus on the direct regulation of a single 
aggregate metric such that trading among individual metrics could occur 
at the site level. This choice ignores one alternative approach to 
regulating multiple impacts, which is to put a cap on each individual 
metric. While this approach would more directly enforce local priorities 
for each impact, it would limit development options within sites. Further, 
because many impacts are positively correlated and some are negatively 
correlated (Chapters 2 and 3), the link between an impact’s cap and the 
resulting development choice could be confounded by choices driven by 
other impact caps (Bennear & Stavins 2007), and thus presents a 
challenge to matching environmental goals to policy outcomes. This is a 
unique characteristic of regulating multiple impacts through multiple, 
impact-specific caps.  
We have applied existing cost effectiveness analysis methods to the 
novel context of regulation of environmental impacts from shale gas 
surface development and found that large gains from trade are possible. 
As shale gas development proceeds globally, governments at multiple 
levels should consider the environmental implications of shale gas 
extraction and design policies that properly internalize environmental 
externalities. In regions where development rights are centrally owned or 
distributed, significant environmental savings can potentially be achieved 
without the need for additional regulations. In other regions, our findings 
can be used to motivate regulations that do better than traditional 
command-and-control approaches. As such, we see large potential to 




4.6.1 Reconfiguring Impact 
Impact Scores output by Bungee are not comparable across sites. 
However, we need something comparable/tradable to be able to allocate 
impacts across sites. To accomplish this, we do the following: 
1. Calculate individual impact metrics     (  ) where   is the metric 
name,   is the index of the site, and   is the layout.  
2. Likewise, calculate the baselines    at each site. In our study, the 
baseline for all metrics is 0. 
3. Find the maximum unit impact for each metric across layouts: 
(    )       (    (  )        ). 
4. Scale each metric for each layout using [3]: 
    (  )  
|    (  )    |
  (    )   
 
5. Finally, we calculate the new Impact Score for each layout as 
            (  )  ∑  
  
  (    (  )   ) 
where    is the relative priority of the metric. This gives us a way 
to trade impacts across sites since the scaling values across sites 
are the same. 
 
This transformation keeps the general shape of tradeoff curves across 
sites, but fails in one important respect. Many tradeoff curves (28 of 84 
sites representing 270 of 607 layouts) no longer satisfy the Pareto-
improvement shape needed for our analysis (see Fig. S 4.1). The reason 
these curves are no long monotonically increasing is because the scaling 
values for each impact metric have changed relative to other impact 
metrics in the site. As such, the relative contribution of each metric to 
the Impact Score changes which causes some layouts to fall away from 
the newly defined Pareto frontier. To get around this, we simply omit 
from our analysis those sites whose tradeoff curves violate the Pareto-
improvement conditions. We were left with the 56 sites (Fig. S 4.2) with 
black tradeoff curves in Fig. S 4.1.  
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4.6.2 Present Value of Gas Production,    
We calculate the profit of gas production in a site using the present 
value. We base our estimates on the flow rate of gas from wells in the 
counties from our sites in our previous study as well as recent national 
well-head gas prices. 
 
The present value    in a site depends on several things: 
1.   , the initial rate of flow of gas from when production begins 
(Mcf/day) 
2.  , the change in the flow rate from a well per unit time (Mcf/day2) 
3.  , the monetary discount rate 
4.   , the number of wells in the site 
 
The flow of gas from a well at a particular time   is approximated by the 
linearly declining curve 
  ( )        ( 4 ) 
 
 
Fig. S 4.1. (a) results from our previous study, where Impact Scores are calculated 
using site-specific normalization constants for each impact metric and tradeoff 
curves are monotonically increasing. (b) results of re-scaling impact metrics to 
calculate tradable impacts, the result of which is that many tradeoff curves (green, 
n=28 of 84) are no longer monotonically increasing, which violates the conditions 





with units of <amount of gas> per <unit of time>. Note that several other 
more complex and accurate estimates of gas flow exist that account for 
linear decrease in flow in the early portions of the well’s life followed by 
declining marginal returns later (Al Ahmadi, Almarzooq & Wattenbarger 
2010; Miller, Jenkins & Rai 2010). We chose this one because the 
present-value of gas is relatively easy to calculate with it and it provides 
estimates of the total amount of gas in a well that agree with other 
findings (Aucott & Melillo 2013). Further, many wells exhibit linear 
decreases in flow during the first decade of production (Al Ahmadi, 
Almarzooq & Wattenbarger 2010; Miller, Jenkins & Rai 2010). The 
simplest alternative is the exponential decay curve, but using this gave 
estimates of the total amount of gas in a well three orders of magnitude 
above (Aucott & Melillo 2013). 
The value of gas at a particular time is just      ( ), where      is 
the price of gas. The present value of gas from all wells in a site 
(assuming all wells begin production at the same time) is given by 
     ∫ (   )
      (     )
    
   
 
The integral goes to      since this is the point at which  ( )   , where 
the estimate of gas flow breaks down.  
    
      
   (   )
[ (   ) 
  
      (   )   ] ( 5 ) 
We estimated these values from existing production data in 
Pennsylvania and our sites from our previous study. We estimate    and 
  by fitting Eq. ( 4 ) to 827 production time-series across 5 counties in 
Pennsylvania (taken from 
https://www.paoilandgasreporting.state.pa.us/publicreports/Modules/P
roduction/ProductionByCounty.aspx). For each well, we estimated    and 
 . If     or there were less than 5 data points, we discarded the 
estimate, which reduced our count from 1,801 to 827 wells. We then 
took the average values across the wells. We found an average   ̅̅ ̅  
             (      ) and  ̅                (      ). For the price of 
gas we used 4.5465 USD per 1000 ft3 - the average wellhead price 
reported between 2008 and 2012 (most recent year) from the EIA, which 
is the period over which development we study took place 
(http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/ng_pri_sum_dcu_nus_m.htm). These data 
from the EIA are at the national level but do not include Pennsylvania. 




Fig. S 4.2. Development sites with grouped well permits (gray) and the Marcellus 
shale play (beige). Sites were derived by overlaying production units on existing well 
permits and taking contiguous land parcels under those production units by a single 
operator. Of the 84 candidate sites (green polygons), 56 (black outlines) were 




In our previous study we assumed every pad would have six wells, 
but they varied by the number of pads. In Fig. S 4.3 we show the 
distribution for the present-value of gas across sites. We calculated a 
total volume of gas for each well at 1.4 Bcf, which is on the lower end of 












As the world changes, it is critical for conservation planning as a practice 
and science to change in accordance. In my dissertation I created 
methods and performed analyses to advance the science and practice of 
applied conservation planning. In Chapter 1 I assessed how new records 
of species observations change spatial priorities in Tennessee and found 
that when planning for complementary richness new observations will 
continue to affect priorities in the coming years. In Chapter 2 I evaluated 
the relative performance of simple planning guidelines to reduce 
environmental impacts of surface infrastructure (“impacts”) for shale gas 
and how such planning produces tradeoffs between impacts. I found that 
while not pervasive, there are tradeoffs between impacts and that single 
guidelines do not perform best across all impacts. In Chapter 3 I explored 
site-level costs of reducing impacts and found heterogeneity across sites 
in both the ability to reduce impacts and the relative costs of doing so. In 
Chapter 4 I analyzed the cost effectiveness of different regulations for 
reducing impacts across multiple sites and found large potential savings 
by using a market-based, cap and trade approach as opposed to a 
traditional uniform, inflexible approach. 
 My dissertation has many implications for conservation science 
and practice. For instance, the results of Chapter 1 suggest that 
biodiversity sampling is most important in the early stages of 
conservation effort, but even at later points continued data collection is 
useful for determining spatial priorities. The results of Chapter 2 justify 
the use simple planning guidelines in sites where major impacts and 
conservation priorities are few and obvious, but that tools that explicitly 
reduce multiple potential impacts are called for in many places. From 
Chapter 3 I can advocate that while many sites will be able to avoid 
impacts inexpensively when taking an aggregate approach, a uniform 
policy that requires developers to act at a median standard will push 
many sites out of production, perhaps unnecessarily. Finally, the 
findings of Chapter 4 endorse market-based tools for reducing impacts 
from shale gas surface infrastructure, especially when regulators make 
an intermediate commitment to reducing impacts. 
 Several important qualities of my dissertation are apparent when 
looking across multiple chapters. First, I find that the granularity of 
biodiversity data used to define benefits for spatial planning is influential 
for planning outcomes (Sutton & Armsworth 2014). Species are not 
distributed randomly on the landscape at large or small scales (Gaston 
2000). Combined with the types of data – usually opportunistic, 
presence-only, element occurrence points of rare species of interest – and 
the result is very grainy biodiversity data.  In Chapters 1 and 3 I find that 
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grainy biodiversity data play a key role in my results. In Chapter 1, 
biodiversity data are concentrated in relatively few sites across 
Tennessee. This is partially due to the natural distribution of biodiversity 
as well as sampling bias inherent in an opportunistically collected 
dataset. The complementary richness of sets of sites for priority action 
responded to the granularity of the biodiversity data, and this led to 
qualitatively different outcomes than an approach that focused on site-
specific species richness. In Chapter 3, large differences in the numbers 
of observed species between spatially adjacent habitat types produced a 
very grainy planning surface for the rare spp. impact metric. As a result, 
in some cases the impacts of expected infrastructure could be greatly 
reduced by relatively small changes to infrastructure placement. Further, 
rare spp. contributed significantly more to reductions in the Impact Score 
than the other four metrics included in that chapter. 
A second important quality of my dissertation is that it crosses 
multiple scales in space and time. The scale of decision making is 
essential to consider when designing applied conservation planning 
research (Spies & Johnson 2003). In Chapters 2 and 3, I focus on site-
level planning that takes place over a few months. At this scale, 
developers and conservation groups are making decisions with 
observable effects on individual organisms and populations that extend 
throughout the site and to adjacent areas. This is the scale at which 
development decisions most directly impact conservation priorities. In 
Chapters 1 and 4 I look at a scale of planning across many sites and 
longer times. At these larger scales, decisions are being made by 
individuals higher in organizations and in organizations that operate at 
larger scales. The information from decisions at smaller scales may play 
an important role in these larger scale decisions (Spies & Johnson 2003).  
Third, my dissertation chapters are all motivated by a need to do 
science that is immediately useful for practice. For instance, In Chapter 
1 I make recommendations for the immediate use of my results for large 
scale planning in Tennessee. I also outline strategies for long-term 
planning in other places, especially where conservation actions are just 
beginning. In Chapter 2 I evaluate simple practices for planning surface 
infrastructure to see in what situations simplified planning is sufficient 
for avoiding multiple impacts. This kind of “rule of thumb” research is 
often a goal of conservation groups working to create best management 
practices or other strategies that can be applied without huge data or 
analysis resources (pers. obs.). I go a step further in the later chapters by 
creating Bungee, a decision-support tool for planning surface 
infrastructure to avoid aggregate environmental impacts. Bungee is made 
most directly for use by the gas industry, but also has defined uses for 
conservation stakeholders and regulators (see Chapter 3 Discussion). At 
the time of writing, EnSitu – the ArcMap Python toolbox that uses 
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Bungee as the analysis engine – was either being used or was intended to 
be used by 27 groups spanning the conservation, government, industry, 
and research sectors. EnSitu is a streamlined front-end for Bungee. It 
combines the individual submodules of Bungee into a simpler two-step 
process in ArcMap. Bungee has its own visual interface, but running it 
entails more work while offering greater flexibility within ArcMap. 
Because of its streamlined structure, EnSitu is the product presented to 
primary users. 
One challenge I faced in my dissertation was to balance the needs 
of science with the needs and limitations of conservation practice. In all 
my chapters I use almost exclusively publicly available datasets, datasets 
which are used in practice. These datasets are free and usually large, but 
are not always of a quality or information content that ideally suits the 
scientific questions being asked. However, in advancing science that 
advances practice, it is important to reflect the decision processes and 
inputs used by decision makers. Another notable place where my science 
met conservation practice is in the design of Bungee. The planning 
problem addressed by Bungee is one that, in order to solve globally for 
realistic scenarios, would take massive computational resources and/or 
a very long time. However, in designing Bungee as a tool for use outside 
of academia, we constrained ourselves to solutions that could be derived 
on the order of hours on a desktop personal computer. As a result, 
Bungee is actually useful for surface infrastructure planning, though at a 
cost of confidence in the overall (i.e. global) optimality of results. 
There is no shortage of free spatial conservation planning tools, 
and as a result much of conservation is (sometimes inappropriately) 
performed with existing tools (pers. obs.). In my dissertation and with 
Bungee I took a different approach. I chose to design a tool for a specific 
conservation planning problem, namely the planning of shale gas surface 
infrastructure to avoid multiple environmental impacts. This decision 
created some distinct advantages, the largest of which is that I was able 
to tailor my solution to that problem rather than sacrifice on the 
relevance of the solution. As a result, my scientific findings address the 
problem more accurately and represent the actual decision process more 
directly. In addition, end users of Bungee benefit because they can work 
in an environment more similar to their experiences, which increases 
buy-in and encourages appropriate use of the software. At the same time, 
tailoring of software presents challenges relative to using existing tools, 
since programming, datasets, test scenarios, case studies, and 
documentation must all be created from scratch. The time and effort to 
tailor solutions to problems is worthwhile if it leads to those solutions 
being used in practice.  
Bungee is not another Marxan (http://www.uq.edu.au/marxan/) 
or Zonation (http://cbig.it.helsinki.fi/software/zonation), two of the most 
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widely used conservation planning programs, because it takes a 
fundamentally different approach to conservation. First, the perspective 
is an intentional balance between conservation and development. On the 
surface, Bungee is a decision support tool for placing shale gas surface 
infrastructure. Using EnSitu (the visual interface) can be as simple as 
inputting two development-related shapefiles and clicking ‘Go’. However, 
the primary driver of infrastructure placement is a suite of conservation-
based, ecologically relevant environmental impact metrics. It is because 
of this balance that I normally think of Bungee’s planning task as 
‘conservation-oriented development’. Second, Bungee plans multiple 
explicitly interacting geometries. It is not uncommon for spatially non-
additive – think complementary richness – objectives to be part of 
conservation planning tools (Sarkar et al. 2006). But how Bungee differs 
is by planning well pad (points/polygons), road (lines), and pipeline 
(lines) features together in a way that goes beyond picking pixels to 
instead pick spatial configurations that would not be derived by thinking 
of the geometries independently. Third, Bungee represents a move from 
‘where to protect’ to ‘where to condemn’. This is not the first time such 
an approach has been taken (Moilanen 2012), but it is a recognition and 
acceptance that threats to conservation priorities are increasingly best 
handled by moderating those threats rather than attempting to prevent 
them. 
Bungee is not limited to planning in the Marcellus shale play or to 
shale gas, but neither are its applications limitless. Within the shale gas 
context, Bungee will be most useful in its current form in areas where 1) 
the shale is moderately uniform thickness, 2) multiple well pads with 
flexible locations are planned simultaneously, and 3) impacts are 
spatially variable over small (tens of meters) scale. The Marcellus play in 
Appalachia is by design the most natural place for using Bungee, but 
groups in other parts of the U.S. and distant countries see low-effort 
extensions of the tool. Bungee could also be used for planning outside 
shale gas. In Chapter 3 I draw an analogy to rural home development, 
which is a comfortable context in which Bungee could be applied. 
Bungee could also be used to plan wind or solar installations. All of these 
applications can be achieved with little or no modification to the 
software, provided the main planning and impacting features are roads, 
transmission lines, and point/polygon features. Bungee is limited, 
however, in the scale of analysis. At the moment, the tool plans at 30-m 
pixel resolution. At resolutions coarser than ~60 m or finer than ~10 m, 
some of the built in assumptions of the software will be violated. This 
precludes two natural uses of the tool, which are to do fine scale final 
planning of infrastructure and separately to simultaneously plan 
infrastructure over whole regions. 
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 One future research direction is to apply my fairly general methods 
to similar analyses at multiple scales across the globe. Since all of my 
chapters aim at providing recommendations for conservation practice 
now, performing such analyses in new places would benefit practitioners 
in those regions immediately. The challenges of applying my methods 
elsewhere are largely data challenges. In some of the places where my 
methods would be most useful, data are sparse and/or poorly 
maintained, and the only remedy is to collect data and perform 
intermediate analyses. In particular, using Bungee in new regions would 
also require an evaluation of conservation priorities, formulation of 
metrics of impact, and confirmation of model assumptions, none of 
which are trivial tasks.  
Other possible research extensions include longer-term and 
ongoing research, especially with regards to shale gas development, 
which would increase the certainty of my results. Especially useful would 
be to see how implementing some of my recommendations affect the 
outcomes of future conservation-relevant activities. For instance, a 
comparison of development using 1) standard practices versus 2) Bungee 
versus 3) rules of thumb could strengthen the case for informed spatial 
planning I undertook. In addition, examining long time series of the 
effects of additional data on spatial priorities would inform the generality 
of my Chapter 1 results. Testing my assumptions about market 
dynamics and developer behavior in Chapter 4 in the lab using human 
subjects would inform the cost effectiveness of cap and trade for shale 
gas (Cason & Gangadharan 2003). 
One question my dissertation raises is what should be the balance of 
regulated versus voluntary reduction of environmental impacts from 
shale gas development. On one hand, the primary goal of creating 
Bungee is to provide a tool for the gas industry to incorporate 
environmental priorities in their planning at low or no cost and minimal 
effort to them. Currently there are few strong incentives for the industry 
to go above and beyond regulation using Bungee. Namely, the main 
incentives I have identified are 1) to promote an environmentally friendly 
image, 2) to adhere to a personal or mission-based conservation ethic, 
and 3) to reveal the financial bottom-line (pers. obs.). Those incentives 
are probably overwhelmed by more certain financial incentives. However, 
pressure from society to be green may change that. On the other hand, 
new regulations can create incentives, e.g. by creating a market for 
impacts. However, there are many issues with creating new regulations. 
New regulations require administration, research, and infrastructure, all 
of which can be costly (Stavins 1995; Falconer, Dupraz & Whitby 2001; 
Joshi, Krishnan & Lave 2001). Poorly designed regulations can create 
moral hazards in which developers are incentivized to harm the 
environment more (Ozanne, Hogan & Colman 2001). Lastly, new 
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regulations that internalize environmental externalities will be politically 
controversial and thus harder to institute. Though my dissertation does 
not inform the feasibility of reducing impacts voluntarily versus through 
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